Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

202. Letter From the Secretary of State to the President¹

Washington,August 19, 1955.

Dear Mr. President: I am sending you separately the “Alpha” statement which I propose to make with reference to the Near East.² This is along the lines we have previously discussed and is, I understand, concurred in by the UK which will plan to issue a public statement of concurrence immediately following my own statement.

The section about boundaries we have decided to generalize rather than to touch on concrete and extremely sensitive subjects such as the access of Egypt to Saudi Arabia and Jordan through Neguib, the road from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and so forth.

We plan, subject to British concurrence expected shortly, to make the statement in New York before the Council on Foreign Relations next Friday evening.

We have accelerated somewhat the program for a number of reasons. The first is that momentarily at least Colonel Nasser seems more friendly and more sympathetic to such a project, although his ambitions in relation to the Neguib are much exaggerated.

The second is that Johnston’s project which I had given the right of way now has taken a bad turn because the Arab States have apparently decided not to deal with him directly but through the Arab League, and while Johnston is still going out to push on his project, it now seems less likely that he can carry it through as an independent effort. He has withdrawn his prior plea to me not to announce this project until he had a further round of his own.

In the third place, while at the moment there is relative tranquillity, events could happen in terms of a Soviet-Arab rapprochement so that we would have to back Israel much more strongly and drop our role of impartiality.

If “Alpha” is to be done at all, it should be done while we can speak as the friend of both.

As you know, we anticipate that the initial reaction of both sides will be negative. The Arabs do not really want to have peace with Israel, and Israel does not want to consider any boundary adjustments. Rather it wants first of all a security treaty with the United States. I believe, however, that the presentation will come to command a serious hearing and that at least it represents a positive effort by the United States to deal with this question. We need to make such an effort before the situation gets involved in 1956 politics.

Both Nixon and Herb Brownell have looked over the statement and think it is tolerable from a political standpoint.

I expect to have it shown in advance to a few of the Congressional leaders, Republican and Democrat.

The text, which was originally worked out in London, has been cabled back to them so that they can take note of some minor changes which have been made.

I would appreciate knowing whether you authorize me to make the presentation, which, as you will note, contains the statement that “I speak in this matter with the authority of the President.”

I would appreciate as early a reply as is practical because we want to have the statement translated into both Yiddish and Arabic and in the hands of all our Near East posts before I speak.³

Faithfully yours,

Foster

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File,Dulles–Herter Series. Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted by Dulles, according to a copy in Department of State,S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 6.

2. The draft statement, headed “#2, 8/19/55,” was sent as an attachment to the letter. It differed most significantly from the July 15 draft (Enclosure 2 to Document 169) in Section III, which reads as follows:

   “If there is to be a guarantee of borders, it would be normal that there should be prior agreement upon what the borders are. That is the third major problem. The existing lines separating Israel from the Arab states were fixed by the Armistice Agreements of 1949. They were not designed to be permanent frontiers in every respect; in part at least, they reflected the status of the fighting at the moment.

   “To draw permanent boundaries which could be guaranteed is primarily a task for those who represent the people who are in contact with each other and who have to live on one side or the other of the boundaries. The task is admittedly one of difficulty. There is no single and sure guide, for each of two conflicting claims may seem to have much merit. The difficulty is increased by the fact that even territory which is barren has acquired a sentimental significance. However, the overall advantages of the measures here outlined would seem to outweigh vastly the net disadvantages of the adjustments needed to convert armistice lines of danger into boundary lines of safety.”

3. The President called Dulles at 10:50 a.m. on Monday, August 22. According to Phyllis D. Bernau’s memorandum of this conversation, “On Alpha, the Pres. said he does not see anything wrong with it.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers,White House Telephone Conversations)