130. Memorandum for the Files, by Oliver L. Troxel, Jr., of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs1
SUBJECT
- Briefing of Ambassador Eric Johnston on Alpha
Mr.Francis Russell called on Ambassador Eric Johnston at the Motion Picture Association, 9:15 a.m., June 17, 1955 to brief Mr.Johnston as to the Department’s current thinking on Near Eastern problems. I was the only other person present.
After a brief discussion of recent events in the area, particularly the increased tension between Israel and Egypt along the Gaza strip, Mr.Russell commented that the Department had, as Mr.Johnston knew, been examining for some time a number of possible means to end the unsatisfactory situation that existed in the Near East. Since about last August, members of the Department’s staff had been considering various aspects of the problem, he said, always with the understanding that no steps should be taken which would interfere with Mr.Johnston’s negotiations. He pointed out that the Secretary and Mr.Allen had both been careful in all their discussions with the Israelis to state that the settlement of the water issue should precede consideration of other major steps, which the U.S. might take respecting the area. He added that he had been asked a few months ago by the Secretary to assist in pulling together the elements of a possible settlement, for inclusion in a public statement on the Near Eastern question, and that he had been in consultation with the British on the matter.
Ambassador Johnston asked what the current thinking was as to the components of a settlement. Mr.Russell replied that, while the [Page 252] details were still under consideration, certain principles must clearly be a part of any settlement. The difficult day-to-day friction between Israel and the Arab states occurred along the borders and, as Ambassador Johnston knew, Israel had been pressing for a security guarantee of its boundaries. The United States obviously could not participate in any guarantee of boundaries, however, unless these were defined. Thus, a settlement of the border question was an essential part of any general settlement.
The Palestine refugee problem, was another major source of area tension; hence the special attention given to Jordan Valley development through Ambassador Johnston’s negotiations. In a general settlement, further steps would be necessary to settle the claims of the refugees for property now in Israel hands, so arrangements for the payment of compensation would also be required. In response to questions by Ambassador Johnston, Mr.Russell confirmed that a resolution of the Jerusalem issue was envisaged as a part of the settlement, and that the Department was thinking in terms of treaty arrangements between the United States and each interested Near Eastern nation.
Ambassador Johnston said that he would like to express his views on the subject, as one who had been in close contact with the area, even though the Department had already doubtless considered the ideas he had in mind. He then explained that a reaffirmation and strengthening of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 for a specific period of time would, in his view, help to lessen area tensions and provide a period in which a more comprehensive settlement could be reached. Mr.Russell said that there were two considerations which raised doubt as to the value of using the Tripartite Declaration. First, the Israelis had already informed us that no such action would meet their needs; they wanted a document which would bear their signature as well as that of the U.S. Second, it is very likely that a situation would arise where the peace of the area would be seriously disturbed but where it would be impossible to ascertain with certainty which side was at fault. It would then be difficult for the United States to know what steps should be taken. When Mr.Johnston commented that the latter would be true even in the case of a treaty, Mr.Russell agreed that a problem existed but pointed out that the obligations would be assumed in the latter case only after a number of steps had been taken to reduce tension—thus decreasing the possibility that any sanctions need be applied.
Mr.Johnston contended that a basic difficulty would still not be overcome. He said that it would take a long time under the most favorable conditions to develop the proposed treaty arrangements— eighteen months would, he said, be a conservative estimate even if the negotiations were to follow a successful resolution of the water [Page 253] issue. Meanwhile, he asked, how would tensions be relieved if an interim step is not taken to stabilize the situation. Mr.Russell replied that there was considerable doubt whether the U.S. would find itself willing to become further involved in the area until after it was assured that the steps he had mentioned had been taken. Mr.Johnston felt, however, that the U.S. would necessarily be involved in any major eruption in the area, regardless of the formal position, and that to refrain from strengthening the Tripartite commitment would only leave people in doubt as to our intentions and exacerbate the present unsatisfactory position. He added that by placing a time limit on the Tripartite reaffirmation, pressure could be placed on the parties to come to a more general agreement.
Mr.Johnston told Mr.Russell that he would very much appreciate having an opportunity to discuss the entire question with the Secretary and Mr.Allen before any statement is made. Mr.Russell assured him that he would be kept informed and would pass on his desire for a full discussion of the problem.
- Source: Department of State,NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 254, Framework of the Fourth Mission—No. 19 (April 22, 1955). Top Secret. Drafted by Troxel on July 7.↩