31. Telegram From the Department of State to the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria1
2922. Austrian Ambassador called today on Secretary. In referring to latest Soviet offers he expressed concern that these might represent Austria’s last chance for independence. Secretary referred to current public reports that motive behind new Soviet policy on Austrian treaty was anticipated impact on German situation. While Secretary said he did not believe that German and Austrian cases were analogous nor that neutral Austria could serve as model for reunified Germany he wished Ambassador to understand clearly that any concern we might have about future of Germany would have no influence [Page 50] on our intentions to press ahead to conclusion of Austrian treaty. He recalled that this had been one of our objectives for many years; that President had referred to it in his speech of April 16, 19532 and that only last Sunday in Augusta the Secretary had welcomed in remarks to press what appeared to be promising developments toward this goal.3 Consequently, he could assure the Ambassador that while there were several points, particularly with respect to neutrality and guarantees of integrity which were not yet clear, US desired to avail present apparently favorable attitude Soviets and would take every appropriate step to conclude treaty as quickly as possible. He recalled that Soviets had in past linked German and Austrian questions and reiterated US determination not to confuse two issues nor to permit former to influence our policy in respect latter.
In response to Ambassador’s question, Secretary expressed view that meeting at Ambassadorial level in Vienna would be not only desirable but necessary to bring treaty to point of signing. He added that while he would not go to Vienna to engage in weeks of negotiations over treaty and related texts, he would be delighted to go to Vienna to sign treaty, once agreement had been reached at Ambassadorial level.
Ambassador said it would be helpful to his government if he could have some idea of timetable of events. Secretary replied that while he would be in Europe for NATO Ministerial meetings, middle of May, he felt that until our Ambassador in Vienna had had opportunity to consult more extensively with his Western colleagues and subsequently 3 of them with Soviet High Commissioner, it was not possible to anticipate date that treaty might be ready for signature.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/4–1955. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and signed for the Secretary of State by Jones. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Rome, and Bonn.↩
- For text of President Eisenhower’s speech, “The Chance for Peace”, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 179–188, or Department of State Bulletin, April 27, 1953, pp. 599–603.↩
- For text of Secretary Dulles’ statement to the press at Augusta on April 17, see ibid., May 2, 1955, pp. 727–728.↩