Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume XI

204. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 6, 1955¹

Washington, December 6, 1955.

SUBJECT

• UN Membership

PARTICIPANTS

• The Italian Ambassador
• Secretary of State Dulles
• Mr. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary for International Organizations
• Mr. Jones—EUR:WE

The Italian Ambassador called today under instructions from his Prime Minister (the Foreign Minister has not yet returned from the Far East) to present Sig. Segni’s views on the UN membership problem for the Secretary’s consideration. The Ambassador began by saying that the Italian Government and the Embassy here were extremely grateful for everything that the U.S. had done to support the Italian application for membership in the UN; that should Italy be admitted this year it would be through the efforts of the U.S. and not by the grace of the USSR. The Italian Government understood, Sig. Brosio continued, the problem which a package solution created for the U.S., particularly one including Outer Mongolia. This situation, according to reports, had led the U.S. to a decision to abstain on the entire membership question.

The Secretary, who indicated agreement with the Ambassador’s statement thus far, interrupted to explain the American position. He said that our decision was influenced by three considerations:

1. That we wish to see as many as possible of the eligible and qualified states in the UN.

2. That we wish to see them admitted within the spirit of the UN charter as interpreted by the advisory opinion of the International Court.

3. That UN membership was not an appropriate subject in which to exercise the veto.

In reviewing these considerations, it had been decided that the most appropriate course for the U.S. to follow with respect to the membership proposal for all 18 applicants, which is now before the General Assembly, was to abstain.

The Secretary went on to say that the primary consideration at the moment was the threat of the Chinese Nationalist veto in the Security Council of Outer Mongolia’s application. He reviewed the history of the creation of Outer Mongolia stemming from the Soviet Chinese Treaty of August, 1945 in which Chiang Kai-shek paid a heavy price for the promise of Soviet support of his government. The Secretary described the Soviet Union’s duplicity in this instance as one of the greatest frauds in history. He added that similar cases could be made against the European satellites such as Albania, etc. and that we could not bring ourselves to cast a positive vote for them or Outer Mongolia.

The Italian Ambassador expressed his understanding of our feelings on this question but added that his government had a public opinion problem also. He went on to say that should Italy enter the UN with the Soviet Union voting in favor and the U.S. abstaining, the Social Communists in Italy would be presented with a powerful propaganda weapon: i.e. that Italy had entered the UN with a favorable Russian vote and in spite of the abstention of the U.S. In order to insure that the U.S. position be clear to the average Italian, the Prime Minister had asked the Ambassador to submit for the Secretary’s consideration three proposals for action:

1. That the resolution proposing the admission of the 18 applicants for membership be “global” in character in the introductory phrases but that it so list each applicant separately that the U.S. would have an opportunity to indicate its favorable vote for Italy, Spain, Austria, etc. and its abstention on Albania, Outer Mongolia, etc.

2. If his suggestion to vote on each applicant separately would endanger the entire proposal, then the Italian Premier hoped that the U.S. would be able to cast an affirmative vote for the package proposal with a clear statement rejecting any implication that its vote favored the satellites. (Premier Segni felt that a positive vote by the U.S. would influence the Chinese Nationalists at least to abstain on Outer Mongolia while an abstention on our part would make it easier for them to veto the package.)

3. The same effect as in No. 2 might be achieved if the U.S. decided to abstain by making a clear statement at the time of our vote that our abstention implied no disinterest in the admission of our friends such as Italy, Spain, Austria, etc., whose membership we had consistently supported and welcomed.

The Ambassador added that he had been instructed to say that his Prime Minister hoped that the United States would find it possible to vote affirmatively on the membership resolution rather than abstain; in other words, follow alternative No. 2 rather than 3.

The Secretary replied that he had been in Rome recently and that he knew and appreciated the views of the Italian Government on this question and the problem which it had in the face of its public opinion. He added, however, that we had a public opinion problem here as well. With respect to our influence on the Chinese Nationalists, the Secretary said that our position of abstention was one which the Taipei Government might find possible to accept for themselves, although he was not hopeful. If we should switch to an affirmative vote we would lose all influence on them and they might be more inclined to cast a negative note [vote].

The Ambassador said that, if he understood correctly, he would report as follows to his Government:

1. That the Secretary did not believe that U.S. abstention on the membership question would in fact encourage the Chinese Nationalists to exercise their veto—rather, the contrary.

2. That should the U.S. feel obliged (which apparently was the case) to adhere to its decision to abstain on the membership question, that our abstention would be accompanied by a clear statement that we favored admission of such countries as Italy, Spain, Austria, etc., and that our abstention related only to our distaste of the satellites.

The Secretary indicated his concurrence with the Ambassador’s understanding of the U.S. position.

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199, December 1955. Confidential. Drafted by Jones. Cleared in draft by Wilcox.