132. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
1928.Nasser asked me last night if I had received decision on principle of whether Egypt could purchase arms in U.S. I replied I had not and pointed out that he must realize his request had had to be put to Washington in most unfortunate light.
In long discussion which followed,Nasser made clear that he was still aware of long range disadvantages of Soviet arms aid. However, partly for morale effect in army and partly for security of Egypt, he still felt desperate need to obtain additional supplies of military equipment which would continue in event of trouble and therefore still seemed discount unfavorable impression acceptance Soviet arms would make.
He also tended discount effect Soviet aid would have within Egypt itself. For example, he insisted he could make deal whereby no Russians were allowed inside Egypt and under which no signed agreement would be necessary. I told him effects would come later and in form he would not like. In my opinion Egypt was important target for USSR. Soviets probably would ask nothing more initially than show of real neutrality and be content with effect that would have upon Middle East as a whole. Second phase would come later when he might find himself incapable of coping with it. He replied he felt communism in Egypt could be controlled and asked if I knew of his action a few hours earlier in jailing Communist leaders. I said I did not but history was full of examples of leaders who felt they could play only so far with Communist and then cut off relationships.
During discussion Nasser retreated somewhat from his previous categorical statement that he intended obtain arms from USSR. (We know that he has held up dispatch of mission to Moscow.)
He asked me several times what I thought answer from Washington would be. I told him I did not know but I thought he had presented his request in most difficult form possible by seeking decision in principle without giving ideas as to items or quantity. Department alone could not decide this question and military certainly would be unable consider such a vague request.
Hope Department will give most careful consideration to reply which I am to make to Nasser. Point at issue in my opinion is not whether Nasser can persuade West to supply arms failing which he [Page 256] will turn to USSR—in fact believe decision should be based upon other factors pushing possible USSR deal aside. I believe Nasser feels he is posing test of U.S. good faith and intentions toward Egypt in its current concern regarding Israel. Therefore present issue is whether as matter of principle Egypt is or is not barred from purchasing military equipment in U.S. If at this time we give Nasser answer that as matter of principle Egypt is denied right of purchase of arms in U.S., believe we shall be very long time getting over effect that will be created. Regardless of facts of past history this matter, Egyptian officers (Nasser included) generally believe it has been impossible for Egypt purchase arms in U.S. If at this time of urgent need, as they see it, when we both know Egypt is far weaker than Israel, we turn Egypt down on question of principle,Nasser and his supporters will not soon forget our action which they will interpret as being totally partial to Israel.
I therefore recommend Department authorize me reply that U.S. has no policy which would bar Egypt from purchasing equipment. It seems to me unnecessary to go beyond this statement unless and until Nasser is prepared specify requirements in practical terms. As Egyptian financial resources are obviously limited, I would expect that in any event Egyptian purchases of equipment could not be large.
Nasser has said that he wishes me to inform him as soon as I receive Department’s views.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–1755. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 1:26 a.m., June 18.↩
- The Department, in telegram 2214 to Cairo, June 17, authorized Byroade to inform Nasser that Egypt was eligible to purchase arms in the United States under the terms of the Mutual Defense Assistance Understanding of December 1952, that the United States would consider any request solely on its merits and within the framework of the principles embodied in the Tripartite Declaration, and that it would consider sympathetically those requests that involved reasonable expenditures. (Ibid., 474.008/6–1755)↩