Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

423. Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee¹

J.C.S. 2099/513

Washington, September 9, 1955.

SCOPE OF MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR IRAQ

The Problem

1. To provide guidance to Chief, MAAG, Iraq, as to the course of action to be taken with respect to:

a. A request² from the Iraqi General Staff for the inclusion of the Royal Iraqi Air Force (RIAF) in the MDA Program for Iraq, and

b. An anticipated request³ for certain naval assistance.

Facts Bearing on the Problem

2. On 28 April 1955 the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, forwarded⁴ two memorandums⁵ received from the Chief, MAAG, Iraq, which outlined the following problems:

a. The memorandum dated 21 March 1955³ anticipated a request from Iraq to include certain naval assistance in the MDA Program for Iraq and requested guidance as to whether an attempt should be made to encourage or discourage actions which are designed to secure naval assistance, and the desirability of indicating that part of the assistance could be secured through reimbursable aid.

b. The memorandum dated 25 March 1955⁶ states that a request² has been received from the Office of the Chief of the General Staff of Iraq for inclusion of the RIAF in the scope of MDAP Grant Aid for Iraq and requests information be furnished upon which to base an interim reply to Iraq with respect to this matter.

3. On 14 July 1955, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) forwarded⁷ to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a copy of a memorandum⁸ approved by the President, subject: “Defense of the Middle East,” which stated in part:

“… prospective military aid available will not permit the United States to increase its total level of effort for the Middle East, except in the case of Iran where it is hoped that a moderate increase will encourage its adherence to the Baghdad Pact … ”⁹

Discussion

4. No funds in the FY 1956 MDA Program or any past MDA Programs have been earmarked for the RIAF or for Iraqi naval assistance. Therefore, any requests by the Iraqi Government for inclusion of these in the present MDA Program for Iraq, could be met only by eliminating or reducing other MDA Programs which are considered to be essential to the accomplishment of U.S. objectives on a world-wide basis.

5. For additional discussion, see Enclosure “B”.

Conclusions

6. Chief, MAAG, Iraq, should be informed that:

a. Present and prospective military aid funds available will not permit the United States to expand its Grant Aid MDA Program for Iraq.

b. Iraq should be encouraged to seek reimbursable aid under MDAP for the RIAF.

c. Any effort on the part of Iraq to secure naval assistance through MDAP reimbursable aid should be neither encouraged nor discouraged, but each specific request should be given detailed consideration.

Recommendations

7. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

a. Forward the memorandum in Enclosure “A” and its Appendix,¹⁰ together with copies of Appendices “A” and “B” and Annex to Appendix “B” to J.C.S. 2099/481, which reflect the above conclusions, to the Secretary of Defense.

b. Upon receipt of approval by the Secretary of Defense, send the message in the Appendix hereto, to the Chief, MAAG, Iraq.

8. No recommendation is made as to the distribution of this paper to commanders of unified or specified commands.

[Here follow Enclosure “A” and its Appendix.]

Enclosure “B”

DISCUSSION

1. The U.S. presently has an interest in obtaining suitable base rights in Iraq. The special status of the U.K. in Iraq ended with the termination of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in April 1955. The new U.K.–Iraq understanding of 4 April 1955 provides for British rights on Iraq bases, but the U.S. would not necessarily enjoy the same rights under any reciprocal arrangement with the British because the bases are now under Iraq sovereignty.

