129. Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, June 16, 19551
SUBJECT
- Palestine—Gaza
PARTICIPANTS
- Sir Pierson Dixon—UK
- Ambassador Hoppenot—France
- Ambassador Lodge—US
- Ambassador Wadsworth—US
- Mr. Barco—US
- Mr. Ramsbotham—UK
At the meeting of the Permanent Representatives it was agreed first that the President of the SC, Mr.Lodge, should let the press know that he had alerted the Secretariat to the possibility that a Security Council meeting might be necessary in San Francisco. It was also agreed that the President should not issue a statement to be quoted.
Sir Pierson Dixon felt that the question to be decided was (a) what should the three governments do if Israel attacked in the Gaza [Page 250] area, and (b) what the UN should do. Under (a) he felt that it was a question of what might be done to take preventive action. He said that the UK wanted joint action under the Three-Power Declaration of 1950.
Mr.Lodge pointed out the desirability of having UN action to back up any three-power initiative.
Ambassador Hoppenot said that he felt that the course of action in the Security Council in the event of serious trouble in the Gaza area should be (1) an immediate report from General Burns, (2) the issuance of a cease-fire by the SC, (3) a call by the SC for Israel to withdraw from the area occupied and (4) pressures on Israel to enforce compliance. Under (4), there were two aspects (a) should the terms of the pressures be fixed by the SC or (b) should it be left to the Members to choose what pressures they should apply?
Mr.Lodge pointed out that we, the US, would want to have the SC indicate the lines of action as much as possible. He agreed with Sir Pierson Dixon that it was not yet the time to think of intervention in the Palestine situation with troops. The possibility of aid to one of the countries concerned being cut off remained, but we would need as specific instructions from the SC as possible without, of course, having our hands tied. Ambassador Hoppenot suggested that this might be done by having the Council, if it met after an attack in the Gaza area, ask all Member States of the UN to “abstain from assistance to the aggressor”. He felt that this was something that the USSR could not veto. Mr.Lodge made clear and Hoppenot and Dixon agreed, that if such line were used it would leave open to Governments to cut off government aid, but that it should not imply that private aid should be cut off. It was also agreed that the Council should call upon countries in the area to exercise the greatest restraint to avoid an intervention by the other Arab states. It was also agreed that the Permanent Representatives should recommend to the Foreign Ministers that it would be desirable to tell the parties what we had in mind doing in the Security Council in the event of an attack. This might have a deterrent effect. The Permanent Representatives agreed that an attack by Israel would be a threat to the peace and would require action under Article 7.
Mr. Ramsbotham was requested to draw up a recommendation for the Foreign Ministers comprising the above points to be submitted after consulting with Mr.Wadsworth.
Mr. Ramsbotham drew up a statement based on the above and this was presented to the three principals at the end of their afternoon meeting.2 Mr.Macmillan questioned the wording of some [Page 251] of the paragraphs but was generally satisfied except that he reacted against the suggestion that SC action should include the call upon other states aimed at deterring other Arab intervention. Reason was not clearly given, but since meeting was then breaking up it was decided to postpone decision until morning session. M.Pinay and Secretary Dulles made no particular comment.
- Source: Department of State,UNP Files: Lot 58 D 224, Palestine. Secret. Drafted by Barco.↩
- No copy of the original draft statement has been found in Department of State files. For final text of the agreed statement, see Document 131.↩