Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

462. Operations Coordinating Board Report¹

Washington, August 7, 1957.

OPERATIONS PLAN FOR IRAQ (NSC 5428)²

I. Introduction

A. References:

1. “U.S. Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East”, NSC 5428, approved by the President, July 23, 1954.

2. National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, NIE 36.2–57, “The Outlook for Iraq”, June 4, 1957.³

3. Basic National Security Policy, NSC 5707/8, approved by the President, June 3, 1957.⁴

B. U.S. Objectives Regarding the Near East are:

4. Availability to the United States and its allies of the resources, the strategic positions and the passage rights of the area, and the denial of such resources and strategic positions to the Soviet bloc.

5. Stable, viable, friendly governments in the area, capable of withstanding communist-inspired subversion from within, and willing to resist communist aggression.

6. Settlement of major issues between the Arab states and Israel as a foundation for establishing peace and order in the area.

7. Reversal of the anti-American trends of Arab opinion.

8. Prevention of the extension of Soviet influence in the area.

9. Wider recognition in the free world of the legitimate aspirations of the countries in the area to be recognized as, and have the status of, sovereign states; and wider recognition by such countries of their responsibility toward the area and toward the free world generally.

C. Special Operating Guidance: In pursuing the policy objectives set forth above, U.S. actions in Iraq should be guided by the following:

Political

10. The United States should support strongly Iraq’s efforts to maintain its independent policies and territorial integrity in the face of threats of communist subversion and pressures from extreme Arab nationalists. The United States should give general support to the regime, including the Crown, the senior leadership of the Army, and government in power. There should be adequate recognition of and acquaintance with political leaders who represent possible friendly and constructive alternatives to whatever government may be in power. The United States should, at the same time, be aware of the pressures for political reforms within the country and be in a position to exert a constructive influence toward gradual reforms as opportunities arise.⁵

11. Pro-Western leaders in Iraq urgently stress the necessity for assistance from the Western nations that will counteract the psychological and propaganda benefits gained by the Soviets from their arms deals with Egypt and Syria. The United States should be aware that a genuine problem exists in this connection. Iraqi leaders are tempted to use this problem as a bargaining point to secure increased military assistance from the United States. While it may prove feasible and desirable to continue a modest annual military aid program in Iraq for a number of years, caution must be exercised to avoid raising Iraqi expectations as to future programs.

12. The United States should recognize the influence of the United Kingdom in Iraq and should cooperate closely with representatives of the United Kingdom in Iraq in areas where such cooperation can be of common benefit to Iraq, the United Kingdom, and the United States. At the same time, the United States should recognize the value both to itself and to the Free World of an easily identifiable United States role in the support of Iraq’s present policy. In this connection, strong support should be given to Iraq in its role as a member of the Baghdad Pact, and for its active and effective military and economic cooperation with its neighbors in the Pact directly and through the Pact organization to the extent of its capabilities.

13. Due recognition should be given to the strong sentiment existing in Iraq for policies and actions which appear to be in common with the other Arab states. The United States should assist where it can in building influence for Iraq’s present policies and leadership in other significant Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon. The possibility of ultimately increasing Iraqi influence in Syria should not be excluded.

14. There should be clear recognition of the political sensitiveness of the Palestine issue in Iraq and of the use made of this issue by Iraqi leaders to maintain an appearance of unity with the other Arab states in the face of the division over cooperation with the West. At the same time, the United States should at an opportune moment move quietly to urge a more constructive Iraqi role in the settlement of the Arab-Israel issues, including an Iraqi contribution to the resettlement of the Arab refugees.

15. There should be continual encouragement of Iraq’s anti-communist stand and of Iraq’s support for a free world policy. Special recognition should be given to Iraq’s unique position as the only Arab member of the United Nations Security Council.

Economic

16. In view of its very favorable fiscal and foreign exchange position, Iraq does not require economic assistance. The United States should, however, provide strong diplomatic and informational support for Iraq’s development program with a view to supporting the efforts of the present government. Iraq should be encouraged to give special emphasis to sound economic projects which will also have an attractive political and psychological appeal to the population. In this way the program may contribute to both political and economic internal stability in Iraq and serve as an example to other nations of the area of a constructive locally-financed development effort. Technical assistance should also continue to be provided to facilitate the successful completion of Iraq’s own programs.

17. Those benefits of the Iraq development program should be emphasized which will provide the basis for long-range reforms, particularly through land resettlement and education. A balance is desired in reforms which would bring about gradual improvement, while at the same time not diminishing at a dangerous pace the power and influence of the traditional sources of Iraqi political power.

18. The importance to the United States of the Iraq petroleum industry should be recognized and efforts of the industry in Iraq to insure continued access to the petroleum resources of Iraq should be fully supported.

19. The United States should provide appropriate encouragement and assistance to the role of United States private investors, contractors, and experts in the development and expansion of Iraq’s economy.

