Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

44. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

Washington, June 16, 1955.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Position Regarding Middle East Defense

1. In response to the memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 6 June 1955, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed a report prepared by a State-Defense working group, entitled “U.S. Position Regarding Middle East Defense.”² As requested in the above memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their comments on (a) the substance of the report, (b) the tactics suggested for discussions with the United Kingdom, and (c) the general procedure outlined in the covering memorandum to the report dated 6 June 1955.

2. Substance of the Report

a. Politico-Military Objectives in the Middle East (ME), Strategy for the Defense of the Middle East, Related Strategic Considerations (Sections I, II, and III). The statement of United States politico-military objectives in the ME, of the strategy for the defense of the ME, and of the related strategic considerations is considered to be consistent with current United States policies and conforms to United States military assessments.

b. Force Requirements, Possible Sources of Forces, Military and Political Considerations (Sections IV and V).

(1) The estimated force requirements in the report reflect the conclusions of preliminary studies on a broad basis by U.S., U.K. and Turkish military representatives. They should not be viewed as definitive but rather as an indication of the general order of magnitude of the forces required. The estimate of the force availabilities to meet the estimated requirements, the sources from which the force deficits might be made up, and the concept of the logistic complex which might be required represent possible solutions, provided the United States and the United Kingdom were to underwrite the programs and if the political aspirations of the ME states concerned could be brought into harmony.

(2) With regard to the deficit in air forces for the area, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, while it would be desirable to provide a D-Day indigenous air component adequate to realize the fuller effectiveness of the ground forces contemplated, a program to accomplish this would be too ambitious in the light of its cost and of the low technical capacities of those countries to operate and maintain such forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore do not foresee the possibility of developing locally-stationed air forces of the size and type visualized in the report. [4 lines of source text not declassified] In addition, United States plans now contemplate air operations which should result in substantial reduction in the capabilities of the Soviet air forces which might be committed to the area, and thereby assist the Allied ground defense. Further, while it would not be possible to provide from outside sources on D-Day the air support contemplated in the report, it is probable that after completion of their initial and primary missions, United States air forces from bases contiguous to the area would be in a position to render more direct support to the Middle East ground forces. A careful analysis of all of the foregoing factors would be necessary before any definitive determination could be made as to the minimum essential air forces required in the area on D-Day.

(3) In determining the costs for providing deficits in the ground forces the report assumes the availability of one and one-third Jordan divisions and a United Kingdom armored division. The present commitment of the Jordan division on the Israeli border and the widely dispersed locations of the United Kingdom armored division in Libya and Cyprus raise some doubt as to the eventual ready availability of these divisions. If equivalent forces had to be obtained from other sources in the ME it would result in a substantial increase in the cost of the ground force requirements. Iran is considered to have a greater potential for providing the required ground forces than the report indicates. In view of Iran’s key position in the strategic defense concept, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States should plan to extend material support to Iran with a view to preparing her forces for a more important role than is contemplated in the report. The results attained by the Army training groups with the Iranian forces should indicate the extent of Iran’s capacity to furnish additional ground forces.

(4) The narrative of the political considerations which would bear upon the contribution of forces and the furnishing of facilities and base rights, etc., by the countries in the area is considered to be a satisfactory appraisal of the present attitudes of the ME states and of some of the obstacles to be overcome if an effective defense arrangement is to be achieved.

c. Political Action Needed to Implement the Strategy (Section VI)

(1) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the progressive steps delineated in the report would constitute an acceptable pattern for the eventual establishment of a comprehensive regional defense organization, should future developments indicate that the establishment of such an organization were both feasible and necessary for an effective defense of the ME. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciate that without United States moral and material support the bilateral pacts, or a multilateral pact, might well lapse into innocuous formalities, they feel that, in the final analysis, the effectiveness of a Middle East defense organization would largely rest upon a mutual recognition by the member states of the threat to their security and upon the degree of their determination to combine in preserving that security. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that such a cooperative approach should spring largely from initiative by the ME states and that the United States should encourage and support their efforts in this direction, while continuing to place major reliance on Turkey and Pakistan to further this movement. The completion of the “Northern Tier” (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan) is considered to be a suitable goal for the immediate future and, to this end, the accession at a propitious time of Pakistan and Iran to the Turkish-Iraq Pact should be encouraged.

