Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

420. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State ¹

Baghdad , March 22, 1955—noon .

739. Since sending Embtel 603 February 21² Embassy has given considerable thought to basic provisions possibly warranting inclusion in eventual new memorandum understanding to replace US–UK memorandum of February 26, 1954 as necessitated by anticipated early termination present Anglo-Iraqi treaty and substitution for it of new Anglo-Iraqi arrangements within context Turk-Iraqi Pact.³ After obtaining view Chief MAAG as well Army and Air Attachés following observations are submitted for Department’s consideration:

1. All indications to date point to likelihood that new Anglo-Iraqi arrangements now being negotiated will vary mainly in form rather than in substance from existing arrangements. Primary responsibility for equipping and training Iraqi armed forces will probably continue be vested in British. I see no reason believe that termination Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930 likely be accompanied by British withdrawal from Iraq as was case when British relinquished their military commitments in Greece and Turkey.

2. Moreover as far as I am aware there is no indication of any desire on our part substantially to increase our political or military commitments in Iraq as long as British continue be willing assume the larger share of responsibility. It follows that any new memorandum of understanding which may be evolved in light of new Anglo-Iraqi arrangements will still be postulated on assumption it remains in US interest support British position in Iraq and that US arms aid to Iraq continue be complementary to that currently supplied by British.

3. Any new memorandum understanding should be considered from both procedural and substantive view points. Procedurally I submit such memorandum might usefully be cast in terms of a tripartite memorandum including US, UK and Iraq, perhaps after initial informal agreement, recent terms thereof, has been arrived at between British and ourselves. This would have merit of making clear to all interested parties precise nature of commitment of each and may help resolve recurrent suspicions held by one or another.

4. Substantively it seems to me present memorandum understanding continues offer reasonable basis for any new agreement even though experience of past few months suggests desirability incorporating somewhat greater elasticity than is currently the case. Specifically following points may warrant inclusion:

(a) Appropriate language changes throughout memorandum necessitated by new Anglo-Iraqi arrangements once these have been concluded and by tripartite procedure suggested above if accepted.

(b) While Chief MAAG and Army Attaché both suggest deletion offshore procurement provisions contained paragraph 3(B)⁴ I am inclined to favor its continuation in at least some form as best means avoiding dislocation existing equipment and expansion plans of Iraqi army. I would urge however inclusion of [garble—time-clause?] which would make offshore procurement obligation dependent upon British ability deliver expeditiously. If for example British deliver or at least supply required equipment within reasonable period of time say three to six months (although exact time could be determined by the experts) Iraqis should seek other sources of supply including US. In anticipation such contingency it may be well stress possibility utilizing reimbursable aid as quick means obtain desired equipment.

(c) Re appended minute to paragraph 4 [5] of existing memorandum⁵ I recommend it not be renewed. Instead I believe it desirable include provision proposed by Army Attaché that where appropriate and not in conflict with existing training procedures training in US military institutions be sanctioned. Apart from this I consider it important too to incorporate a provision that British vested as they are with prime responsibility of training of Iraqi armed forces undertake do so along lines of evolving NATO tactical and staff techniques in order insure possible further association of Iraqi armed forces with those of NATO with minimum of difficulty.

(d) Appended minute on US intentions re air force program⁶ should in my view be allowed lapse at end present FY and not be renewed. While I hold that there probably little advantage to be gained by US participation in training of modest RIAF which may better remain a function of the British I nevertheless question necessity formally incorporating any such self restraining provision in new memorandum and would prefer that Iraqi requests for any US air equipment or air training be parried locally on informal basis.

(e) In order insure continuing elasticity in light changing circumstances including possibility JCS may at some future time wish increase US military commitment here, provisions should be incorporated calling for periodical review of memorandum by participating parties to determine progress of Iraqi military buildup program to date and allow deficiencies and shortcomings be corrected.

5. As of possible help to Department and Defense in formulating their views on any new memorandum understanding copies of Chief MAAG, Army and Air Attachés’ observations on subject being pouched.⁷

Gallman

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5/3–2255. Secret. Repeated to London.
2. In telegram 603, Gallman noted that he felt it might be well to consider the nature of any new understanding with the United Kingdom on supplying arms to Iraq. (Ibid., 787.5/2–2155)
3. A Pact of Mutual Cooperation between Turkey and Iraq, generally referred to as the Baghdad Pact, was signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955. For text, see 233 UNTS 199. Regarding U.S. policy with respect to the Baghdad Pact, see Documents 1 ff. The Pact was adhered to by the United Kingdom on April 5, by Pakistan on September 23, and by Iran on November 3.
4. Paragraph 3(B) of the Memorandum of Understanding stated that the United States, in formulating any program of arms aid to Iraq, would give due weight to the possibility of avoiding dislocations in the existing re-equipment and expansion plans of the Iraqi forces and minimizing logistic difficulties, by means of offshore purchases in the United Kingdom.
5. Reference is clearly to the minute in paragraph 5, dealing with the training of Iraqi forces.
6. This minute noted that no U.S. program for the Iraqi Air Force was contemplated for fiscal years 1954 and 1955. It also stated that if the United Kingdom could not meet certain equipment or training requirements of the Iraqi Air Force, the United States would consider providing such equipment and training after conferring with the United Kingdom.
7. These observations are included in despatch 456 from Baghdad, March 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/3–2955)