2. In light of the above and the factors set forth in the Appendix to Enclosure “A” hereto,¹¹ it would appear expedient that the RIAF be provided such token aid as is possible under the existing circumstances. Since the U.S. can not now, or in the foreseeable future, increase its total level of effort for the Middle East (except for Iran) there appear to be only three lines of approach open as to a solution for this matter; i.e.,

a. Divert MDAP funds from other countries to Iraq. This is considered impracticable in view of the relatively small amount of money available and the higher priorities of the other countries concerned.

b. Divert sufficient MDAP funds from the present MDA Program supporting two divisions, to provide a token MDA Program for the RIAF. Since present planning envisages only 15 million dollars at the most as being available for the Iraq FY 1956 MDA Program, it is considered that an attempt to stretch this amount to cover both an air and a ground program would result in a weak program for both. This is further magnified by the fact that the amount finally allocated to Iraq for FY 1956 could well be much less than the amount now planned for, i.e. 15 million dollars.

c. Encourage Iraq to seek reimbursable aid under MDAP for the RIAF. Since Iraq is eligible and can economically afford to pay for such a token program, it is considered much more desirable to adopt this course of action rather than attempt to provide both an air and ground program under MDAP Grant Aid.

3. By virtue of its geographical location and topography, Iraq includes the most practicable land routes from the USSR to the Mediterranean via Iran. It possesses an estimated seven per cent of the world’s known petroleum reserves. Although Iraq might prefer to be free of foreign entanglements, its millitary and economic weaknesses and the potential threat of the USSR have caused it to retain its ties with the United Kingtom. Iraq, by accepting U.S. military aid and recently by entering into a defense arrangement with Turkey, has moved closer toward alignment with the West.

4. The Iraqi Army is currently capable of maintaining internal security and probably could resist invasion by any of its neighbors, excluding Turkey, but could offer no more than brief delaying action against attack by a major power. In this connection, it would be of particular value towrd the achievement of U.S. military objectives in the Middle East if the existing Iraqi forces possessed a greater capability for inflicting delay on any Soviet attack through the Zagros Mountain passes. The development of such a capability, however, would be difficult, time consuming and expensive.

5. From the foregoing, it is apparent that although Iraq is strategically located in the “backstop” area of the Zagros Mountain line and contains the most practicable land routes (via Iran), between not only the Zagros passes and the Mediterranean, but other important inland routes to both Turkey on the north and Kuwait on the south as well, the Iraqi armed forces by themselves could do little to contribute to the defense of the area—in fact could offer only brief delaying action at best—in the event of attack by a major power.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, JCS Records, CCS 092 (8–22–46) (2) Sec 15. Top Secret. This report was transmitted by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 23. Colonel E.W. Williamson, USA, and Colonel F.B. Elliott, USAF, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), were consulted informally in the preparation of this report. After making amendments, the Joint Chiefs approved the recommendations in paragraph 7 at their September 9 meeting.
2. Annex to Appendix “B” to J.C.S. 2099/481. [Footnote in the source text; not printed.]
3. See Appendix “A” to J.C.S. 2099/481. [Footnote in the source text; not printed.]
4. Enclosure to J.C.S. 2099/481. [Footnote in the source text; not printed.]
5. Appendices “A” and “B” to J.C.S. 2099/481. [Footnote in the source text; not printed.]
3. See Appendix “A” to J.C.S. 2099/481. [Footnote in the source text; not printed.]
6. Appendix “B” to J.C.S. 2099/481. [Footnote in the source text; not printed.]
2. Annex to Appendix “B” to J.C.S. 2099/481. [Footnote in the source text; not printed.]
7. Enclosure to J.C.S. 1887/108. [Footnote in the source text; not printed.]
8. Annex to Appendix “A” to J.C.S. 1887/108. [Footnote in the source text; not printed.]
9. Ellipses in the source text.
10. Enclosure “A” is a draft memorandum for the Secretary of Defense recommending that the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, did not participate in the Joint Chiefs decision outlined in this report. The Appendix is a draft memorandum to the Chief, MAAG, Iraq, repeating the information contained in points 4 and 6(a) of the report, with additional comments on the subjects of naval assistance and an Air Force reimbursable aid program. Neither is printed. See also footnote 11 below.
11. The Appendix stated, among other things, that the United States had an interest in generating as favorable an atmosphere as possible for future negotiations on obtaining suitable base rights in Iraq.