298. Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, February 8, 19551
SUBJECT
- Shah’s Conversation With [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], February 8, 1955
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] dined with the Shah February 8 in New York. The conversation was somewhat desultory due to a pre–dinner interruption by the Queen and, later, the presence of other dinner guests. The Shah indicated he was pleased to have had a talk with Deputy Under Secretary Henderson and later with Assistant Secretary Allen and Ambassador–designate Holmes. Although little new of a substantive nature had come up in these conversations, he had been very favorably impressed by Mr. Holmes and looked forward to having him in Iran.
The Shah also mentioned his half–hour’s conversation with Major General Harkins, Deputy Chief of Staff for G–3. While he had appreciated General Harkins calling on him, he had not understood entirely the objective of Harkins’ mission. (The Iranians had been carefully informed General Harkins was calling at General Ridgway’s request to clarify the planning underlining [underlying] the dispatch of the military [Page 710] training teams to Iran. General Harkins had also been ready to inform His Majesty that the United States was now planning to provide the essential field training facilities and supplies to get the Army training program under way and to facilitate the work of the United States Army teams. The Shah’s remark to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] may have been in the nature of a “fishing expedition” for any further information that might be available on the subject of military aid—JCK.)
At one point the Shah complained that he still didn’t know “where he stood” on aid. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] then told the Shah he had not been very specific in stating what he wanted the United States Government to do. He offered the opinion the Shah should set forth in concrete terms exactly what he would like the United States Government to do for him. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] remarked that even in their friendly, informal conversations in Florida, His Majesty had not been explicit in saying what he personally wanted in order to carry out his general program.
The Shah’s rejoinder was that what he really had in mind was budgetary aid for defense support purposes. He was facing at least three lean years before there would be any quantity of Iranian funds available for him to use in increasing the efficiency of his forces. He wanted to increase pay and allowances in order to attract better quality junior officers, and to give his troops decent food and quarters. This was important for morale, and to make training effective. He had no definite figures available but he thought “not a great deal of money” was involved as far as the United States was concerned. He estimated that approximately $20 million a year for three years would do the job. This, of course, would be in addition to the military end–item assistance required to equip and arm his forces as they were trained.
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said that while any discussion in this field was outside his competence, he urged the Shah to make these specific views known to the United States Government. The Shah said that he preferred to do so after his return to Iran and would plan to place his ideas before Ambassador Holmes after the latter’s arrival.
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said the Shah gave him the impression that he had thoroughly enjoyed his visit and was leaving this country with a feeling of understanding and accomplishment.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.1½–955. Secret. Drafted by Kitchen on February 9.↩