445. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 5, 19571
SUBJECT
- Visit of Crown Prince Abdul Ilah of Iraq
I. PALESTINE SITUATION
PARTICIPANTS
-
For the United States:
- The Secretary
- Mr. Rountree—NEA
- Ambassador Gallman
- Mr. Memminger—NEA
- Mr. Eilts—NEA
-
For Iraq:
- Senator Salih Jabr
- Senator Tawfiq Suwaidi
- Senator Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi
- Deputy Fadhil Jamali
- Senator Ahmad Mukhtar Baban
- Ambassador Moussa Shabandar
- Mr. Hashim Khalil, Iraqi Embassy
After welcoming the Prince, the Secretary said he had come at an auspicious time. The fact that King Saud is also here adds significance to the presence of the Iraqi delegation. The Secretary had earlier seen the President, who had told him briefly of his meeting with the Prince.2 He then invited the Prince to express any further views he might wish to communicate to us.
The Prince observed that the Iraqi delegation had come to present both the Iraqi viewpoint and that of the other three Baghdad Pact Moslem states. He would ask his colleagues to review the several matters of concern. Thereupon Dr. Jamali listed these as (a) Palestine, (b) Syria, (c) Egypt, (d) Jordan, (e) Saudi Arabia, (f) North Africa.
Jamali then outlined the well-known Iraqi views on Palestine. A great injustice had been done to the Arabs. The million refugees are fodder for Communism. If some justice is to be restored to the Arabs, if the dignity of the UN is to be retained, if Middle East confidence in the United States is to be restored, the 1947–48 UN resolutions should be implemented. The existence of a UN police force should now make this possible. Suwaidi added his view that Nasser had turned to the Soviets largely because of disillusionment over the West’s attitude on Palestine. Jabr warned that unless the UN resolutions on Palestine are implemented, it will inevitably lose prestige in the area. Baban felt that permitting Israel to obtain arms superiority was the root of the problem. All emphasized the danger to peace inherent in the problem and urged the United States to take action to resolve it.
[Page 1030]The Secretary replied that we know the presence of Israel creates a difficulty in the area and that the refugees are a potential source of danger. He recalled that the UN resolutions had initially been rejected by the Arabs. Since then various other arrangements have evolved, none of which can readily be altered without mutual consent. The Secretary doubted the value of coercion to force acceptance of the resolutions. They might be acceptable to some; others do not find them so. He had hoped a year and a half ago when making his August 26, 1955 speech that some beginning might be made in resolving certain aspects of the problem. This prospect seems more remote today. The present Administration has proven that it is more disposed to take an impartial view of the issue than have its predecessors. It has refused to be dominated by the Israeli viewpoint. We are ready to approach a solution to be dominated by the Israeli viewpoint. We are ready to approach a solution to the Arab-Israeli and to the refugee problems whenever it appears that something useful may be accomplished. Any approach must take into account all that has gone before. For the moment, we will probably have to continue to live with the issue. We know it offers an opportunity to the Soviets to step in and offer assistance. Yet, as the Secretary had pointed out to King Saud, it was U.S. influence rather than Soviet arms which had saved Egypt. The states of the area should know this. We sympathize with the need for a solution. Perhaps the refugee problem may be resolved first. Some, but not all, may be able to return to their homes in Israel. In any event, the problem will have to be handled piecemeal and within the context of the United Nations.
Other subjects discussed are recorded in separate memoranda.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.11/2–557. Secret. Drafted by Eilts.↩
- See the memorandum of conversation, supra.↩
- See Documents 446–451.↩