Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

133. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv,June 18, 1955—6 p.m.

1069. At Prime Minister’s request that I call at his residence in Jerusalem today (Shabot) on an urgent matter I visited him at twelve noon. He was considerably agitated saying “yesterday was a day of shock.” He referred to Lodge’s proposed meeting of SC in San Francisco for purpose of discussing (as Prime Minister termed it) the Gaza strip situation.

Sharett was visibly upset for fear that meeting was being called on basis of rumor that “Israel has massed troops and arms on Gaza border with intention of making aggressive move into Gaza, probably during UN meeting in San Francisco.” He said this was fantastic story which he feared may have been sold to Lodge and other SC members by Arabs. He was afraid that SC meeting might well result in “Israel being hauled before bar on a completely false charge—that whatever resolution came out of meeting the edge of sword would be aimed toward Israel to its unfair disadvantage.” He wished to place this matter immediately before me denying categorically veracity of story and requested that I inform Department without delay. This I agreed to do.

In exchange of comment, I made following points:

1. He should be certain that IDF was not in any possible way vulnerable to charge. He assured me that it was not and that there was no plan whatever for aggressive use of arms on border.

2. That I felt sure that SC would not condemn Israel unjustly on basis of unconfirmed rumor—this seemed to me axiomatic; but in view of situation, admitting that border had been relatively quiet for several weeks, there were several unsettled problems which General Burns was trying to solve and thus a firm resolution calling attention of both Egypt and Israel to March 30 resolution of SC would seem a reasonable action. After some argument, he admitted logic involved but said most important incomplete item was failure of Egypt to follow UN instructions to carry out high level talks despite continued pressure by General Burns, the US and UK. In this connection, he said General Burns told him yesterday there was still no agreement by Egypt but that Gohar was taking to NasserBurns’ arguments for talks at a level higher than Gohar,² and a reply was expected Monday June 20. Therefore, he thought it might be effective if US again urged Nasser to accede to such a program and should make approach now to coincide with Nasser’s consideration of Burns’ recommendations. I informed him I would pass on his suggestion to the Department.

3. That it was common knowledge that IDF had long been in a position to defend itself on border but I had seen no evidence of a recent build up of military strength in that area for an aggression to coincide with UN meeting in San Francisco. (He gave me impression that Lodge’s proposal may have stemmed from Embassy reports although he did not make direct charge. He did remark “I am confident that had you believed situation described to be true, you would have come to me and asked for confirmation.” In any event, he made it clear that he did not want Israel to be charged with threatening aggressive action, referring again to substantial period of time without incident on border.)

In subsequent comment, he thought any SC action at this time would conflict with efforts now being made by Burns to solve outstanding problems and would come just at time Israel had come out with its firm proposals for reducing border tension (see immediately following telegram³), which proposals would form part of agenda for proposed Israel–Egypt talks. He thought that SC action should be postponed until these efforts were exhausted, especially in view of border quietness.Comment: Although Embassy agrees with Sharett to extent he was speaking of absence of large-scale mobilization, evidence available indicates recent active maneuvers in Negev area. As reported Embtel 1067,⁴ Embassy believes immediate crisis has passed, due largely three weeks period without Israel casualties along border and apparent willingness to await results Burns negotiations.

Lawson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–1855. Secret;Niact. Received at 6:10 p.m. Repeated priority to Cairo and London. Repeated on June 20 to San Francisco for Ambassador Lodge. (Ibid., 674.84A/6–2055)
2. Burns met with Gohar on June 16. Telegram 365 from Jerusalem, June 18, reported Burns’ account of the meeting, as he had described it to Cole. (Ibid., 674.84A/ 6–1855)
3. Infra.
4. In telegram 1067, June 18, the Embassy in Tel Aviv reported that the U.S. Army Attaché had concluded that the Israeli troop movements in the northern Negev were nothing other than large-scale maneuvers. Although the Embassy recognized that the Israelis could use such exercises as a springboard for military action, it had concluded that the evidence available indicated that the Israeli Cabinet had taken no decision at that time to permit large-scale military action against the Egyptians. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–1855)