700. Letter 43 from Johnson to McConaughy1
I am starting this letter to you Monday evening to deal with some of the matters raised in your letter of August 13, and will finish it after the meeting tomorrow.
First, let me say that I was startled and distressed at this week’s TIME story directly quoting me on the talks, particularly on my alleged remarks concerning reduction of dangers of war in the Taiwan area. While from a domestic point of view the story is favorable, and TIME’S intentions were the best, it is not of any help to the talks. I saw the story immediately on my arrival here last night and today got hold of the [Typeset Page 1148] correspondent to whom I talked last week. I told him first that it was my clear understanding that our conversation was, as in the past, entirely background, and secondly, I had a very clear recollection that when he had asked me concerning the effects in the Taiwan area I had refused to discuss it even for background, saying only that he could speculate on that as well as I could. When I raised this with him today he admitted, as confirmed by the PAO here, that when arrangements were made for him to see me it was understood that it was not an interview but that during the course of our conversation I had at a couple of points said “don’t quote me on this” and therefore he assumed that it was alright to quote me on other points! This is pretty thin and I told him so. With regard to the [Facsimile Page 2] alleged remarks concerning Taiwan, he agrees that I did not say this in our conversation but that I had said something to that effect some five or six months ago which he had quoted to TIME at that time and that based on my statements to him that there had been no substantive change with respect to the negotiations during recent months TIME had now picked up and used the quote. This is even thinner and I have asked him to let TIME know in very definite terms that I am very perturbed over it. I am sorry that it happened as I have thus far been fairly successful in my relations with newsmen here and dislike having this mar the record.
I certainly agree that the issue of American correspondents travelling to Communist China has created a real stir. They timed this very cleverly and the results have probably exceeded their rosiest expectations. As I indicated in my telegram from Prague, I think the damages to us and their purposes are already largely accomplished and the issue of whether newsmen now go or not is now substantially secondary. I would hope we could find some way of recovering from the situation, but the only thoughts I had in this regard were contained in my telegram. I know that it must be terribly difficult to handle, particularly with the Secretary away, and you have my full sympathy. I suspect that Wang will find it difficult to resist the temptation to throw it at me tomorrow, and my present inclination is to counter by noting the virtual unanimity of the press on the importance of imprisoned Americans being released and thus try to get back to implementation. I feel this might be somewhat more profitable than confining myself to the line suggested in the guidance for tomorrow’s meeting, although I will of course also use that as necessary.
With regard to the Chinese in prison, I agree that considering all the circumstances it is probably better for the Red Cross alone to see them. I am glad to know that visits are now getting underway. My thoughts with regard to handling it from thereon are as follows:
If any desire to go to Communist China I doubt the wisdom of having them write to the Indian Embassy to obtain passage money. While I am thoroughly sympathetic with the idea of the Chicoms being made [Typeset Page 1149] to pay their way if possible, I am fearful that they would use this in every way possible to sabotage the program. I can [Facsimile Page 3] think of several ways in which they could do this and their imagination is even more fertile than ours. By in effect making it dependent upon Peiping’s agreement to furnish passage money, we give them an opening that we can be sure they will use to the maximum in every way to embarrass us. I therefore wonder whether it would not be worth the difference in cost to us to pay the additional expense to transport them to Hong Kong.
With respect to publicity, I think that we should make a public announcement at the time the men are embarked which would contain: (a) a few brief sentences on the belated Peiping interest in these men and their effort to use them as a justification for continuing to hold Americans (b) the Red Cross interviews (c) the action taken to permit their return, names, and any other such pertinent details. I would entirely omit any mention of our invitation to the Indians, Chinese Communist’s refusal to permit the Indians to act, etc. First this would bog down the whole press release in involved explanations, the inevitable necessity of trying to explain the Chicom’s attitude, why we have gone ahead in spite of that attitude, etc., etc. I would also think that from the standpoint of both the Indians and Taipei its omission would be best, and would suggest that before putting out the press release we call in the Indians and tell them what we are doing. I would think that it would gain only appreciation from the Indian side. If the Chinese later desire to come out with an expression of their attitude and attempt to explain it, let them do so as no rational person will be able to follow them.
I would say nothing to Wang here until the men are actually embarked. This would in all probability mean that I would not be able to say anything to him until after the press release had been issued although I see no great harm in this. On the other hand I would call in the Indians shortly before the issuance of the press release, give them the text, and if not included in the release, the names of the persons being released.
With regard to the timing of meetings, I have been proceeding on the assumption that the Department continued to desire that I suggest no interval longer than a week and leave it up to him to push it beyond that time if he desires. Therefore, I agreed to a Tuesday meeting this week rather than push it up longer to Thursday. However, I will bear in mind that you prefer a Thursday meeting, as do I.
[Facsimile Page 4]In thinking about the possibility of a break, it has occurred to me that we have perhaps been oversimplifying the way they may attempt to bring it about. It seems to me that he might well attempt to take the attitude that it is no use having further meetings until I have something “new and constructive” to present and when I do he will be glad [Typeset Page 1150] to meet with me at any time I designate. In such an event I would of course refuse to accept any such condition, point up its ultimatum aspects, and making a definite proposal for the date of the next meeting strive to obtain a definite acceptance or rejection from him. However, it is possible that the situation might become somewhat confused.
August 21
Well, things livened up a bit at today’s meeting and his performance confirmed my feeling they are continuing to build up their case along the lines of Chou’s People’s Congress speech. He placed me in a dilemma which I was able to avoid today and was able to counterattack. However, the situation is going to be much more difficult next meeting and harder for me to maintain the objectives of assuring continuation of the talks and also carrying out my other instructions with regard discussion of renunciation of force and trade. I know you will consider all this in my guidance for the next meeting. Whereas I would not expect any clean break at the next meeting it is possible that he might try a gambit along the lines of the first paragraph at the top of this page, or set the stage to pull it later on. Of course, once I have taken a flat stand against discussion of trade until renunciation of force is resolved it would be very difficult for me to recede from it and this can well start us on the road to an actual or de facto break. On the other hand I recognize the almost insuperable difficulties of giving me any basis on which I could discuss trade in a positive sense even contingent on a satisfactory renunciation of force. You will note I have carefully avoided thus far even stating the converse of my present instructions, that is trade discussions might be “fruitful” if renunciation of force was agreed upon. They could, of course, well exploit just the fact of discussion of trade even on a contingent basis. I do not know what the answers can be but hope you will give me the maximum of straws with which to build my bricks. (I have written this before writing my [Facsimile Page 5] “comment telegram” just in the way of doing some “thinking out loud” with you.)
[text not declassified]
All the best to all.
Sincerely,
American Ambassador
P.S. I was tremendously surprised and naturally most pleased at the President’s letter which I received at Prague through EE last Friday. I have transmitted an acknowledgment through EE which I asked they show FE before sending on.
- Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Personal–Informal. Johnson signed the original “Alex.”↩