848. Letter from Martin to Clough1
It was with mild surprise that I received Deptel 4085 yesterday. While I was aware that Alex was being transferred, I had assumed that the Department would be arranging for some other Mission Chief in the area to carry on with the Geneva talks. I am, of course, flattered that the Department should repose enough confidence in me to designate me to continue them after Alex’s departure. However, I am somewhat dubious about the Chinese Communist willingness to carry on negotiations [Typeset Page 1457] at my level at least for some time to come. While I claim no special competence in reading Chinese tea leaves, I thought I should communicate my preliminary reaction to your telegram as soon as possible.
I think it virtually inconceivable that Wang will agree to negotiate personally with me and unlikely that he will agree at the meeting to designate another representative. While I concur in your judgment that the Chinese Communists are unlikely to break off the talks, I think they may be willing to see them suspended indefinitely on the issue of the level at which they are to be conducted. They may argue that just because the talks have bogged down is no reason to put them on a lower level. Progress is less likely at a lower level (their line may run) than at the Ambassadorial level, while if we are really sincere in our desire to settle differences, we should agree to talks on the Foreign Minister level. Thus the Chinese Communists may well take the occasion of Alex’s departure to renew their propaganda for Foreign Minister level meeting, though indicating willingness to continue at the Ambassadorial level. My guess is that they may hold to this position for some time, making clear that they are not breaking off the talks but simply waiting until we have seen fit to appoint another Ambassador to carry them on.
[Facsimile Page 2]My feeling that the Chinese Communists are likely to hold out for Ambassadorial talks is based on the fact that I can see no great pressure on Peiping to agree to talks at a lower level, which would be a move in precisely the opposite direction to that advocated by them. While Chou En-lai told the Mission Chiefs in Peiping recently that his regime would be willing to carry on the talks for ten or twenty years, he did this, I think, in the context of his discussion of the so-called two-China policy. He was indicating on the one hand, that the Chinese Communists would not agree to such a policy even though negotiations at Geneva were to go on for ten or twenty years, and, on the other hand, that the Chinese Communists were very patient and would not be the ones to break off negotiations. I recall, too, that he referred specifically to the “Ambassadorial” talks and I can’t see that there was anything in his remarks which indicated eagerness to carry these talks on at a lower level.
To say that I doubt that the Chinese Communists will accept lower level talks (at least for some time to come) is not to say that we should not make the pitch outlined in the telegram under reference. Looking back over the talks, I think it fair to say that they were quite productive for the first five months but not since them. While certainly some purpose has been served even during the period since December, 1955 (e.g. in connection with the stabilization of the situation in the Formosa Straits), its importance has probably diminished with time. In any event, after two years without appreciable progress it would seem appropriate to indicate our dissatisfaction in terms stronger than the [Typeset Page 1458] usual protests at the negotiating table. Alex’s transfer provides us with such an opportunity.
I think we should anticipate the possibility that the Chinese Communists, having read the New York Times article of December 1, will have foreseen that Alex will say his farewells at the Thursday meeting and will have prepared their positions in advance to meet various contingencies. Thus they may have already decided that they will not consent to continue discussions at a lower level and will be prepared to explain their position to the press immediately after the meeting. While it is possible that they might even [Facsimile Page 3] take this pretext to end the talks entirely, my feeling is (as indicated above) that they are more likely to stress their willingness to continue the talks but only at the Ambassadorial level. I think we should be prepared for such a contingency as this and have our reasons for designating me rather than an Ambassador ready to give the press.
Another contingency for which to prepare a press explanation is the one mentioned in paragraph three of the reference telegram. Under these circumstances we would have to explain to the press why no date was set for the next meeting, since absence of this information would inevitably lead to speculation that the talks had been broken off.
In case the talks do continue without interruption, I wonder whether I can carry them on effectively without assistance. Since I have seen no indication that the Department is contemplating providing me with an “advisor”, I take it that you do not feel that at the present pace of the talks there is need for one. Certainly at the tempo of last month’s meeting I think I could manage on my own but there would be no assurance that the meetings would continue at such a low key. Alex has apparently felt on the basis of his long experience that it was essential to have an advisor.
One final item: Am I correct in assuming that paragraph three of the reference telegram simply means that the Consulate General in Geneva will act as a postbox for me and that it is not contemplated that I will be staying on at Geneva?
I am sending a copy of this letter to Geneva so that I can discuss it with Alex and get his reactions, and in case you wish to cable your reactions to it there.
Sincerely yours,
First Secretary of Embassy
- Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Confidential; Official–Informal. A copy was sent to Johnson at Geneva.↩