Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

161. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs and the Policy Planning Staff¹

Washington, December 5, 1956.

PROGRAM TO COUNTER SOVIET PENETRATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

I. Essentials of the Problem

1. The primary threat to the interests of the United States and the West in the Middle East (especially oil, Suez Canal and pipelines) arises from Soviet efforts at penetration.

2. Soviet penetration is facilitated at present by three factors:

a. The ambitions of Nasser and the willingness of Nasser and the Syrians to work with the Soviets, especially to obtain arms.

b. The instability and divisions among the other Middle Eastern nations which fear Communist penetration.

c. The increased animosity toward the UK and France resulting from their military action against Egypt and intensified by the fact that their action was taken in conjunction with Israel’s invasion of Egypt.

3. We must assume the Soviets will exploit whatever opportunities are available to enhance their influence in the Middle East. No direct means is available to us to stop them from doing so. Accordingly, our efforts to counter Soviet penetration must be directed primarily at curtailing the opportunities offered by the above factors or restricting Soviet means of exploiting them.

4. Any progress toward these objectives will require that the issue of troop withdrawals be disposed of. The UK and France have now announced their intention to withdraw their forces from Egypt, and Israel is in the process of withdrawing from the Sinai peninsula. Israel must also remove its forces from the Gaza strip and the islands in the Gulf of Aqaba.

II. Elements of a Program

1. Our efforts to counter Soviet penetration must proceed on several fronts at the same time. An effective program must include measures to—

a. Circumscribe Nasser’s power and influence and to mobilize the UN and other opinion for actions that will serve this purpose.

b. Close off access to Soviet arms for Egypt and Syria.

c. Enhance the cohesion and sense of common interest among the anti-Communist actions of the area.

d. Seal off or mitigate the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The program outlined below includes a series of actions intended to advance these several purposes and to reinforce one another.

2. The program cannot succeed without the support of the friendly countries of the area and a substantial majority within the UN—such a majority necessarily including a number of the so-called uncommitted countries. Both of these prerequisites will depend on the conviction in the Middle East and Asia that we are firmly committed to support genuine independence for the countries concerned. Our stand in the Egyptian crisis has reinforced this conviction and greatly increased our prestige and opportunity for leadership.

3. In order to mobilize the requisite support, we will have to avoid several pitfalls:

a. We will have to counter suspicion that our aim is to dominate or control any of the countries or to reimpose British domination in a different form. For this reason, our actions will be largely self-defeating if they create a general impression that our objective is directly to overthrow Nasser.

b. Our actions must not appear to threaten the obvious security interests of the Soviet Union. Otherwise they will be considered by some to justify Soviet counteractions. Thus we must not appear to be seeking to make this area a base of operations for our own purposes as against the Soviet Union. Indeed, some of the necessary measures, especially in the UN, will have to be publicly justified on grounds other than the contest with the Soviet Union.

In short, our program must commend itself to the friendly states in the area and to the UN. We must count on the cumulative effect of the various measures [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to frustrate Soviet penetration and use of Egypt and Syria for this purpose.

III. Proposed Program

1. The measures outlined hereunder should be pursued concurrently. It may be anticipated that Egypt will oppose all of them. We should play upon this opposition to stigmatize Egypt as an impediment to peace and progress in the Middle East. By so doing, we should be able to mobilize opinion against Nasser and to circumscribe his power and influence.

A. Proposal for Middle East Charter

2. A new framework for cohesion and cooperation among the Middle Eastern states that have some comprehension of the Soviet menace is urgently needed. The Baghdad Pact, particularly because of its reputation in the area as a British instrument, very probably cannot be adapted for this purpose. There are reasonably good prospects of forming a new grouping around a nucleus consisting of Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Other potential members are Ethiopia, Jordan, Libya, Sudan and Yemen. Egypt and Syria would almost certainly refuse to join such a grouping.

3. The documentary basis of this new grouping would be a Middle East Charter setting forth the principles which the subscribing states believe should govern their relations with each other and the rest of the world. The Charter would include a strong anti-Communist declaration. We would encourage and bolster the new grouping by giving a unilateral commitment to support its members against Communist aggression and by providing substantial economic and some military assistance to the members. This concept is further developed in the paper entitled “Proposal for a New Grouping of Middle Eastern States”.

