346. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran1

1295. January 31 Amini strongly urged on Hoover need for some positive act of US support for Iran view Soviet overtures2 and growth public doubts re Baghdad Pact. Urged US join Pact or make new statement re US interest in maintaining Iranian independence. At minimum wanted strong statement support Baghdad Pact in US-UK communiqué.3

Amini was told that while mention one specific country in communiqué would open Pandora’s box, we hope include statement support for Pact. Hoover explained inability US join Pact now. Reminded Amini of many previous US statements supporting Iran and explained Iran need feel no doubt re US continued interest and desire support Pact.

Suggest you use above in modifying Deptel 12774 when speaking to Shah and Prime Minister.

Amini also mentioned briefly Iran’s urgent need for financial aid. Was told US would continue view Iran’s problem sympathetically.

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Amini reported he had cabled Tehran recommending all oil revenues resulting from increased production over agreed levels would go to budget. Government reportedly approves and will submit proposal to Senate.

Re para 6 Embtel 1166.5 French aide-mémoire January 16 contained discursive survey conditions Middle East. Emphasized French desire cooperate in seeking solution Arab-Israel problem. Strongly urged establishment new economic development program in Middle East. Press reports of criticism Baghdad Pact grossly exaggerated. While French unenthusiastic toward Pact their aide-mémoire did not attack it and made no proposals hostile to Pact. This information passed to Iran Embassy confidentially.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/2–256. Secret. Drafted by Hannah, cleared by Kitchen and Baxter, and approved by Rountree.
  2. In telegram 1094 from Tehran, January 17, Chapin reported a conversation with Foreign Minister Ardalan. Ardalan informed him that Molotov on January 13 had suggested to the Iranian Ambassador in Moscow that the 1927 Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Non-Aggression be replaced by a guarantee of Iran’s neutrality from the four great powers. According to Ardalan, Molotov stated that the Soviet Union would be willing to give such a pledge if Iran left the Baghdad Pact. To counter these Soviet moves, Ardalan suggested to Chapin that the announcement of U.S. economic assistance to Iran would be an effective counterweight. (Ibid., 661.88/1–1756)
  3. For text of the joint statement, February 1, which does mention the Baghdad Pact, see Department of State Bulletin, February 13, 1956, pp. 232–234.
  4. Telegram 1277 to Tehran, January 30, reads as follows: “As you deem appropriate you may inform Shah as follows:

    “While difficult prejudge communiqué Eisenhower Eden talks we believe it will be general in scope and in all probability will not provide suitable occasion for special mention detailed problems of particular concern of Iran.” (Department of State, Central Files, 033.4111/1–2656)

  5. Not printed.