Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, Volume V

138. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, June 15, 1955.

I have sent to S/S to you for approval my memorandum of your private conversation on the afternoon of June 13 with Chancellor Adenauer,² at which Blankenhorn, Weber (the Chancellor’s interpreter) and I were also present. In this memorandum (of which there are only two numbered copies herewith) I set down certain passages in that conversation which I believe are too sensitive for distribution.

I. At the outset of your meeting with the Chancellor, he stated that Shaeffer had been twice approached by a General Mueller (identified as the head of the East German People’s Police) in an effort to ascertain what chance there was of direct negotiation between the GDR and the Federal Republic. The second approach suggested a meeting in East Berlin which Mueller stated was designed to transmit information for communication to the allies and thereby to assure a successful meeting of the 4 Heads of Government. (The Chancellor held in his hand a handwritten letter which he withdrew from and in conclusion returned to his billfold. It was my impression that this was a letter from Shaeffer to the Chancellor reporting Mueller’s second approach.) The Chancellor said that Shaeffer felt that he ran considerable personal risk in meeting with Mueller. He was, however, now in Berlin and planned to go ahead with the meeting. (I inferred that this was being done with the Chancellor’s explicit or implicit approval.) The Chancellor concluded this report by stating that he was momentarily expecting to hear the results of the meeting from Shaeffer but as yet had received nothing.

II. At the conclusion of the Chancellor’s citation of excerpts from various intelligence reports made available to him, he stated that the SPD, in his opinion, has connections with lower echelons in the Department of State. He linked this statement with a reference to the fact that various remarks concerning the possible neutrality or neutralization of Germany kept reappearing, despite official denials, as in the case of the President’s press conference. He did not elaborate further on this point.

III. In discussing with the Secretary the annotated National Geographic map, he stated that it had been prepared for him by General Heusinger.³ In the course of the discussion of the map, it was confirmed by the Chancellor that all of Italy is intended to be in Zone 2. The Chancellor stated that he had had the lines drawn on an English map so that there would be no indication of its origin. Toward the end of the conversation the Chancellor reverted to the map and said that he thought the President would like to study it. The impression was left that the Chancellor would not himself raise this subject with the President unless he had the opportunity to do so alone.

At the very conclusion of the conversation the Secretary inquired whether he had approved himself on political grounds the zonal plan which Heusinger had sketched on the map. The Chancellor responded that certainly he had approved it on political grounds; otherwise he would not have given it to the Secretary. He then explained that it was of course only for use if the Secretary’s intended effort to push the Soviets back failed. The Secretary in reply reiterated essentially his remarks concerning our intention to make a strong effort to secure the withdrawal of Soviet forces to the border of Russia and achieve a substantial measure of national independence for the European satellites.

IV. After the Chancellor had expressed his full agreement with the Secretary’s exposition of his own views on the current weaknesses in the Soviet position, the Chancellor assured the Secretary that Germany was not tired. The Secretary replied that he was not concerned about Germany but he was worried about Great Britain and France. The Chancellor answered that he was not worried over Great Britain becoming tired. He was, however, concerned over France. He said that Faure had told him of his intention to shift Pinay to the Ministry of Defense and take over the Quai d’Orsay himself. Faure he considered brilliant but unreliable. The Chancellor then said that he would see Eden in London on his way home but that he would not talk to him with the intimacy which characterized this conversation with the Secretary.

LTM

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Strictly Confidential. Top Secret; Personal and Private.
2. Supra.

3. No copy of the map under reference has been found in Department of State files or at the Eisenhower Library. However, the following summary outlines its details:

   “1. Establishment of a demilitarized zone with limits on both sides of the Oder-Neisse line reaching approximately from the Elbe to the Vistula, and extending from the Baltic Sea south through Europe and converging on either side of Trieste;

   “2. German territory west of the Elbe to be garrisoned by EDC troops only;

   “3. Europe west of Germany to be garrisoned by NATO troops; …” (Annex C to NSC 5524, June 28, 1955; Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5524 Series)