Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

290. Memorandum of Discussion at the 231st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 13, 1955¹

Washington, January 13, 1955

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1. “CIA Quarterly Report,” 2. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security,” 3. “U.S. Policy Toward Formosa and the Government of the Republic of China,” 4. “Current U.S. Policy Toward the Far East,” and 5. “United States Policy on Berlin.”]

6. U.S. Policy Toward Iran (NSC 5402/1;²NSC 5402;³ NSC Action No. 1266;⁴ NIE 34–54;⁵ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 10, 1955⁶)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council at some length on the background of the new policy paper on Iran (NSC 5402/1), calling particular attention to paragraphs 20 and 21 (copy of Mr. Cutler’s briefing notes filed in the minutes of the meeting).⁷ He then pointed out the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to paragraph 21. They wished that the “amount and rate” of such military and defense support aid to Iran should be directly “controlled by” rather than merely “related to” the various conditions set forth in the subparagraphs of paragraph 21. Furthermore, they wished to add an additional subparagraph e, to read as follows:

“e. The availability of military assistance and defense support funds in the light of U.S. worldwide commitments and duly established priorities.”

Secretary Humphrey said he strongly supported the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the inclusion of the condition set forth in their proposed subparagraph. The other members of the Council at first perceived no objection to adding this subparagraph. However, Under Secretary Hoover, who had taken Secretary Dulles’ place at the table, said he was opposed to adding this subparagraph, since he believed that the principle of the paragraph which the Joint Chiefs desired to add was present by implication in all NSC policies. The President inclined to agree with Secretary Hoover, and inquired whether, if the Joint Chiefs’ subparagraph was put in the Iranian paper, it would not appear to militate against Iran specifically, since such a paragraph had not been inserted in other policy papers.

Secretary Humphrey said that if it was absolutely implicit in all NSC papers, and if this implication were clearly understood by all concerned, he would have no objection to leaving the subparagraph out of the Iranian paper.

Secretary Hoover then said he wished to refer briefly to subparagraph 21–c, which conditioned U.S. military assistance to Iran on “the role which Iran is expected to play in Middle East defense”. Secretary Hoover went on to say that the State Department had been trying to get this role determined for something over a year and a half, and that there had been no policy decision on the matter. We were in very great need of deciding on some kind of defense plan for the whole Middle East area, and more particularly for Iran’s part in this area defense.

The President said that he thought it unlikely that we could do much more than make an approximation of Iran’s defensive role under varying assumptions.

Admiral Radford said he desired to point out the unusual difficulties which were encountered by military planning for this troubled part of the world. He mentioned the conversations with the British about Iran’s defense role, which had been delayed because of our desire to include the Turks in such conversations and the British objection to their inclusion. He then mentioned the “hassle” with Pakistan with respect to the amount of assistance which the United States was to afford that country. This problem remained to be ironed out. In any case, continued Admiral Radford, Pakistan and Turkey were the two key nations in the defense of the Middle East. We could readily defend Iran if we could expand the Pakistani Army to anything like its real potentialities. Military opinion, both in Pakistan and in Turkey, takes a very poor view of the military capabilities of the Iranian Army—in particular, of the capabilities of the Iranian officer corps. For these and other reasons, concluded Admiral Radford, it was going to take some little time yet to define the role of Iran in the defense of the Middle East.

The President pointed out the important contribution the Germans had earlier made to the development of the Turkish Army, and the great contribution which the British had made to developing the armed forces of what is now Pakistan. In the light of these historical facts, was it not possible that with the right help and guidance the Iranian Army could likewise be developed into something effective?

Mr. Cutler suggested that the point raised by Secretary Hoover could perhaps be met by the insertion of the words “early determination of” between “the” and “role” in paragraph 21–c.

The National Security Council:⁸

a. Discussed the subject on the basis of the reference report (NSC 5402/1) by the NSC Planning Board, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum.

b. Adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 5402/1, subject to the following amendments:

(1) Paragraph 14, first sentence: Delete the word “very”.

(2) Paragraph 21: Delete “[controlled by]”⁹ and the footnote relating thereto.

(3) Paragraph 21–b: Revise to read as follows:

“b. Iran’s ability and willingness to continue reorganization of its military establishment and its ability by intensive training under the tutelage of U.S. training teams satisfactorily to utilize present military equipment and to absorb additional equipment.”

(4) Paragraph 21–c: Revise to read as follows:

“c. Early determination of the role which Iran is expected to play in Middle East defense, following the conclusion of the current US–UK–Turkey military talks.”

(5) Paragraph 21–e: Delete this subparagraph and the footnote relating thereto, on the basis that the principle of this subparagraph is present by implication in all policies recommended by the NSC.

Note: NSC 5402/1, as amended, approved by the President, subsequently circulated as NSC 5504,¹⁰ and transmitted to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

[Here follow items 7. “Security Requirements for Government Employment” and 8. “Report by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.”]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on January 14.
2. See footnote 8, Document 286.
3. Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, p. 865.
4. NSC Action No. 1266, November 9, 1954, noted an OCB Progress Report on “United States Policy Toward Iran,” October 13, 1954, and noted that the NSC Planning Board was reviewing NSC 5402 in light of the Progress Report. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95) The OCB Progress Report, October 13, is not printed. (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5402 Memoranda)
5. NIE 34–54, “Probable Developments in Iran Through 1955,” December 7, 1954, is not printed. (Ibid., NIE–INR Files)
6. See footnote 1, Document 287.
7. The minutes of all National Security Council meetings are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File.
8. Paragraphs a and b and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 1304, approved January 13, 1955. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
9. Brackets in the source text.
10. Infra.