596. Instruction From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Venezuela1
SUBJECT
- Transmitting Copies of Security Survey of Venezuela’s Petroleum and Iron Ore Mining Industries
For the Embassy’s use only, there are enclosed two complete copies of the report2 of the security survey of Venezuela’s strategic petroleum and iron ore mining installations, conducted earlier this year by William Brewster and Edward Patrick Gallagher of International Police Services, Inc., a private corporation located at Washington, D.C. The survey was undertaken by the company under arrangements concluded with the Department, which was assigned responsibility for the project under paragraph 53 of “Analysis of Internal Security Situation in Venezuela and Recommended Action”, prepared under NSC Action No. 1290–d and approved by the Operations Coordinating Board on June 13, 1956. The primary purpose of the survey was to review the recommendations of, and compliance with, a similar project undertaken in Venezuela in 1948, and to assess, on a current basis, the vulnerability of the petroleum and iron ore mining industries to sabotage.
The survey conducted in 1948 did not include Venezuela’s iron ore mining facilities, but did include the oil refining installations in the neighboring islands of Aruba and Curacao, in addition to the petroleum industry in Venezuela. NSC Action 163/1, approved by the President on October 24, 1953, entitled “Security of Strategically Important Industrial Operations in Foreign Countries”,3 assigned to the Department certain responsibilities in connection with security [Page 1169] surveys not only of Venezuela’s oil industry, but also of the refineries located in Aruba and Curacao, which are dependent for their operation on the availability of crude oil supplied from Venezuela. It was envisaged that the survey undertaken in Venezuela earlier this year would be extended to include the refineries in Aruba and Curacao, but that did not prove possible in view of the refusal of the Netherlands Government to permit such a survey.
In addition to providing a comprehensive review of the installations and facilities of individual petroleum and iron ore mining companies in Venezuela, the report contains sections on administration, the Guardia Nacional, Seguridad Nacional, conclusions and recommendations, and a bibliography.
In summary, the main conclusions reached by the survey team are:
- 1.
- The industry as a whole is vulnerable to destruction or damage from acts of sabotage committed either by individual saboteurs or by armed bands.
- 2.
- General compliance with the recommendations of the 1948 survey is not evident; although several companies have initiated extensive security programs others have not done so.
- 3.
- Uniform participation by the companies in a security program requires a continuing external impetus to insure constant maintenance of security measures.
- 4.
- Destructive acts by organized labor are not likely.
- 5.
- Fire protection and safety programs are generally adequate, the oil industry having made tremendous improvements in these respects since the previous survey.
- 6.
- Communications facilities, embracing both intra and inter-company networks, are generally adequate.
- 7.
- Attack against company water supplies is not likely.
- 8.
- The security of the oil industry cannot be considered independent of the security existing in related service and supply companies.
The section of the report entitled “Security Program Guide” contains recommendations for the establishment of an adequate security system in the oil and iron ore mining industries in Venezuela. The initial task, the report states, is for company management to survey and evaluate its installations to determine which are the most important to continued operations and which are most susceptible to attack or sabotage. It must be recognized that it is not economically feasible or theoretically necessary that all kinds of installations achieve the same degree of protection. The protection to be provided to each facility should be based upon an analysis of two factors: (1) the degree to which the facility is critical to the continued operation of the company’s installations as a whole, and (2) its vulnerability to attack. The report outlines additional broad criteria for establishing a [Page 1170] security system and then proceeds to make more specific recommendations for implementation by individual companies:
- 1.
- Management should designate a Security Director and delegate to him sufficient high-level support to enable him to administer the company’s security program in coordination with the Venezuelan Government and the security directors of other companies, so that an integrated, industry-wide program can be established.
- 2.
- Certain restricted areas among company installations should be designated and safeguarded.
- 3.
- Access to certain facilities should be restricted, and a badge and identification control system should be established.
- 4.
- An adequate screening program should be established for employees.
- 5.
- Adequate guard forces should be organized under the direction of the Security Director, with care taken in their selection, training and indoctrination.
- 6.
- Perimeter barriers around key installations should be established and provision made for enforcing them.
- 7.
- Perimeter barriers and critical facilities should be adequately illuminated.
- 8.
- Adequate security communications networks should be established.
- 9.
- Protective alarm systems should be employed wherever necessary.
- 10.
- An emergency plan should be prepared to provide for protection in the event of fire, Acts of God, strikes, riots and sabotage.
- 11.
- Special control procedures should be established to safeguard movement of vehicles, entry of packages, and of such key facilities as transformers, communications centers and equipment, main control valves, regulator stations, water tanks and pumps.
The Embassy is requested to review the enclosed report in detail and to submit its comments in regard to the efficacy of the survey, the validity of survey team’s conclusions, and the feasibility of its recommendations. The Department is transmitting under separate cover sufficient edited and abridged copies of the report to supply the Venezuelan Government and the individual oil and iron ore mining companies that participated in the survey.4
The Embassy should distribute these copies to the addressees only after it has reviewed the report in sufficient detail to assure itself that the information contained therein can appropriately be released. In distributing the edited copies of the report the Embassy should emphasize the confidential nature of the survey and the necessity for restricting distribution of the report to those who need to know. No reference should be made to the participation of any agency other than the Department in making arrangements for the [Page 1171] conduct of the survey, and no pertinent NSC or OCB documents should be cited.
After the copies of the report have been distributed to all addressees, the Embassy should discuss the report with appropriate officials of the Venezuelan Government and the individual oil and iron ore mining companies in order to determine the best procedure to implement the recommendations of the survey team. Wherever necessary, the report should be brought up to date by appropriate revision, and the Embassy should submit periodic reports of its progress in encouraging compliance with the recommendations of the survey team. Copies of the complete report have been distributed to interested agencies of the U.S. Government, but not to the U.S. affiliates of the companies that participated in the survey.5