Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

107. Draft Memorandum From Francis H. Russell to the Secretary of State¹

Washington,May 24, 1955.

SUBJ

• Launching Alpha

In anticipation of my commencing leave within a couple of weeks, I am putting down my ideas with respect to various ways that are open to us to launch the Alpha program, in the order in which I believe they should be considered.

1. Ambassador Byroade should be given another two or three weeks to see whether an opportunity arises in which to follow up on the discussions about a possible settlement which he had with Nasser and Fawzi before Nasser’s trip to Bandung.Byroade should be authorized to mention the possibility of a US contribution of $100 million to the High Aswan Dam (see my memo of May 18 attached, Tab A²).

2. If Byroade does not find an opportunity to raise Alpha with Nasser in the normal course of his talks, the President or the Secretary should send a letter to Nasser which Byroade would be authorized to use as a basis for soliciting Nasser’s cooperation in Alpha. The letter would acknowledge that the Gaza raids have made difficult an approach to settlement at this time but state that nevertheless Egypt would stand to gain much from taking the initiative. A draft of such a letter is attached (Tab B).

3. If Nos. 1 and 2 should not prove feasible or successful, an approach to Jordan should be made by the UK and the US. Although Jordan is handicapped by a weak government and by its weakness in relation to its sister Arab states, it has the largest stake of any Arab country in a settlement with Israel, and the British are in position to exert some pressure.

4. Failing in all of the above approaches, the US and the UK might publicly state their conviction that an equitable settlement of the Israel-Arab dispute is possible and make clear the contribution which the US and the UK are prepared to make to assist in such a settlement (a guarantee to both sides of the Israel-Arab border, financial assistance in dealing with the refugee problem, and economic aid—e.g., the High Aswan Dam). This could be done through a speech by the Secretary, the publishing of a joint démarche, or introducing a resolution in the UN. This approach should be used only as a last resort. At best, it would set up a set of specific objectives toward which the Western powers and the UN could exert their influence. At the least, it would provide an answer to Jewish pressure groups until Israel gave its assent to the main elements of such a settlement.

Tab B

DRAFT LETTER FROM PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO PRESIDENT NASSER³

My Dear Friend: I am asking Ambassador Byroade to discuss with you a matter of deep interest to me, that is, an accommodation between the Arab States and Israel. I am impressed by the yearning on the part of all of the peoples of the world for a period of tranquillity and a removal of the specter of armed conflict. The Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung, as well as recent events in Europe, reflect this universal feeling. The Bandung communiqué correctly noted the inter-dependence of freedom and peace and the correlation between peace and social and economic progress.

Turning specifically to the Near East, I detect a weariness at the existing impasse, a rejection of negativism, and an eagerness to find a positive forward policy. The record of your Government in espousing social and economic development and in solving troublesome international questions such as the Suez Base controversy leads me to the thought that Egypt might wish to assert area leadership by example and undertake the task of resolving the Arab-Israeli problem.

I recognize the difficulties in the way of any Arab-Israel settlement—the periodic border outbursts do not serve in any way to lessen them—but I am convinced that it is possible to reach agreements which will bring to all the nations concerned definite advantages over the existing situation. Besides removing the constant danger of a renewal of hostilities, an accommodation would give added impetus to social and economic programs which, as your Government has correctly diagnosed, are indispensable to progress and security. Countries of the Western world, including the United States, would find it easier to extend appropriate assistance which might be requested. Accordingly, I hope that it will be possible to work out with you proposals which subsequently may be discussed with other interested countries in the area. I understand that the present Prime Minister of Great Britain expressed to you similar thoughts during your discussions in January of this year.⁴

I am suggesting that you take the leadership in this matter because of my high respect for your achievements and reliance upon your statesmanship. It is my conviction that this problem will yield to our cooperative efforts as other difficult ones have done with results beneficial to all the peoples concerned.

I extend to you my personal best wishes and hopes for the continued progress of Egypt under your leadership.

1. Source: Department of State,NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc., April 26–June 30, ’55. Top Secret; Alpha. The source text bears the following handwritten notation: “Withdrawn per agreement of W[alter] K. S[cott]/Russell, 6/2. To be superceded by new memo. 6/2. R[obert] L. B[urns].” Attached was an uninitialed typewritten chit that conveyed the same information.
2. See the attachment to the memorandum of May 23 from Murphy,supra.
3. Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted by Russell on May 24.
4. Prime Minister Eden spoke with Nasser on February 20.