Military

20. Although the United States considers the U.S.-U.K. Memorandum of Understanding with respect to military assistance to Iraq is no longer legally in effect, the U.K. has been informed that for the present the U.S. is continuing to follow the policies set forth in that memorandum, particularly with reference to the exchange of information with the British on military programs in Iraq, offshore procurement of equipment in the United Kingdom, consultation on training, and continuance of the British position of primary responsibility for the Iraqi Air Force.

21. Within the over-all U.S.-approved military objectives of creating an Iraqi armed force capable of maintaining internal security and providing resistance to external aggression, the United States should continue programs designed to improve the efficiency and morale of the Iraq Army. Iraqi pressures for increases beyond the country’s capacity to absorb and to support should be resisted.

22. The United States has been under pressure from Iraq to supply equipment for Iraqi air defense. Extending United States assistance to the Iraqi Air Force would necessarily require further clarification of United States–United Kingdom military aid responsibilities under the United States–United Kingdom Memorandum of Understanding. Appropriate attention should also be given to United States Middle East defense plans and to major financial responsibilities the U.S. would be required to assume if the U.S. were to support the Iraqi Air Force.

Information and Cultural

23. Informational activities should be designed to emphasize United States interest in Iraq’s continued independence and territorial integrity and the benefits to be gained by Iraq from cooperation with the West. The program should also emphasize the direct contribution which the United States is making through technical assistance to social and economic progress in Iraq.

24. To the extent possible, the United States should also lend full support to the improvement of Iraq’s own information media, including particularly Iraq radio’s internal broadcasting. Special emphasis should also be placed on encouraging Iraq to make its development program more widely understood and supported within the country.

25. The cultural program should be used to nourish the cultural ties with the United States and particularly the ties with those groups who, as students or in other capacities, have visited the United States.

26. In all activities appropriate attention should be paid to the younger educated groups, to the students, to lawyers, and to other professional persons. It is particularly in these groups that communist and other extremist propaganda has made inroads.

27. The U.S. should bring about the distribution of films, press and radio materials on Iraq development in other Asian and African countries to enhance Iraq’s prestige in the area, especially with other Arab countries, and with neutral and newly independent countries.

Internal Security

28. Although Communist Party activity has been illegal in Iraq since 1927, the communist organization carries on limited underground activity in an effort to exert influence on left-wing groupings, to infiltrate government and army and to keep open its channel of communications. Party discipline is considered fairly effective, its skill in creating and exploiting fronts is good, and it has shown considerable vitality in recovering rapidly from periods of repression. If political instability should come about by the release of internal political rivalries which are now either submerged, or held in check, conservative and moderate elements will be threatened by growing political consciousness among urban groups and by peasant agitation for improved living conditions, and the Communist Party could develop increased capabilities for creating disturbances. Such a condition also would permit greater influence on internal Iraqi politics by extremist pressures from other Arab states.

29. The United States, therefore, should assist Iraq in strengthening its internal security forces.⁶ Efforts to this end should be undertaken, however, in such a way that they cannot be interpreted as support for a particular government, but rather to enable Iraq to maintain its political independence against possible weakening and overthrow through external subversion. At the same time, the United States should recognize that nationalist elements in Iraq, including many that are themselves anti-communist, oppose the present regime and regard the police and other organs of control in the country as political weapons designed to maintain the present government. In providing assistance to the maintenance of internal security, as set forth in paragraphs 61 to 63, the United States should be cautious that its efforts in this direction or other United States programs do not become identified with the political aspects of police measures to the detriment of the long-range United States standing in Iraq.

30. To broaden support by the public and above-mentioned groups outside of the government, the program should seek to train the Iraqi police forces in techniques which will engender more public confidence and trust. Concomitant with the delivery of equipment under the Richards’ Mission commitment the police advisory group in USOM should assist the Iraqi police in developing indoctrination and training programs designed to increase the popularity as well as the effectiveness of the police force. The present police training program in the United States should contribute to this reorientation of the outlook of the Iraqi police. The Embassy in Baghdad should be the focal point for keeping the British informed in a general way of the scope and developments of this program.

D. Selected U.S. Arrangements⁷ With or Pertaining to Iraq:

31. U.S. Involvements Which May Imply Military Security Guarantees:

a. The United States indicated its support for the area Baghdad Pact countries by State Department press release 604, dated November 29, 1956, which stated in part:

“… the United States reaffirms its support for the collective efforts of these nations to maintain their independence. A threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of the members would be viewed by the United States with the utmost gravity.”⁸

The United States has participated in the work of the Baghdad Pact through membership in the economic, military and counter-subversion committees.

b. The United States, by a Joint Resolution on the Middle East, signed by the President on March 9, 1957, announced its determination to assist Middle Eastern nations to maintain their independence. The Resolution declared that the United States is prepared to commit its military force, on the determination of the President, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism, whenever a victim requests such aid.

