594. Despatch From the Ambassador in Venezuela (McIntosh) to the Department of State1
Summary: The election of 1952 served to demonstrate to the Pérez Jiménez Government that the maintenance of stability and the accomplishment of a considerable amount of progress did not serve to overcome public hostility to its authoritarian shortcomings.
Five additional years of vast material achievement has failed to alter the picture. The Government—after considerable delay, suggesting indecision—finally disclosed a late-hour plan which precluded a contested election. This took the form of a plebiscite under which a liberally defined electorate would be given an opportunity to approve the Regime and reelect Pérez Jiménez on December 15, 1957.
Following the announcement of the proposed plebiscite, the rubber-stamp Congress quickly passed it without amendment and the Regime—by pressure on the business community, professional organizations, government controlled labor and on other “fuerzas vivas”—carried off a successful lightning campaign to drum up “spontaneous” messages of support for the Regime and its Election plan.
Within two weeks after the passage of the Election Law, election machinery was completely organized down to the lowest level and a get-out-the-vote campaign initiated.
Business and professional sectors and government officials for the most part reacted favorably to the idea of a plebiscite. However, the suppressed political opposition clandestinely attacked the Government plan on both constitutional and moral grounds; and many [Page 1165] native Venezuelans became irritated by the Election Law provision that aliens with two year residence may vote. Although voting is not compulsory, the government had made it clear that it desires a large turn out and this became a matter of concern to U.S. citizens. Since under our Immigration and Nationality Act citizens will lose their nationality by voting in the plebiscite, the Embassy explained the situation to the Venezuelan Government and with the latter’s agreement published a notice quoting the pertinent provision of Public Law 414.
The approaching election date witnessed an increase in wild rumors and unfounded speculation that serious disturbances and possibly considerable violence would develop. However the only outbreak of anti-government agitation thus far has been limited to university and secondary school students who held protest demonstrations. These were quickly and effectively quashed by security agents.
With slightly more than a week remaining before election, the Pérez Jiménez regime appears to be well in control of the situation and should be able to weather further minor disturbances, provided it does so prudently and avoids creating an emotional crisis. With no effective opposition in sight and with the armed forces apparently supporting the Regime, the mechanics of the plebiscite make it appear a foregone conclusion that the Regime will be “approved” at the polls on December 15 by an overwhelming majority.
[Here follows an account of pre-election situation in Venezuela.]
Pre-Election Estimate of the Situation.
With slightly more than a week remaining before the election, the Pérez Jiménez regime appears to be well in control of the situation and should be able to weather the minor disturbances inspired by opposition elements, which might crop up before the election date provided it does so prudently and avoids creating an emotional situation of crisis proportions around which the opposition could crystalize public opinion against the Government to the extent of forcing the issue. The Government seems aware of this pitfall and appears to have tried to sidestep it, judging by the pains it took to avoid bloodshed during the quashing of the student demonstration.
Further student restiveness can be expected both before and after the election. However, thus far, the student disturbances have not spread to other segments of the population, although the possibility that labor groups might be encouraged to take some sort of action should not be discounted despite the fact that independent organized labor activities have been heavily harassed and curtailed by the Government during the last few years. Labor’s grievances [Page 1166] against the Government are many and fundamental and in recent weeks there have been rumors of impending strikes; but it is doubtful that independent labor has the wherewithal to initiate serious trouble for the Regime.
As was indicated above, political activity is now not only a factual but a legal monopoly of the Regime and the political opposition, whether in exile or in a state of dormant “toleration”, must rely on clandestine methods of operation. In the absence of an emotional crisis which the opposition political groups could use to heat up public passions to their own advantage, their capabilities, whether singly or united, appear to be negligible as long as the military continues to support Pérez Jiménez.
While lacking unanimity of hierarchical opinion, opposition elements in the Church do not seem disposed to become involved in the election situation as long as the Government does not take action against the Church or clergy. The Government seems to be aware of the dangers in picking a fight with the Church and it would appear unlikely that the Regime’s tacticians would run the risk of doing so at this time.
Rumors of schisms within the military have cropped up from time to time, particularly during the last few months. For the most part these rumors appear to be the outgrowth of public speculation rather than based on accurate knowledge. Clandestine opposition pamphlets circulating locally are designed to sow dissention among the military and contain appeals to the armed forces to oust the “triumvirate” of Pérez Jiménez, Vallenilla Lanz and Estrada on the basis that the latter is now using the military to advance its own ends rather than continuing the “government of the Armed Forces”. While undoubtedly there are dissident or personally ambitious individuals within the armed forces, by and large the Venezuelan military officers enjoy a unique position of special privilege and opportunity for graft and it would appear unlikely that they would want to risk a plot to oust Pérez Jiménez in the absence of disturbed conditions. Moreover, so far as is known, there does not appear to be any military man on the scene who at the same time is personally ambitious and enjoys sufficient popularity and influence with the officer corps to lead dissident officers in a coup against the Regime. Were such an individual known to the Embassy, he would probably also be known to the Regime and safely taken out of action as happened to Lt. Col. Oscar Tamayo Suarez.
With some exceptions, business is good and the economic situation continues favorable. It is highly unlikely that the business community as a whole would be willing to become involved in anything that would disturb economic conditions for the sake of altering the political situation. The feeling of the economic sector [Page 1167] toward the Government is generally favorable, despite occasional complaints about grafting officials and some resentment about the pressure in connection with the Government’s campaign to drum up “spontaneous” messages of support.
Venezuela has been subjected to rule by dictators throughout most of its history. In the absence of democratic traditions, the majority of the Venezuelans have developed what appears to be an apathetic or acquiescent attitude toward their authoritarian governments. In the present political situation, the typical mood of the man in the street appears to be one of passive, though cynical, acceptance of the Regime’s decision and plans to remain in power. Under the circumstances described in the preceeding paragraphs and given the mechanics of the plebiscite itself, it appears a foregone conclusion that the Regime will be able to announce that it has been “approved” at the polls on December 15 by an overwhelming majority.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 731.00/12–657. Confidential.↩