Office of the Historian

55. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 30, 19551

Washington, June 30, 1955

SUBJECT

  • Middle East Defense

PARTICIPANTS

  • Department of State
    • The Under Secretary (in part)
    • Mr. Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary (in part)
    • Mr. Jernegan, NEA
    • Mr. Mathews, S/P
    • Mr. Unger, EUR
    • Mr. Dixon, NEA
    • Mr. Burns, S/S–RO
  • Department of Defense
    • Deputy Secretary Anderson
    • Admiral Radford
    • Mr. Ernst, OSD
    • Colonel Powers, JCS Staff
[Page 128]

In preparation for the next session of the US-UK talks on Middle East Defense, scheduled for the latter part of the week beginning July 5, the following State-Defense positions were agreed upon concerning points raised by Ambassador Makins at the US-UK sessions June 23–24:

(1)

In view of the decision of the Secretary of State that the US is not at present in a position to formally associate itself with the Baghdad Pact, the US for the time being should establish liaison with, and coordinate its bilateral military assistance programs in the area with, the military planning organization to be set up under the Baghdad Pact. It was suggested this might be done through the US Military Attaché at Baghdad. If this procedure were followed, a senior US military officer might be assigned at Baghdad. At the same time, the Ambassador at Baghdad might be given responsibility for on-the-spot US relations with the Council of Ministers of the Baghdad Pact.

It was suggested that the US might establish, in Washington, a Middle East planning group to coordinate US bilateral military aid programs in the area with the activities undertaken by the organs set up under the Baghdad Pact. (It was noted that a telegram had just been received reporting a Pakistan Cabinet decision to adhere to the Pact, thus permitting the creation of the Pact’s Ministerial Council.)

(2)

The US should inform the UK that, while the US will not at the outset become a member of the Pact, it has the following suggestions regarding organizational procedures; the Council of Ministers might meet periodically; rather than having a joint planning staff established under the Pact, the Military Representatives of the Council members might meet periodically to coordinate their country plans and exchange views (SEATO model); a small secretariat might be established, but a command organization does not seem in order.

[Numbered paragraph 3 (2½ lines of source text) not declassified]

(4)
The US should inform the UK that it plans to continue its present policy of off-shore procurement of certain MDAP items in the UK for delivery to Iraq and Pakistan. The US should ask the UK to elaborate its need for information on the US military aid program in Pakistan and precisely the type of information it wishes.
(5)
The US favors Iranian adherence to the Baghdad Pact in due course.
(6)
Middle East Defense arrangements should be based on the Baghdad Pact.
(7)
US-UK consideration of the question of command structure in the Middle East should be left in abeyance.
(8)
In considering the need for infrastructure and stockpiling in the Middle East area, US bilateral military aid programs in the area should be recognized as representing the extent to which the US is presently prepared to contribute to the fulfilling of this need.
(9)
US bilateral military aid programs in the area should be recognized as the US contribution towards the fulfillment of the deficit in ground forces in the Middle East area.
(10)
The US realizes there are at present no sources, either within or outside of the area, of forces to fill the present air and naval deficits in the Middle East.

It was agreed that, prior to the next session of the US-UK talks, a brief memorandum should be sent to the President, outlining the background of the present US-UK discussions, pointing up the major points presented by the UK, and setting forth the recommended US position on Middle East Defense, A talking paper on this subject should also be prepared for the President, in the event Sir, Anthony Eden raises the matter at Geneva.2

  1. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 70, Near and Middle East. Top Secret. Drafted by Mathews.↩
  2. Reference is to the Heads of Government meeting at Geneva, July 18–23, attended by the heads of government of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. For documentation, see volume V.↩