Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

452. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv,December 12, 1955—8 p.m.

597. When talking this morning to Tekoah, in charge armistice affairs Foreign Ministry, he gave me the same official version last night’s action against Syria as reported Embassy telegram 592.² I replied that an action of this magnitude could not be planned and placed in operation over night; that the alleged incident had not been serious and that Lake Tiberias situation had been less troublesome this year than last. I did not accept the Israel explanation of last night’s aggression and doubted whether world opinion would. Tekoah then said that the action was more of a preventive than punitive nature. With the fishing season beginning it was necessary to teach the Syrians that they could not interfere with Israel activities on the lake. I replied that opinion abroad would regard the action taken and casualties inflicted as disproportionate to the objective he had mentioned. In a subsequent conversation with Herzog I reminded him of our talk last week when I ventured the opinion that the worst thing Israel could do at this juncture was to stir up trouble with any of its northern neighbors and he had expressed himself as being in full agreement with this view.

Comment: Although the official GOI explanation is adequate to justify last night’s action to the Israel public, already conditioned by prolonged detention Israeli prisoners in Damascus (Embassy telegram 403³) and statement by Amer that Egypt and Syria ready to open war against Israel (Embassy telegram 559⁴), it neither explains nor justifies timing or magnitude Israel operation. Coming on the eve of US decision re arms availability for Israel this operation is explicable only as (a) a first class Israel blunder or, (b) a decision by GOI “to GOI alone [go it] alone” dealing with the Arabs. It is known that GOI has been apprehensive about efforts to complete its encirclement by bringing Lebanon and possibly Jordan into network of alliances directed from Cairo (Embassy despatch 387⁵). It is possible that Israel wants a showdown on the Syro-Egyptian military pact at this time either to prove to Syria and the other Arabs States that Nasser cannot be relied on for assistance or, if he does respond in the south, to deal him a telling blow.

I am dining with Walter Eytan, Director General of the Foreign Ministry, tomorrow evening. If there are any representations which Department desires me to make beyond those already set forth above, please instruct.

White

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/12–1255. Secret; Priority. Received at 4:30 p.m., December 13. Repeated to Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, London, and Paris.
2. Dated December 12; not printed. (Ibid.)
3. Dated October 24, not printed. (Ibid., 683.84A/10–2455)
4. In telegram 559, November 30,Lawson catalogued a series of recent press despatches that had served to intensify Israeli concern with their “‘survival’ problem.” Among these was a statement attributed to Amer that “Egypt and Syria are ready to open wars of liberation against Israel moment public opinion in both countries demands it.” (Ibid., 784A.5/11–3055)
5. In despatch 387, December 12, the Embassy in Tel Aviv informed the Department of State that on December 7 Israel’s government-controlled radio station, Kol Israel, broadcast a warning to Lebanon to avoid involvement with Syria in a military pact. (Ibid., 780.5/12–1255)