(2) The Joint Chiefs of Staff would be opposed to the establishment now, or in the future, of a ME defense organization with an elaborate superstructure patterned along the lines of the NATO. Further, they consider that promotion by the United States, at this time, of a comprehensive Middle East defense arrangement, involving combined planning by constituent countries and consideration of command arrangements, would be premature and would entail or imply the acceptance by the United states of commitments which, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should await further developments. As to whether the United States should adhere to a “Northern Tier” pact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that should such a pact be consummated and hold real promise of viability, the United States, having from the outset stimulated its development, could not indefinitely abstain from adhering to it in some form. It is envisaged that our adherence would be on the broadest basis possible, carrying no obligations for the earmarking of United States forces for the area, nor any implied commitment as to the order of financial or material support we might extend.

(3) The United States military aid program for the area should be designed to provide first for the internal security of selected ME countries; beyond that it should be based on the development of plans for the regional defense and of the prospective roles of the recipient countries in that defense, rather than on separate country-by-country estimates of individual defense needs. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel there may be a need for the establishment in the area of a small United States joint agency to supervise the Military Assistance Advisory Groups and Missions in the ME, to coordinate their programs on a regional basis. This matter will be the subject of a separate memorandum in the near future.

d. Magnitude of Possible Military, Economic, and Construction Programs (Section VII). In the absence of a detailed analysis and an actual survey, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no firm basis for revising the costing of the force deficits, of the supporting construction, and of the other minimum military programs contemplated in the report. However, on the basis of a limited review, it is considered that the concept of requirements is on a more elaborate scale than the prospective evolution of a ME defense arrangement would now justify. As indicated in subparagraph 2 b above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the program for the air forces, particularly, would require substantial downward revision. As regards the program as a whole, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel it is highly unlikely that funds of this magnitude would be forthcoming from the Congress for these purposes.

3. Tactics for Discussions with the U.K. (Tab D). The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, since the proposed talks with the United Kingdom are to be informal, exploratory, and of a political nature involving no commitments, the United States tactics suggested in the report would be generally acceptable from the military point of view, provided that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in this memorandum are reflected, where pertinent, in the presentation of the United States position.

4. General Procedure Outlined in the Covering Memorandum.

a. In their comments on the substance of the report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented a number of factors which they consider should be weighed in determining the procedures to be followed in the approach to a ME defense arrangement. In general, the Joint Chiefs of Staff contemplate a more deliberate approach to the establishment of such an organization than the proposed procedures suggest. Their views may be summarized as follows:

(1) Commitments for other theaters and the lack of suitable bases and storage facilities do not permit the earmarking of specific United States military forces for employment in the ME at this time.

(2) There is not at present nor is there likely to be a future requirement for an elaborate ME defense organization along the lines of the NATO.

(3) While the eventual establishment of a comprehensive defense arrangement for the ME appears to be a desirable objective, it is considered that, in view of the present Arab-Israel tensions and the uncertain relations among the Arab States themselves, the United States should not stimulate the establishment of such an arrangement at this time nor undertake a United States-Israel defense pact.

(4) The completion of the “Northern Tier” is a suitable goal for the immediate future. The next logical step in its development would be the accession of Pakistan to the Turk-Iraqi Pact followed at a propitious time by the accession of Iran to that pact. The United States should encourage this development without a commitment as to the form of eventual United States association with the pact.

(5) The United States should decide now, in principle, to adhere to the, “Northern Tier” pact after such a pact is consummated; the timing of our actual adherence should be decided in the light of future developments in the ME, but should not be too dependent upon developments in the Arab-Israeli controversy. Such adherence, if undertaken, should be on a broad basis not involving commitments as to the earmarking of United States forces or as to the order of financial support the United States might extend.

(6) For reasons indicated in subparagraph 4 a (3) above, measures toward an expansion of the “Northern Tier” pact, so as to include other Middle Eastern states, should be deferred.

(7) While continuing to place reliance upon Turkey and Pakistan to further our plans in the ME, the United States should cooperate closely with the United Kingdom in moving toward the establishment of a ME defense arrangement.

(8) United States military aid programs for the ME should be designed to provide, first, for the internal security of selected countries of the area; beyond that they should be based on plans for the regional defense rather than on separate country estimates.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the procedures proposed in paragraph 4 of the covering memorandum be modified to reflect the foregoing views.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford³
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/6–2255. Top Secret. The source text is a photostat copy of the memorandum that is attached to a June 22 transmittal memorandum from the Director of the Executive Secretariat, Walter K. Scott, to Murphy, Jernegan, Mathews, and Elbrick. Also attached to Scott’s memorandum is a June 20 memorandum from Admiral Arthur C. Davis to Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson with its attachment, Document 47.
2. Supra.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.