81. Memorandum of Discussion at the 267th Meeting of the National Security Council, Camp David, Maryland, November 21, 19551
[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and item 1, Allen Dulles’s briefing on significant world developments affecting U.S. security.]
2. Report by the Secretary of State
[Here follows Dulles’ report on the Foreign Ministers Meeting (printed in volume V, page 803) and on his trip to Spain and Yugoslavia.]
Lastly, Secretary Dulles said that he would touch on the problems of the Near East. In the main, our policies toward that area had been run from Washington by Under Secretary Hoover, although Secretary Dulles had likewise been involved while at Geneva.
Secretary Dulles expressed the view that there could be little doubt but that the Soviets had deliberately opened a new cold war front in the Near East. Molotov had been very evasive when the Secretary had questioned him on Soviet policy toward that area, and had kept insisting that the arms deal with Egypt was a simple commercial transaction from which no serious political repercussions were to be expected. It was obvious, continued Secretary Dulles, that the Soviet moves in the Near East confronted the West with a very grave situation. The loss of the oil of the Middle East would be almost catastrophic for the West. Moreover, Egypt was the gateway to Africa, the retention of which was so very important for us. If Europe were to lose Africa, little would be left of Europe in a short time. We needed to watch this situation very carefully. For some 25 years we had observed [Page 201] the Communists going to work to bring China under their control. We had done nothing about it until it was too late. We could not afford to repeat this mistake with regard to the Middle East or Africa.
Secretary Dulles then said he did not believe that the Arab governments were entirely happy over the prospect of possible future dependence on the USSR. It was obvious that they wanted to play off the West against the Soviet bloc, but if they were compelled to choose one or another, they wouldn’t be very happy to choose the Soviet bloc. On the other hand, they might be forced to make such a choice if the West became identified with Israel in active hostilities between Israel and the Arab States. The only solution that Secretary Dulles could perceive for the short-range problem was a general solution of the quarrel between the Israelis and the Arabs. Such a solution he believed by no means impossible. Our policies and those of the UK were pretty much alike, though Secretary Dulles expressed some distaste for Prime Minister Eden’s recent speech on the Near East situation.2 He said that Eden had tried to drag him into supporting this speech at the very last minute, but that he, Secretary Dulles, had bucked at full endorsement. After all, Secretary Dulles pointed out, his own speech of August 26 on this situation had been discussed for weeks in advance with the British and his proposals cleared with them before the speech was made.
Nevertheless, Secretary Dulles said that no significant cleavage between the U.S. and the UK on Near Eastern policy could be permitted. It was plain enough that the United Kingdom was trying very hard to swing support over to the side of the Arabs and to regain the lost British position with the Arab States. While this was understandable, it was simply impossible to ignore the position of the Israeli Government. If we did so the Israelis might move in such a way as to bring down the whole house.
This reminded Secretary Dulles that he had had a serious talk with Foreign Minister Sharett at the State Department this morning. Secretary Dulles had urged Sharett to remain calm and to avoid incidents involving the Arabs even if provocation existed. It had been a good talk. The Israelis had presented us with a large request for arms. Accordingly, in the course of his conversation Secretary Dulles had referred to the fact that the U.S., along with the UK, was setting up a group to exchange views on arms requests from Middle Eastern countries before any action was taken. Apropos of the Israeli-Arab situation [Page 202] as a whole, Secretary Dulles said that while he regarded it as extremely dangerous, it was not more so than other difficulties which we have encountered and surmounted.
Secretary Dulles then referred to the meeting which was occurring today of the representatives of the five Baghdad Pact powers. This was likewise a situation which needed careful watching. There was no doubt whatever that the Baghdad Pact worried the Soviet Union. The Soviets were genuinely concerned over the possibility that the United States might secure military bases in Iran. Accordingly, this game must be played very carefully. Half-way measures by the United States toward the Baghdad Pact might be worse than no measures at all. Secretary Dulles asked Mr. Anderson if the Planning Board was considering our general policy with respect to the Near East and to the Baghdad Pact. Mr. Anderson confirmed that earlier action by the Council had been restricted to the Arab-Israeli problem, and that the Planning Board was now preparing a general review of our Near Eastern policy as a whole.
Secretary Dulles then went on to remind the National Security Council that the concept of the so-called “northern tier” of Middle Eastern states had originally been his own concept. At the time that this concept had been accepted there was a general feeling that we could not hope to induce the Arab States south of this tier to join with it. This view had in fact been borne out by events. The United Kingdom, which had been initially skeptical of the northern tier concept, had now switched to strong support of it; indeed, they were supporting it now more strongly then perhaps was wise. The British were now putting all their money on Iraq. In any event, the situation needed most careful reappraisal, because the British are tending to run away with it. Secretary Dulles also reminded the Council that he had not been “too keen” on having Iran join the Baghdad Pact when that country had done so, although he had agreed to the move. However, he did not think that the Soviet arms offer to Egypt could be correctly described as the Soviet reaction to Iran’s joining the Baghdad Pact, because the beginnings of the arms deal were much earlier in time than the date when Iran actually joined the Baghdad Pact. Thus, while the arms deal might not be an act of Soviet retaliation, the Soviets may nevertheless pursue their Near Eastern policy with much greater vigor than they had in the past. While we could not let the British make our policy for us in this area, or follow the British line blindly, we should certainly cooperate with the British.
At this point the President interrupted to point out that Colonel Nasser had recently made a very odd statement to Pete Jones, to the effect that we should do well to remember that “the Russians did not come to me; I went to them.” This, said the President, indicated that Nasser felt obliged to secure the arms on the ground that otherwise his [Page 203] government would collapse. Secretary Dulles added that there was a measure of truth in Nasser’s reasoning. Nasser felt that he must hold his job. The Army was the key to holding the job, and the Army was demanding armament. Accordingly, there was no clear demonstration yet that Colonel Nasser actually proposed to turn his back on the West and cast his lot with the Soviet bloc. On the other hand, he may become involved in such a course if forces are unleashed that he was incapable of controlling.
[Here follows discussion of NATO; Fiscal Year 1957 programs for military assistance, economic aid, and foreign information; and U.S. military forces.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on November 22.↩
- Reference is to Prime Minister Eden’s Guildhall address on the Arab-Israeli dispute delivered at Mansion House on November 9. For text, see Frankland (ed.), Documents on International Affairs, 1955, pp. 382–385.↩