Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

41. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv,March 4, 1955—8 p.m.

757. Re recent Cabinet change and return of Ben Gurion to direct participation in government (Embtel 698²), Gaza incident (Embtel 737³), and my talk with Prime Minister Sharett March 3 (Embtel 754⁴).

Embassy’s current appraisal portent of events follows: Consensus is that Gaza incident was the result of a Cabinet decision (probably Sunday, February 28) and attack had full government approval. It was not only carefully planned, timed, and executed, but full consideration was given to resultant impact. Objective use officially determined and force necessary for success of operation carefully chosen.

Prime Minister’s statement to me that incident had been carried somewhat further than originally intended, seems proof of government planning even though action may have been more “successful” than originally conceived.Sharett’s statement he and Ben Gurion were in complete accord, reinforces belief that action was result of Cabinet decision, despite fact above assertion was included in an ambiguous statement to me suggesting incident could have occurred even if Ben Gurion had not been in government.

I understood Sharett’s explanation that Gaza action did not represent any change in policy toward Arab States, but was simply an “episode” which could happen again but he hoped would not, designed to convince me that this was not to be a continuing policy. On the other hand, it was obvious that he was leaving matter open, that the Israel Government was maintaining its right to freedom of action and that there was no real assurance that there has not, in fact, been a change in policy.

Israel motives, as reconstructed by Embassy, probably included:

(1) On international front, attack designed to show UN, US and Great Britain that Israel Government was reaching the end of its rope in following policy of moderation. The signing of Turco-Iraq pact had left it isolated in the area; it felt a sense of frustration because its views were being ignored in the west’s long-term planning; its relative strength vis-à-vis the Arab world was about to suffer; time was running against Israel; there was need to regain initiative and to set stage dramatically in Security Council for reconsideration ofBat Galim and other matters by broadening of issue. Israel Government, therefore, felt it had to respond to [by] showing world that it would not hesitate to meet “its contractual responsibilities to the defense of the state” as Sharett told me.

(2) As for Arabs, the action seems to have been designed to show once again Israel’s belief that only way to make Arabs come to terms is through force and that Israel is ready to return to a more openly “get tough” policy if Arabs make the mistake of interpreting past restraint as sign of weakness.

(3) On domestic front,IG knew that move would be popular in all sectors and quell criticism of government in some; among border settlers it would serve to calm increasing nervousness and assure them of government concern for their safety; it would serve to strengthen the Mapai party position which had suffered by recent Cabinet crisis; it was an effective pre-election move.

The influence of Ben Gurion in the government, his dynamism and his response to public opinion are reflected in the action taken and the foregoing analysis of probable Israel motives. Even Sharett has admitted this indirectly by telling me that in principal there has been no change in the moderation policy he had been fostering “insofar as he was concerned”, but that his efforts to encourage it were not now so effective and it was more difficult than in the past for him to follow this line. His statement to me that, “Ben Gurion and I are in complete accord” might well mean that he now agrees with Ben Gurion’s tougher attitude.

The choice of Egypt as a target may have been based on the following considerations:

(a) As the strongest of the Arab states, it was the most suitable target for a devastating raid which would lower the prestige of its army in the eyes of the Arab world.

(b) FollowingBat Galim case, Cairo trial and spy executions there was a popular demand to do something to Egypt.

(c) Egypt’s claim that the state of belligerency with Israel still exists offered good excuse to take limited military action to show Egypt what the implication of that claim meant.

(d) Egypt’s refusal to comply with UN resolution of freedom of passage through Suez Canal⁵ is the most damaging of all Arab economic boycott measures and the one which Israel wants most to eliminate. If the Arabs applied economic boycott measures without restraint and indulged in cold-war propaganda without curb, Israel would show Egypt and the Arab world that it could use the weapon best suited to its purpose, armed force.

Lawson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/2–455. Secret;Niact. Received at 6:58 a.m., March 5. Repeated to Cairo, Amman, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Jidda, London, and Paris. Repeated niact to USUN.
2. The Embassy in Tel Aviv notified the Department on February 18 that the Israeli Government the preceding evening, February 17, had announced Lavon’s resignation as Minister of Defense, and that he had been replaced by Ben-Gurion, whose appointment “had not been anticipated.” (Ibid., 784A.5/2–1855)
3. See footnote 2, Document 33.
4. Supra.
5. Reference is to the U.N. Security Council resolution adopted on September 1, 1951. (U.N. doc.S/2322)