Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

353. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State¹

Paris,October 25, 1955—10 p.m.

Dulte 10. Eyes only Hoover from Secretary. Follows text of message from Eden to Bulganin October 20, left with Secretary by Macmillan October 21:

Begin verbatim text. “Thank you for your telegram of October 11² in which you replied to the message I had sent you about the supply of arms to Egypt.³

The purpose of my message was to draw your attention to the risks to peace which must flow from the supply of armaments to Egypt and Israel on a considerable scale. My present information suggests that the contemplated scale of deliveries to Egypt is very large. If fully carried out, these deliveries are sufficient to destroy any hope that an arms race between Egypt and Israel can be avoided. I cannot accept the view that because the contract is said to be without political conditions it therefore cannot lead to an arms race or to a breach of the peace.

I also find myself obliged to point out that, contrary to what is stated in Your Excellency’s message, Her Majesty’s Government have not imposed political conditions for the supply of arms to Egypt.

We have tried to keep deliveries to both sides within limited proportions with the sole purpose of preventing an increase in tension. The sales of arms which have been authorized in recent years, both to Egypt and to Israel, for legitimate purposes of self-defence, have been made on a commercial basis and without political conditions of any sort. Allow me also to point out that my message to Your Excellency did not contain any accusation to the effect that Egypt is not interested—or is less interested than other states in the area—in securing peace.

I am glad to note your statement that the Soviet Government share our concern for lessening tension between Egypt and Israel. Her Majesty’s Government are no less anxious than the Soviet Government that all states in this area should be sure of the inviolability of their rights and national interests. They cannot agree, however, that these purposes will be served by the consignment to one party to the dispute of very large quantities of armaments. I cannot emphasise too strongly the dangerous consequences of such deliveries both in the area itself and in the general context of world tension.

I agree that joint success in solving the wider question of a general reduction of armaments would also be of great importance. But this does not absolve us from the duty of reducing the danger of war between these two countries, with all the unforeseeable consequences which that could involve.”

Aldrich has seen in Paris.End verbatim text.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/10–2555. Secret; Priority. Received at 6:34 p.m. Repeated to Moscow and London.
2. Bulganin enclosed the text of his message of October 11 to Eden in his reply of October 20 to Eisenhower. See Document 349.
3. Reference is to Eden’s message of October 4 to Bulganin, which Bulganin received on October 5. For further information concerning the contents of Eden’s message, see Document 324.