Office of the Historian

351. Memorandum of a Conversation, Villa le Chene, Geneva, November 10, 1955, Noon1

Geneva, November 10, 1955

USDel/MC/40

SUBJECT

  • Tactics for Item 2 and Future Work of the Conference
[Page 742]

PARTICIPANTS

  • United States
    • The Secretary
    • Mr. Stassen
    • Mr. MacArthur
    • Mr. Merchant
    • Mr. Bowie
    • Mr. Gray
    • Mr. Wainhouse
    • Col. Bailey
    • Mr. Matteson
  • United Kingdom
    • Mr. Macmillan
    • Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick
    • Sir George Young
    • Mr. Pink
    • Mr. MacKenzie
    • Mr. Hancock
  • France
    • M. de Margerie
    • M. de Menthon
    • Gen. Genevey

Mr. Pink, on behalf of the officials on the working level, submitted four points for the consideration of the three Ministers:

1.
Who speaks first? With Mr. Macmillan in the chair it was thought that Mr. Molotov would speak first, said Mr. Pink.
2.
After Messrs. Molotov, Dulles, and Pinay have spoken, Mr. Pink thought it would be desirable to have a break and discuss whether or not to introduce the Three Power Declaration.2 The answer to this question would depend, he said, on what Mr. Molotov says.
3.
Is there to be a “restricted session”? Mr. Pink reported the officials thought it would be a mistake to press for such a session since it would give rise to speculation that something was in the offing.
4.
What lines are the Ministers taking in their speeches? Mr. Macmillan said with him in the chair he would call on Molotov to speak first and after Mr. Dulles and M. Pinay had spoken he would suggest a break in the meeting and during the break we could discuss, he said, whether to table the Tripartite Declaration. That indeed would depend upon what Mr. Molotov says. Mr. Pink broke in to say that if Mr. Molotov puts forward the usual line it would be very strange to put in a Declaration. It would be preferable to defer the tabling of it for later.

Mr. Dulles felt that it would probably be wise to hold it back and not put it in on the first day for the reasons stated. Our proposal, he said, is not responsive to the kind that Molotov might submit. Our proposal, he said, is really a basis for a General Assembly resolution. However, Mr. Dulles went on to say that he saw no harm in giving this question on whether we should table our declaration during a break in the session further thought.

[Page 743]

Mr. Macmillan then inquired whether we ought to have a restricted session. The unanimous opinion was that we should not.

Mr. Macmillan then asked what the respective lines of the Ministers would be. Mr. Dulles outlined briefly what he would say as did M. Pinay.

The Secretary felt that we might be able to wind up Item 2 on Friday, and if not, we might have a meeting on Saturday morning to end it. That would leave us Item 3 for next week and on that there is not much to say. It appears that nothing very fruitful has as yet come up from the Experts. The Secretary felt that two days would be sufficient for Item 3.

Mr. Macmillan thought that the Russians were holding back.

The Secretary felt that the most important thing to do is to meet with Molotov on Friday, the 11th, and go over the timetable which Mr. MacArthur had distributed and seek agreement on it. The Secretary reminded the other Ministers that we have an agreement to hold the Conference down to three weeks.

Mr. Macmillan then asked how we are going to end this Conference. The Secretary replied that it was most important to start drafting a communiqué now. Mr. Macmillan stated that if we finish Item 3 with the Tuesday morning meeting and Item 1 on Tuesday afternoon, that would give us Wednesday to discuss the communiqué. The Secretary suggested that during the break, Mr. Macmillan ask Molotov to meet with him tomorrow to consider the future work of the Conference.3

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 609. Confidential. Drafted by Wainhouse on November 15.↩
  2. For text of the proposed declaration on disarmament, submitted to the conference during the tenth plenary, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 199–201, or Cmd. 9633, pp. 132–133.↩
  3. The three Western Foreign Ministers discussed the future work of the conference with Molotov at 3 p.m. on November 11. Macmillan proposed, and Molotov agreed to, the following schedule: November 11 and 12, disarmament; November 14 and morning November 15, East-West contacts; afternoon November 15, European security and German reunification and any other business; November 16, final communiqué. The U.S. Delegation reported on this meeting in Secto 255 from Geneva, November 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/11–1155)↩