32. U.S. Commitments for Funds, Goods or Services:

a. Ambassador Richards informed the Iraqi Government on April 8, 1957, as follows:

(1) The U.S. is prepared to provide Iraq certain equipment on a grant basis for the First and Second Infantry Division in accordance with the second supplemental Army military assistance program dated February 4, 1957 (valued at approximately $6.2 million). (Financed under FY 1957 approved program.)

(2) The U.S. is prepared, in principle, to furnish additional military assistance to Iraq on a grant basis for tanks, vehicles, artillery, mortars, recoilless rifles and ammunition for the Third Infantry Division and Armored Command, and for a 90mm AAA battery with associated radar control and electronic equipment (valued at approximately $7.4 million). (Financed under FY 1957 approved program.)

(3) The U.S. is prepared, in principle, to provide Iraq with the following on a grant basis: (a) Modern civil police equipment and training, initially up to the value of $1 million; (b) telecommunications equipment to the value of $1,150,000 towards completion of Iraqi portion of regional telecommunications system; and (c) $350,000 for the engineering survey of the Baghdad–Kut–Basra railroad. (Financed under FY 1957 approved program.)

b. An agreement on atomic energy cooperation for civil uses was signed between the United States and Iraq on May 2, 1957.⁹

33. Other Arrangements:

a. The United States agreed to a military assistance program and to the maintenance of a military assistance advisory group in Iraq by an exchange of notes dated April 21, 1954.¹⁰

b. The United States technical assistance program was established under the general agreement for technical cooperation signed April 10, 1951.¹¹ This has been supplemented by subsequent technical agreements, including in particular, an agreement for a program of economic development dated November 16, 1952¹² and an agreement for a cooperative program of community welfare signed March 2, 1955.¹³

II. Current and Projected Programs and Courses of Action

[Here follow specific current and projected programs and courses of action, followed by annexes concerning Iraq’s fiscal and foreign exchange position, and British support to the Iraqi armed forces.]

1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Near East: January-July, 1957. Secret. A covering note by Charles E. Johnson, Executive Assistant to the OCB, indicates that the Board concurred in this Plan for implementation by the responsible agencies of the actions and programs contained therein at its meeting of August 7.

   According to minutes of the OCB meeting of July 31, the OCB discussed and revised a July 27 draft of the Operations Plan for Iraq, and deferred final action on the paper pending the preparation by the Working Group of an annex covering U.K. past and present programs and future plans for military aid to Iraq, and the resolving of any questions that might have remained with respect to paragraph 52 of the paper. The OCB noted a report by the Department of Defense that the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact was making a series of planning studies on the Pact countries, including one on air defense. Upon completion of these studies, the Department of Defense would be able to define more clearly Iraqi military needs within an overall Baghdad Pact context, and the relation of possible U.S. assistance thereto. The OCB noted that it was important that no impression be given the British or the Iraqis that the United States might assume any greater responsibility for the Iraqi military program. (Ibid.)

2. Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 525.
3. Document 458.
4. Vol. XIX, p. 507.
5. In telegram 20, July 6, the Embassy in Baghdad commented on a draft of this Plan, sent on June 19, as follows: “While concurring in general with reference to influence we should exert for political, social and economic reforms (paras 10, 16, 33), we feel careful consideration should be given to the type of reforms we wish to encourage, time period within which they may reasonably be expected to be achieved and their implication upon various aspects of Iraqi social structure. Careless and unthoughtful advocacy of all types of reform in a country such as Iraq could easily produce dilemma difficult to resolve in U.S. interests, e.g., hasty and radical reform measures would inevitably diminish power and influence of sheikhs who constitute important political stabilizing factor. Rapid and serious decline in their influence would place tremendous power in hands of few irresponsible extreme nationalists and create forces making for disunity and instability.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.87/7–657)
6. Internal security forces are as follows: The National Police, a semi-military organization with primarily civil duties, which includes a mobile police force; the Army which has a role in maintenance of civil order in instances where the National Police is unable to cope with the situation; and the Directorate General of Security which controls foreigners, passport and nationality functions in addition to counter-intelligence and counter-subversion. [Footnote in the source text.]
7. See State Department publication Treaties in Force for additional arrangements. [Footnote in the source text.]
8. Ellipsis in the source text. The full text of this statement is printed in Department of State Bulletin, December 10, 1956, p. 918.
9. This unperfected treaty, signed in Washington on June 7, never entered into force, due to the failure of the Government of Iraq to give written notification to the Government of the United States that it had complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for the entry into force of such an agreement.
10. For text of this agreement, see TIAS 3108; 5 UST (pt. 3) 2496.
11. For text of this agreement, see TIAS 2413; 3 UST 541.
12. For text of this agreement, see TIAS 2757; 3 UST (pt. 4) 5882.
13. For text of this agreement, see TIAS 3209; 6 UST 701.