B. Suez Canal and IPC Pipeline

4. We should urge the UN SYG to expedite the survey of the Suez Canal and to submit a report of the survey to the UNGA at the earliest possible date. We should continue to support the SYG in his efforts to begin the early clearance of the Canal either by unilateral US statements or by GA action as appropriate. We should at an appropriate time support a GA resolution endorsing the efforts being made by the SYG to bring about early agreement on a permanent regime for the Canal based on the six principles approved by the UNSC. We should also explore the possibilities of obtaining passage of a resolution putting the GA on record as favoring the prompt repair and return to operation of the IPC pipeline.

C. Israel-Arab Armistice Lines and Arms Embargo

5. We should continue to support the SYG, by such methods as may be appropriate, in his efforts to deploy the UNEF in the Gaza strip, on the islands in the Gulf of Aqaba and at key points along the Egypt-Israel Armistice Line. We should urge the SYG, once this deployment is achieved, to retain the UNEF in these positions until the GA is satisfied that the objectives of its resolutions with respect to the Egyptian crisis have been attained.

6. At a time and in circumstances that will not jeopardize the arrangements outlined in 5 and with particular regard to the likelihood of support by a substantial number of nations, we should introduce a resolution in the UNGA providing for UNEF patrol of all Arab-Israel armistice lines with the consent of the parties (see draft resolution attached). It is doubtful whether such consent [unknown amount of source text missing] the four contiguous Arab states until the GA determines that stable peace has been established in the area. It might well be difficult to get the necessary GA votes for this proposal, especially if it could be objected that this would deprive the four Arab states of the ability to defend themselves against their other neighbors. In order to meet this objection, we should explore the possibility of having the UN undertake some special obligation for the security of the states thereby deprived of further arms. This would also help to counter efforts to extend the ban to cover other countries.

D. Restraint of Israel

8. We should press Israel (a) to agree to the stationing of UNEF or to a substantial increase of the UNTSO observer corps on its armistice lines with Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, (b) to extend full cooperation to UNTSO and (c) to abandon its policy of dealing unilaterally with Arab incursions into Israel by reprisal raids. We should if necessary use the threat of US economic sanctions to ensure Israel’s compliance.

E. Permanent Solution of Arab-Israel Conflict

9. We should press for UNGA action on a resolution, similar to the one we have tabled, providing for a GA committee to explore the possibilities of a permanent settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict. We should make it clear that the committee would be expected to examine the problems of permanent boundaries and equitable arrangements for the reintegration of the Arab refugees into the political and economic life of the Middle East. Arrangements should be made to convene the GA in special session in the spring of 1957 to receive the committee’s report or to avoid an adjournment of the Eleventh regular Assembly so that that it can reconvene promptly at the call of its President.

10. We should continue our support of UNRWA and reach an early decision on the question of UNGA action to transfer primary responsibility for the administration of refugee relief to host governments.

11. We should consider at a later stage the utility of establishing a UN agency to stimulate and coordinate economic development and cultural cooperation in the Middle East. Such an agency might facilitate the resettlement and rehabilitation of the Arab refugees and, in time, provide a bridge for cooperation between Israel and the Arab States.

IV. Understanding With UK and France

1. We should inform the UK and France of the foregoing program, pointing out that it is directed toward countering Soviet penetration in the Middle East and circumscribing Nasser’s power and influence. It would, therefore, serve their interests as well as ours. In adopting this program, we have had very much in mind the vital importance of the Middle East to Western Europe.

2. We should seek to convince the UK and France that they should, for the time being at least, avoid injecting themselves in the Middle East and leave to the US the primary responsibility of restoring the Western position in the area. We should make it clear to them that in our view the methods they have recently been following will only increase Soviet opportunities and capabilities.

[Here follows the text of a draft resolution to be placed before the U.N. General Assembly concerning the Arab-Israeli dispute.]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.80/12–556. Secret. Forwarded to Secretary Dulles under cover of a December 5 memorandum from Bowie and Rountree, indicating that the paper was a revised version of the one discussed at the December 3 meeting and should be considered in conjunction with the paper attached at Tab A, supra. Wilcox, Phleger, and Barnes concurred in the paper. The Bureau of European Affairs concurred in the general approach. Murphy noted on the source text: “comments forthcoming.” Henderson concurred “subject to reservation favoring Baghdad Pact.” MacArthur submitted no comments on the paper.