Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

165. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo,July 20, 1955—noon.

104. As recommendations mytel 10, July 2,² were made only after consideration of dilemma described Deptel 127,³ I find it impossible, in light of what I understand to be basic United States objectives in this part of world to alter my previous strong recommendation that we attempt to meet expeditiously and without substantial reduction Egypt’s requirements as listed Embtel 11.⁴

While of course Department at present confronted many issues of overriding importance feel I have apparently not been able adequately communicate consequences of foreign policy in ME area which I believe would follow if we deny Egypt’s request. It seems to me that United States security interests that area require us in our own interests to meet Nasser’s request in order prevent GOE from concluding that there is virtually no prospect of fruitful cooperation with the United States in any of the most important foreign issues currently confronting Egypt. If convinced United States indifferent to Egypt’s military position and that we in fact may have objective keeping Egypt in relatively weak position vis-à-vis Israel,GOE in all probability will then wish carefully reexplore possibilities of cooperation with Soviet bloc, including the question of arms procurement. Effect of Egypt’s decision would not be confined Egypt alone. While of course cannot be certain course this reexamination will take and relaxing tension along border might stay Egypt’s hand, all evidence we have points to fact that Egypt will most probably accept Russian offer of arms. These purchases may be substantial as payment acceptable in cotton which Egypt otherwise unable dispose of.

We may not like to be faced with this type of situation as factor in making up our mind whether Egypt should be able buy arms from United States but fact is we are so faced. Certainly it seems to me we should be prepared avoid such consequences as long as we can conscientiously say arms we provide are not upsetting balance and fall within the defensive requirements envisaged by tripartite declaration. Am not recommending going beyond this point as this would in fact be getting into arms race in area which tripartite declaration of course opposes. The point is, however, once Russian arms begin to enter this area on side of Arabs the West will have lost control and the arms race will be on as we certainly would not be in a position under those circumstances to deny Israeli requests for more arms irrespective of the consequences to our relations with the Arab States. Consequence GOE reliance on Russian arms would not be limited to arms race but very possibly would open Egypt Soviet penetration all spheres with considerable influence other Arab States.

I hope Department can send me as soon as possible cost and availability data re items on Nasser’s list. When final Egyptian decision has been made as to items required (and in this decision GOE’s limited foreign currency holdings will probably play important part), Department will then be in better position review Israeli requests on basis of relative military capabilities.

Department of course must weigh all aspects prior to decision, but for my part I cannot entirely forget that it was Israeli action that initially started build up of tension at Gaza that has resulted in GOE decision purchase more armament. Nor can I ignore in my thinking fact that even if GOE decided purchase entire list Egypt’s position would still remain relatively weak as compared to Israel. Under these conditions it would seem to me that a decision which would not permit Egypt to purchase arms in the United States (or specify that Israeli purchases should be equal purchases by Egypt) would hardly be consistent with policy of impartiality we have tried so hard to establish and maintain over past three years.

Byroade

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/7–2055. Top Secret; Priority; Received at 1:26 p.m.
2. Document 143.
3. Telegram 127, July 18, informed Byroade that “favorable action on Egyptian request will place us under strong pressure grant Israel permission purchase similar quantity comparable equipment.” It asked Byroade whether, in view of this, he would still recommend favorable action on the Egyptian request or if a “substantial reduction in Egyptian list and correspondingly smaller sale to Israel” would be advisable? (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/7–1455)
4. Document 160.