Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

53. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

Beirut, June 25, 1955—2 p.m.

1373. In light of situation as seen from Beirut I submit following observations regarding suggested new approach to Nasser (Cairo telegram 1929 to Department):²

1. One of principal contributors to “great debate” on defense pacts is Egyptian press and radio. Much of wind would be taken out of debate if, Nasser and colleagues could be persuaded to take Byroade’s excellent advice and quit the field of Arab quarrels. Cannot readily understand Nasser’s contention that this would “separate him from Arab world” and lead to “Egypt’s being left alone with Israel.” As result recent Gaza tension we have seen that even in midst of Arab controversy and disunity Arab state with least reason to be helpful to Egypt, namely Iraq, is not only willing to cooperate with other Arab states in defending Egypt in event Israeli attack but also ready take initiative in organizing common effort.

2. Although we are not eager for states south of northern tier to join that arrangement and have not put pressure on them to do so, fact remains we have told Lebanese and others (Deptel 1072 repeated Cairo 1251)³ rear area states could assume role in relation to defense organization and that we hoped they would so act as to leave open possibility of their association with development defense organization in future. Lebanon at least, and I suspect others, probably still convinced that US would welcome additional Arab states joining Turco-Iraqi Pact. Feel certain Chamoun’s activity in favor of Pact based in part on that premise. For US now to encourage Egyptians in action effect of which would be to say that we do not believe other Arab states should join pact might only serve to confuse and perplex our friends regarding our aims and policies in Middle East. Such a step would reinforce impression already being propagated in area by Saudi, Egyptian and French sources that US may be “cooling off” toward Turco-Iraqi Pact. It might also weaken domestic position of some of staunchest friends of northern tier, such as Chamoun.

3. Have we reached point where we are prepared to say definitely that development and consolidation of northern tier arrangement will not require adherence in one form or another of some of rear area states to Turco-Iraqi Pact? Also might it not be unwise to take a firm position on this question until our own relationship to pact is settled? Were we to join pact, it would probably become more attractive to certain others. If in meantime we had persuaded Egypt to embark on suggested line of action, might we not risk dilemma of having to choose between (A) discouraging Arab friends from joining ME defense organization in which we were member and (B) not discouraging them, thus appearing in Egyptian eyes to violate spirit if not letter of proposed formula?

4. While suggested declaration might tend to remove hostility and disruptive tactics toward northern tier, am inclined to doubt it would be equally effective in improving materially prospects for positive cooperation of hinterland with northern tier.

5. Appreciate considerations which have prompted Cairo’s suggestion, but I believe it may be premature unless we have definitely concluded northern tier requires no further Arab membership and unless Nasser’s domestic position such that step of this nature required at this time to bolster him.

Heath

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/6–2555. Secret. Repeated to Cairo, Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Jidda, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.
2. Document 45.
3. Document 9.