Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

351. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran¹

Washington, February 14, 1956—7:29 p.m.

1387. Although US not yet able join Pact nor willing undertake bilateral guarantee in “reply” to Molotov proposal four-power neutrality “guarantee” as desired by Shah and Prime Minister (Embtels 1094 and 1104)² we attempting by other measures reassure Iran of continued US support. This connection believe Shah and Government should be assisted in preparing diplomatic, political and propaganda countermeasures to Soviet maneuver. Suggest in your discretion you discuss (without leaving written memo) matter with Government and if possible Shah prior his departure India along following line:

1. Department has considered carefully implications Molotov suggestion and agrees with Shah it is maneuver to isolate Iran from neighbors and dismember Baghdad Pact. In this regard it is similar to recent Bulganin proposal bilateral treaty with US designed undermine NATO and create false sense security. Soviets may not attempt push four-power Pact idea immediately to conclusion but proceed by stages, analyzing reaction each stage, probing for soft spots before proceeding. Even if they plan make major issue of proposal, their timetable may well be geared to trip of Shah to Moscow in June unless circumstances surrounding Shah’s forthcoming visit to India provide them with some unexpected opening. (Although idea first broached about January 13, Soviets have not introduced theme into propaganda or addressed formal note.) Therefore, would suggest Iran’s objective should be give no sign uncertainty which USSR can exploit. Iran should plan its reaction carefully order be constantly prepared in advance to check next Soviet step.

2. Iran’s present treaties provide good basis for parrying Soviet maneuvers and placing USSR on propaganda defensive. Following points may be of use to Iran in event USSR later makes four-power neutrality guarantee subject of formal note or propaganda.

a. Soviet Union protected by Iran’s obligations as member United Nations. Additionally Soviet-Iran agreements provide USSR with unusually well-defined explicit guarantees against Iranian aggression alone or in concert other nations.

b. While Iran protected against Soviet aggression by same guarantees, Soviet claims right under all treaties with Iran to introduce forces on Iranian territory as means protection against any threat posed by pro-Czarist elements. Although this should be dead letter since no threatening pro-Czarist forces remain in world, still this provides pretext which has been used in Soviet threats and against which Iran must protect itself. Event USSR should later argue that Iran’s security adequately guaranteed by existing Soviet-Iran treaties, it might become useful to Iran to point out that this claimed Soviet right of intervention creates element of inequality in Soviet-Iran relations to Iran’s disadvantage.

c. Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Roumania all signed non-aggression conventions with USSR identical to that signed by Iran in July 1933.³ Past violations and present threats to Iranian independence by Soviets do not result from lack treaty guarantees from USSR.

d. Pact by four outside powers to preserve any given status quo in Iran would be retrogressive in an era of dying colonialism. In previous Iranian experience, such Great Power Pacts have resulted in exploitation Iran. Fact Soviet attaches condition that Iran withdraw from Baghdad Pact proves treaty suggested by Soviets would restrict Iranian freedom manage own affairs.

3. Above points intended only as suggestions to assist GOI in analyzing strength of Iran’s diplomatic position and as fruitful line of consideration for developing suitable diplomatic and propaganda approach to future Soviet maneuvers as necessary. Would be tactical error to use these lines prematurely, that is, before clearly required by situation. Iranian objective would be to force USSR onto diplomatic defensive and thereby lessen likelihood of stronger Soviet diplomatic action.

FYI: Department aware broader implications Soviet maneuver in context present Middle East situation. As re Iranian desire for some new evidence US support to use as counterweight Soviet maneuver, Department sought urgent action on budgetary aid and is endeavoring expedite solution problems of DFS military construction program and military aid deliveries in FY 1956. However, fact USSR has not yet pushed four-power pact in propaganda or most recent note to GOI (Embtel 1218)⁴ suggests Molotov comment only preliminary feeler in slowly developing campaign of nerves. We believe not advisable for US offer new commitment after each step in Soviet campaign nor to do so now as result Molotov suggestion.

In effort supply Embassy with further grist for discussing Soviet maneuvers with GOI Department pouching elaboration points 2a through d. End FYI.

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/2–656. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hannah; cleared by Kitchen and NEA/UN, NEA/L, NEA, and EE; and approved by Allen. Repeated to Moscow and London.
2. Neither printed. Telegram 1104, January 18, reported the Shah’s concern with the effect the Soviet offer might have on the Iranian public. (Ibid., 661.88/1–1856)
3. Reference is to the Convention for the Definition of Aggression, Annex and Protocol of Signature, signed at London, July 3, 1933.
4. Dated February 6, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/2–656)