325. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State1
386. Following is text of confidential memorandum handed me Sept 2 (Embtel 385, Sept 3)2 by PriMin:
Begin text.3 The US should realize that the adherence of Iran to the Turkish-Iraqi Pact is a matter of vital importance which must be considered very carefully.
At a time when the USSR is showing unexpected conciliation in settling differences and making friendly overtures, early adherence, in our present weak condition, might provoke hostile reaction and dangerous retaliation.
An examination of the Turkish-Iraqi treaty does not anywhere reveal a guaranty on the part of the US to come to the defense of Iraq (or of Iran should she join the Baghdad Pact) in case of attack by Soviet forces. Would a transgression of our border by Russia constitute a casus belli?
Turkey of course is amply protected being a member of NATO, with American and British warships close by in the Eastern Mediterranean, and military aerodromes constructed by the US.
Public opinion and the feeling of parliament must be taken into account. The ground must be prepared; at present, opinion is divided (e.g. Taqizadeh4 who is hesitant and in favor of neutrality and enjoys the confidence of the people in contrast with Djamal Emami5 who is distrusted and all for joining the Baghdad Pact at once).
- (a)
- A greater amount of financial assistance by the US (60 percent of our revenue is now spent on our small army which must be increased and improved. Should we borrow money to finance our army? The ordinary budget cannot stand the strain of both civil and military expenditure and, as is well known, the oil revenues are by law earmarked for the carrying out of development projects by the Plan Organization);
- (b)
- The betterment of the lot of the people;
- (c)
- The recognition of Iranian sovereignty over the Bahrain Islands by the US and Great Britain (which would have a tremendous psychological effect on the people at large, making Great Britain and the US extremely popular);
- (d)
- A guaranty that the US and Great Britain would immediately come to the defense of Iran should she be attacked by the USSR;—all of these would strengthen the hands of the Iranian Govt in taking a decision. There is no idea of bargaining or of blackmail.
I am merely putting the facts clearly before you. Our sympathies are entirely with the West and our friendship for America is wholehearted and unshakeable. There is no thought of our going behind the Iron Curtain which, by the way, is being lifted after the Geneva talks. But we, we must know where we are going and calculate all the risks involved.
Although the Turkish President’s visit is really in return for the late Shah’s visit to the late Ataturk, we must be prepared to reply to any proposals or suggestions of Mr. Bayar. We must be clear about our requirements: Security and peace to improve the lot of the people; American financial, economic, and military assistance; a guaranty of our independence and an assurance that the US and Great Britain will come to our help if and when we are attacked.
(When Iran joins a regional defensive collective security pact she must do so with prestige and honor; with sufficient strength to protect her borders; with a clear assurance that the US and Great Britain will come to her assistance if attacked, i.e. a guaranty of her political independence and territorial integrity.) End text.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/9–355. Secret; Priority.↩
- In telegram 385, the Ambassador reported a discussion with Ala on September 2 which touched on many subjects including Iran’s adherence to the Baghdad Pact and American military assistance to Iran. At the end of this discussion, Ala handed Chapin the text of the memorandum transmitted in telegram 386. (Ibid., 780.5/9–355)↩
- The original memorandum in Ala’s handwriting was transmitted to the Department in despatch 131 from Tehran, September 8. (Ibid., 780.5/9–855)↩
- Seyed Hasan Taqizadeh, President of the Senate.↩
- Elected Senator from Tehran.↩