339. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State 1

599. 1. Within hour of drafting my 598,2 Prime Minister sent me urgently. At Prime Minister’s house I found Prime Minister, Ala and Amini who had left Shah only few minutes previously.

2. Prime Minister said, “I gave Shah a faithful account from my verbatim notes of what you had to say. Shah has instructed me to tell you that he is most grateful for US views. Shah has, however, after due consideration of points made by US, including that of possible Soviet reaction, decided that if Iran is to join pact it is case of now or never. Shah has decided not to alter his plans to adhere within next few days: His speech will be as planned earlier. Shah asked me to explain to you that maneuvers designed to prevent adherence are growing stronger and stronger and only way to stop them is by taking plunge.

3. Prime Minister smiled and said jokingly, “I know this early action is contrary to advice contained your instructions. Perhaps you would like us to leak this fact to the press.” (Comment: He obviously has no intention so doing.)

4. Ala went on to say that Shah will immediately proceed with steps necessary to join pact, i.e. he will call a combined meeting of foreign affairs committees of Senate and Majlis to lay before them his decision “without at this time asking their advice”. Next step, he said, will be formal diplomatic notes to embassies of pact powers here expressing desire to adhere. Upon receipt their formal replies (presumably invitations to join), there will be signature with one of contracting parties of an adherence instrument and simultaneous public announcement.

5. I said that it was possible my government might wish to amplify its views already expressed and asked how long these formalities would take to complete. Amini (who appears in reality to be acting Foreign Minister) said, “Perhaps until Wednesday.” I said, “Why not Thursday?” He agreed that action would not be completed before Thursday and said that I could so inform my government.

6. Whether or not Iran adheres to this schedule, I think there is little chance now of Shah receding from decision described above unless Department wishes me to go so far as first part of second [Page 789] sentence paragraph 1 of Department’s 569, October 6. This I am loathe to do without clarification and facts with which to answer Shah’s questions.

Chapin
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10–855. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, and London.
  2. Supra .