311. Letter From the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration(Stassen) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Hensel)1
Dear Mr. Hensel: Your letter of May 142 requested reconsideration of the magnitude of the planned FY 1956 allocation of funds for Defense Support and Direct Forces Support for Iran in light of recommendations from the field and JCS findings of April 12. In my letter to you of December 13 I expressed interest in strengthening training programs and supporting Iran’s defense budget on a limited scale. Several efforts were made in the current fiscal year to undertake projects toward this end and a supplementary fund of $3.5 million is now being programmed to support the expanded training effort. At the request of the Departments of State and Defense, FOA has also considered a $9.5 million construction program for the relocation of military units and stores in defense sites and for the construction of airfields and military roads. However, because it has not been possible to find funds to meet these added requirements, it now appears that this program, if it is to be carried out at all, will have to be funded in FY 1956 from (a) the $7.5 million included for this purpose in the FY 1956 Direct Forces Support request and (b) the $17.5 million illustratively programmed for this purpose in the total Defense Support funds sought for the Near East and Africa in FY 1956.
There remains, however, an important substantive question concerning the desirability of moving ahead with such a large scale defense site reconstruction program in advance of (1) an evaluation of Iranian military capabilities of the kind now being conducted by U.S. training teams in Iran, and (2) a U.S. governmental determination of the role which Iranian forces should play in Middle East defense. Before, and in the absence of, such an evaluation and determination, it is not possible to reach a conclusion as to whether the proposed [Page 741] projects are in fact confined, as your letter suggests they should be, “to training support and those projects which the Country Team can assure will not prejudge any future decision to support or not to support a change or addition to the current mission of the Iranian forces involved”. The proposed projects certainly go well beyond the purposes of training support, and it may also be that the relocation of units and depots, and the construction of new roads and airfields, as contemplated by these projects, would in fact prejudge a decision on the mission of Iranian forces involved. In any event, careful consideration should be given to the question of whether the United States, by financing some of these projects, is likely to lead the Government of Iran prematurely into thinking that the United States has an interest in a particular mission for the Iranian forces and has, through such financing, made commitments toward the support of the forces required to execute such a mission.
The foregoing note of caution and limitation is not intended to preclude the institution for sound political reasons of an expanded Direct Forces Support type of program which might also have important military by–product in terms of a more effective utilization of existing forces. For this reason FOA has recently supported an estimate for Mutual Security funds for Iran for FY 1957 which is based on an increase in Iranian defense construction requirements. Our request to the Budget Bureau, as you know, is composed of $15 million Direct Forces Support and a complementary $25 million Defense Support fund, on the assumption that this magnitude of construction and supporting activity can be justified even if there should be no increase in MDAP or the approved force basis for Iranian forces.
Since the beginning of FY 1956 is now close at hand and pressure from the field for a decision as to our future policies and course of action in this area is intense, it is suggested that a thorough study be commenced immediately here in Washington of the currently proposed and possible alternative military support program for Iran. It might also be desirable simultaneously to initiate a field evaluation to determine exactly which of these projects would in fact meet the criteria which you suggest and, therefore, be eligible, within such criteria, for early implementation.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/6–2855. Top Secret.↩
- See footnote 4, supra.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