Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

40. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv,March 4, 1955—8 p.m.

754. Re Embtel 743, March 3 [1].² At private luncheon with Prime Minister today I found him more relaxed and calm than at any time since my arrival in Israel. Although last night he had given important foreign policy review before Knesset he showed little tenseness over that experience and more significantly I believe, reflected no serious compunction over Gaza strip event.

The sole subject of discussion which produced luncheon invitation appeared to be the Turkey–Iraq pact. In that connection he immediately drew attention to his Knesset speech on subject and responsibilities on US deriving from American policy in Middle East which supports pact. He repeated in general the principal points reported Embtel 753³ but underscored US responsibilities. He said exchange of letters between Iraq and Turkey amending pact⁴ came as surprise as he had received definite assurances . . . there would be no statement in pact referring to UN resolutions. This was most important objection of Israel to original communiqué on pact.

. . . . . . .

Sharett admitted quite frankly that terms of exchange of letters not likely to be put into practical effect. He said, “This would mean a bloody war and there is not going to be a bloody war.” Nevertheless, he said, the psychological effect on the Arab world is tremendous. Fact that Turkey endorses anti-Israel policies of Iraq must give tremendous boost to Arab anti-Israel campaign and attitude. His remarks in this field followed closely those reported by Embassy and in fact he implied desire that his main points Knesset speech be transmitted to Department.

In reply to my direct inquiry he admitted that pact had brought deterioration in Israel public attitude towards the US although there had been no change in Israeli foreign policy with regard to US as result of pact. It merely meant, he said, that Israel’s isolation and exclusion from Middle East defense system became more highly emphasized in minds of people and government and that latter felt more strongly, “that it recognizes its contractual responsibilities with regard to the defense of the state”.

Also in response to my direct inquiry as to whether pact had altered Israel’s foreign relations policy with regard to Arab states and in fact changed government’s recent past policy of moderation, he replied in the negative. In this connection, he introduced, and apparently without premeditation, the Gaza strip incident and told me emphatically that there was no direct connection between the pact signing and the incident. As he put it, the direct reflection of the signing of the pact occurred in the field of public opinion which universally supported the Gaza strip action of Israel’s military forces but was is no way the actuating instrument.

I then inquired directly whether timing factor had been involved and if so, why had the Gaza incident taken place at this particular time. He showed amazement that there should be any suggestion of timing of the incident and then engaged in a discussion of the final factors which led up to the high pressure for action under which the IDF had recently been existing. The principal reason being in his terms the fact that, “We have definitely traced recent act of sabotage, espionage and murder to the Egyptian Government Intelligence center at Gaza.” (It is interesting to note that at no time in discussing this subject did he claim that the incident was retaliatory in nature following Egyptian military attacks upon Israel military forces, as has been claimed by IDF.) He seemed to be placing the basis of the action on an “explosion which had to come after a build-up of tension and might have occurred at any time.” Throughout this discussion of this dramatic incident he showed one [none?] of the usual emphatic and over-tense treatment of the subject.

I then asked him, also directly, whether the Gaza strip incident was indicative of a change in policy and was in fact the embarkation on a more activist policy, or whether the fact moderation policy which he had been fostering would continue. He told me that there was definitely no change in policy in that respect. He admitted that his efforts to encourage the policy of moderation were not now so effective and it was more difficult for him than in the past to follow this line, but that in principle there had been no change insofar as he was concerned. He described the incident, “as merely an episode—an episode which could occur again but which we hope will not have to recur.” In subsequent discussion he again referred to the Gaza strip incident as an “episode”. He admitted that the incident had been carried somewhat further than originally intended and that there were considerably more casualties than had ever been anticipated. This he ascribed to the high pitch of tension under which the military forces operated.

I then spoke of the rather popular impression in certain quarters and what appeared to be rather logical under the circumstances, that is, that the incident was co-incident with the return of Ben Gurion to the government, and thus was indicative of the beginning of a less moderate policy as result of his return to the government. This he denied strongly but he did make this somewhat ambiguous statement, “I am not saying that this incident would not have occurred had Ben Gurion been outside the government but it could have occurred just as easily.Ben Gurion and I are in complete accord.” He then made it a point of suggesting that I might call on Ben Gurion at the Ministry of Defense in Tel Aviv especially since Ben Gurion had invited me to visit him some weeks ago. I gathered from this suggestion that BG might be able to support and explain the governments actions and policies under present conditions as Sharett himself had endeavored to explain them to me. Just before I left after lunch he again assured me that the return of Ben Gurion to the government has had no effect on the government’s foreign policy.

In discussing the detrimental psychological effects of the Turkish-Iraq pact to Israel’s position, the Prime Minister expressed the opinion that [garble] obvious fear of Arab and especially Iraq’s reaction to a Turkish-Israel trade agreement conference, also put Turkey in an unfavorable and weakened position with regard to Iraq. This would greatly encourage Arab action against Israel. . . .

Embassy comment: It seems likely that Prime Minister was presenting GOI cases in light in which he desired USG to regard them. While not acceptable as presented, complete evaluation will involve consideration many factors and Embassy will present considered comments as soon as possible.

Lawson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–455. Confidential; Priority. Received at 10:40 a.m. Repeated to Cairo, Amman, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Jidda, London, and Paris.
2. Document 37.
3. Dated March 2, it reported remarks on the Turco-Iraqi Pact which Sharett had made that day in the Knesset. (Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/3–355)
4. In letters exchanged at the conclusion of the Turco-Iraqi Pact on February 24, Prime Ministers Nuri al-Said and Menderes pledged close collaboration to repulse aggression against either country and to secure the implementation of all U.N. resolutions pertaining to Palestine and forming the basis of the Arab position vis-à-vis Israel.