Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

138. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, November 14, 1956—1 p.m.

757. After careful consideration I respectfully suggest developments moving too rapidly and threat deterioration BP much too imminent permit wait-and-see attitude envisaged Deptel 939, November 12 to Tehran² (see today’s AP reports from Baghdad and Beirut re threat Iraqi withdrawal). In my judgment great danger disintegration BP exists with consequent grave decline US prestige unless US gives satisfactory assurances BP members immediately.

Prime Minister told me yesterday (inadvertently I thought) that at recent four power Tehran meeting it was thought wiser postpone formal January BP Council meeting Karachi because of mounting anti-British sentiment throughout ME. He indicated feeling persisted that without full membership US to offset British membership four Muslim powers might prefer have UK out of Pact.

In view vehemence with which all BP Prime Ministers urged early US adherence Pact (Embtel 731, November 9)³ as reinforced Menderes representations to Warren (Istanbul’s 366, November 10),⁴ Mirza’s statements to Hildreth (Karachi’s 1345, November 12)⁵ and remarks made to Gallman (Baghdad’s 795, November 9)⁶ I am certain on basis my conversations with four Prime Ministers, Shah and Mirza that four Muslim governments will not be content at this moment with mere statement our negative attitude towards US adherence BP as outlined numbered paragraph 1, Deptel 939, November 12 to Tehran. I suggest it most important US continue exercise leadership for which BP powers look to US and which they have valued so highly in present crisis. If we are not prepared take early action responsive their recommendation we should spell out candidly and in detail “variety of reasons” why we believe time is not propitious particularly in view detailed refutation by Menderes and others earlier US objections.

As seen from Tehran major obstacle to US membership at this time is apprehension re nature Soviet reaction. It is fully appreciated here that reactions Soviet Union to such move can only be adequately evaluated in Washington and must be paramount in Department’s thinking. However Turkey and Pakistan already enjoy US assurances under NATO and SEATO in event aggression, and US has taken strong stand to protect Iran against Soviet threats on two occasions since 1945. Non-aggressive nature BP clear from text and confirmed by recent events. US adherence now could not be properly interpreted as aggressive, would be in line actual US policy and interest ME and could be expected exert strong attraction on non-Communist Arab states.

Thanks to courageous stand President and USDel in UN moral leadership US in ME has never been higher. As reported my telegrams this fact fully recognized by four BP Prime Ministers not only through statements to me and US representatives other BP capitals but in formal communiqué Tehran conference. At same time British prestige has dropped sharply result Suez intervention. It appears from here now is golden opportunity while situation is still fluid consolidate US position by early adherence BP rather than permit this ascendance be dissipated by what may seem to four Muslim powers lapse of US interest in area if not unwillingness continue provide decisive leadership. If US remains unwilling join Pact when previously stated reasons appear no longer valid members likely conclude real reason for US refusal is unreadiness commit itself defense ME. This interpretation would have shattering effect on morale BP countries.

Chapin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–1456. Secret; Niact. Repeated Niact to Ankara, Baghdad, and Karachi, and Priority to Paris and London.

2. In telegram 939 to Tehran, sent also to Ankara, Baghdad, and Karachi, the Department of State in response to reports of apprehension among Baghdad Pact members over the Suez Crisis and danger of Soviet intervention advised:

   “Because of current high tension in area and possibility precipitate action might be undertaken and have adverse counter action, we believe all countries interested in area should move with extreme caution. During next few weeks we will have opportunity to study and assess situation and should be ready to discuss results and next steps at Baghdad Pact’s meeting in January [1957].” (Ibid., 780.5/11–1256)

3. Supra.
4. Not found.
5. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–1256)
6. In telegram 795, Gallman reported in part that Iraqi Foreign Minister Bashayan had told him that anti-British and anti-government feelings were rapidly mounting in Iraq and that all sides were concerned over the possibility of Soviet intervention in the area. (Ibid., 684A.86/11–956)