132. Memorandum of Discussion at the 289th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 28, 19561
[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1–3: a briefing by Allen Dulles on significant developments affecting U.S. security, East-West exchanges, and U.S. civil aviation policy toward the Soviet Union and its satellites. Vice President Nixon presided at the meeting.]
4. United States Objectives and Policies With Respect to the Near East (NSC 5428;2 Progress Report, dated May 17, 1956, by OCB on NSC 54283)
Mr. Anderson briefed the Council on the main points of the reference Progress Report (copy of brief filed in the minutes of the meeting).4 In the course of his briefing he stressed a notable development as to the Israeli water development plan. The Israelis had privately expressed to the U.S. Government their interest in a proposal under which they would agree not to go forward with their project for a diversion of the Jordan River waters (the Banat Yacov project) if they were granted their request for a $75 million loan from the Export-Import Bank for the development of other water resources than the Jordan River.
In concluding his briefing, Mr. Anderson pointed out that although a review of our current policy toward the Near East was directed some time ago by the National Security Council, the President had recently stated that this review should not be completed until he “determines that evolving conditions in that area make feasible the adoption of a new long-term policy toward the Near East.” In the meantime, interdepartmental studies were going forward as to the [Page 308] possible impact upon the oil supply in Western Europe of several possible developments in the oil-producing and oil-transit states in the Middle East.
When Mr. Anderson had concluded his briefing, Secretary Humphrey inquired whether the last point, on postponing a review of our Near East policy, should be taken to inform the Export-Import Bank to sit quiet and do nothing about the Israeli request for a $75 million loan for water development. Secretary Humphrey pointed out that certain negotiations with the Israelis on this subject were now going on. If the Council did not wish the Bank to do anything about this matter, the officials of the Export-Import Bank should be so informed.
Secretary Dulles replied that all the President wanted was to postpone a general review of our Near East policy at the present time. This by no means meant that the Export-Import Bank should not continue its negotiations with the Israeli Government with respect to a loan for water development in Israel. Secretary Humphrey stated that as far as the Export-Import Bank goes, “we let nature take its course.”
Secretary Dulles replied that we would certainly not want to agree to accept the Israeli commitment to do nothing for a period of two years with respect to the Jordan River diversion in return for a loan. Secretary Dulles then went on to emphasize that the situation in the Middle East, as far as oil resources and supply were concerned, was a situation of the utmost gravity for the entire free world. Most of the oil production in this area was in the Arab countries, some 80% of it. The rest of it was in Iran. The great danger lay in the fact that transportation of the oil and the pipelines centered in areas under the control of Syria and Egypt. Syria controlled the pipelines, and Egypt controlled transportation through the Suez Canal. Thus these two countries had a hold on the jugular vein of Western Europe, and obviously the Soviets were seeking to increase their influence in both Syria and Egypt. If these lines were cut, we would be faced at once with a crisis. The Arabs can certainly try to blackmail us, and the whole situation was made to order for the USSR to move in on. This was, in fact, the toughest long-range problem that we were up against, and it explains why the State Department is trying so hard to avoid adopting a policy of all-out support for Israel. Adoption of such an all-out support policy for Israel would almost certainly permit the USSR to dominate the Middle East and, as a result of its control of the oil of that region, to dominate Western Europe.
Secretary Dulles then suggested that one possible solution to the problem might be for the United States to build a lot of much larger tankers. This would reduce Western Europe’s dependence on the pipelines and on the Suez Canal. Admiral Radford pointed out that the number of tankers required to reduce this dependence would be impossibly [Page 309] large. Secretary Humphrey agreed with Admiral Radford. Secretary Dulles said that perhaps this was the case, but that some solution had got to be found for Western Europe’s abject dependence on Arab whims.
Admiral Radford said he had another difficulty to raise with the Council. A few months ago the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been directed to conduct military planning with the British and French to meet the possibility of war in the Middle East. To date we have not discussed military planning with the French, because we had been informed to plan with the French only if they requested to be brought into the planning, and they had not as yet made such a request. We had, however, continuously been planning with the British, and now, indeed, had run into an impasse with the British military people as to our contingency planning. The British officers are insistent on a combined command structure throughout the Middle East, even though the head of the combined command structure might be an American and not a Britisher. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are strongly opposed to a combined command structure for the Middle East, and the issue may have to be resolved at the governmental level because it cannot be resolved at the military level.
[1 paragraph (12 ½ lines of source text) not declassified]
Admiral Radford commented that the British would be completely out of the picture in the Middle East if they lost Cyprus and its bases. While the American military have not counted on using Cyprus bases in the event of hostilities, nevertheless the fact remains that if we were barred from a Cyprus base we would have to go in and seize some other base or else induce the Turks to provide us with one.
Secretary Dulles concluded that while the Middle East was providing us with a lot of headaches, at least—as the Vice President had just pointed out—there was so far no war in the Middle East. For this we could be thankful.
The National Security Council:5
Noted and discussed the reference Progress Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on June 29.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 525.↩
- Not printed. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Near East (NSC 5428))↩
- The minutes of all National Security Council Meetings are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File.↩
- The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1597, approved by the President on June 29. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action)↩