Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

35. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 22, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Middle East Defense

Discussion

The “northern tier” concept has materialized rapidly since the approval last July of NSC 5428 (U.S. Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East) and has taken a turn not then contemplated in that the U.K. has adhered to the indigenous Turk-Iraqi Pact. Pakistan apparently will adhere to the Pact in the near future, and the Shah of Iran has shown a keen interest in the “northern tier” concept and has proposed military staff talks among Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey. Meanwhile, we are proceeding with military aid programs in all four of these countries.

We are not reaping the full benefit of these developments because we lack a comprehensive political-military strategy for the defense of the Middle East. On the one hand, the “northern tier” countries do not know what is required of them; on the other, we are undecided as to our own role and have inadequate criteria against which to measure the effectiveness of our country programs of military aid in terms of regional defense.

There is accordingly an urgent need for us to reexamine the problems of Middle East defense and our own capabilities of contributing to their solution. Political and military aspects are closely intertwined. For example, the best defense line in the area is hinged on the Zagros Mountains in Iran. If this is the line to be held, the Iranians must accept temporary Soviet occupation of the greater part of Iran. Another problem would arise if it were determined on military grounds that Turkish troops must be stationed in Iraq. Despite the recent Turk-Iraqi rapprochement, the Iraqis are not wholly convinced that Turkey has lost all imperial ambition and the presence of Turkish troops in Iraq would be resented and feared. Arab-Israeli differences will present their own special and inevitable difficulties.

We must carefully consider British capabilities and intentions. You will recall that Eden spoke to you in Bangkok on February 23 of the British desire for bilateral political-military talks in Washington on Middle East defense.² On March 15 the Under Secretary wrote to the Deputy Secretary of Defense expressing the view that it would be desirable to accede to the British request and solicit Defense views. We have had no reply to this letter.

At the time that Eden approached you, Admiral Cassady, representing the JCS, had just concluded military talks on Middle East defense with the British and the Turks in London. Cassady submitted his report to the JCS shortly thereafter. The Department has attempted to obtain the substance of his report through the State–JCS meetings and the JCS member of the NSC Planning Board but has been given only very general information.

At the State–JCS meeting on April 15 there was a general discussion of Middle East defense from which emerged a JCS view that may be summarized as follows: U.S. political-military policy with respect to the Middle East should be reviewed by the NSC; thereafter, it might be useful to have informal bilateral discussions with the British but we should avoid formal talks as these might offend the Turks. Admiral Radford suggested that a State-Defense working group be established to formulate policy recommendations with respect to Middle East defense.

We support Admiral Radford’s proposal of a State-Defense working group which we believe should be established at or near the Assistant Secretary level. The terms of reference of the group should be broad, including inter alia the identification of principles, effective and practicable from both political and military points of view, governing the strategy of Middle East defense, an assessment of the nature and extent of U.S. participation that may be required, an examination of the advisability of expanding the geographic scope of the “northern tier” concept, a determination of the quantities and types of forces needed for effective defense and a consideration of ways and means of bridging the gap between available indigenous forces and force requirements for effective defense.

Although we favor the establishment of the working group supported by Admiral Radford and thus far accept the JCS position that a review of our Middle East policy is needed before talking with the British, we believe that U.S.-U.K. talks are essential and not merely— as the JCS seems to assess them—of possible utility. Our view seems to accord more than that of the JCS with paragraph 17b of NSC 5428 which states that the U.S. should conduct secret military-political conversations with the U.K. regarding the development of the “northern tier” concept.

Because of the importance that we attach to talks with the British, we consider, in contrast to the JCS view, that the findings of the working group should not be formally submitted to the NSC before we talk with the British. The group’s report would, therefore, serve in the first instance as a basis for these talks. After the talks and in the light of the further information derived therefrom, the group would make such revisions of its recommendations as might seem advisable and this revised report would be formally submitted to the NSC for its consideration.

In view of the urgency of this matter, we believe that the working group should be established as soon as possible and should be instructed to produce its recommendations not later than June 15.

Recommendation

It is recommended that you and the Under Secretary meet with Secretary, Wilson, Deputy Secretary, Anderson and Admiral, Radford and approach them along the following lines:

1. Emphasize the Department’s belief that it is essential for State and Defense urgently to review U.S. political-military policy with respect to the defense of the Middle East as a whole.

2. Endorse Admiral Radford’s proposal of a State-Defense working group to formulate appropriate policy recommendations, with the reservation that these recommendations should serve first as a basis for talks with the U.K. and only thereafter be formally submitted to the NSC, and urge that this group be established at a high level as soon as possible with instructions to report not later than June 15.

3. In order that State may prepare itself for participation in the working group, request that Admiral Cassady’s report of the tripartite military meetings in London be made available to the Department as soon as possible.

4. Seek Defense agreement to the holding of informal political-military talks with the U.K. as soon as practicable after the completion of the working group study and to an interim reply to the British informing them that we would be prepared to have informal discussions after we have completed a review of our own position.

1. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 70. Top Secret. Drafted by Elbert G. Mathews of the Policy Planning Staff. A notation on the source text indicates that it was seen by the Secretary.
2. See vol. XIV, pp. 70–72.