Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume III, China, Microfiche Supplement

498. Letter 23 from Johnson to McConaughy¹

Letter No. 23

Geneva, February 22, 1956

Dear Walter:

I tremendously appreciated your letter No. 31 transmitting various documents which I have found most useful and helpful, and this letter is primarily for the purpose of replying thereto.

I was greatly disappointed to receive a telegram from Bonn this morning, saying that Miss King could not arrive here until next Monday, so that means we will go through another meeting session without a secretary. Miss Ferguson, who formerly worked for me and is now Mr. Gowen’s secretary, has most generously volunteered to forego her holiday today in order that I could get this reply off to you.

1. We all feel that Lindbeck’s Paper on Treatment of Imprisoned American Civilians is a most admirable piece of work. It strikes an excellent note and, except for the last page where I have fairly substantial suggestions for rewriting conclusions, we only have nit picks. For your convenience in handling, I am enclosing a separate sheet giving our suggestions and I am retaining here the copy of the Paper which you transmitted to us.

2. The DRF Intelligence Report on the Foreign Ministers’ Conference. This is also an excellent piece of work and except for the following I concur with it.

In the abstract and again on page 3 the paper gives the impression that the United States supports the GRC “legal” closure of the mainland ports. I had always understood, and Dave confirms that it was also his understanding up to the time he left the Department, that we had never taken a position in support of this port closure. In fact it is my recollection that we protested it at the time it was imposed and I do not recall that we have ever withdrawn our protest. In any event I feel certain that Chou would never raise with us the question of GRC termination of this measure which he would regard as a “domestic”, that is GRC-PRC matter. He might raise the question of U.S. material aid to the GRC in maintaining this policy and, thus, the U.S. “interference” in a Chinese “domestic” matter.

With respect to the general thesis of Section IV, particularly the bottom of page 7 and page 8, it seems to me most unlikely that the Chinese Communists would attempt an invasion of Taiwan (as opposed to the Offshore Islands) as a means of coercing the United States into a Foreign Ministers’ conference. If the Chicoms had reached the point of being able to mount such an invasion, they would be shooting for the complete elimination of the GRC and the possession of Taiwan. They would certainly not be prepared to suspend any such invasion for a Foreign Ministers’ conference or have any interest in such a conference until the battle had been decided.

While not disagreeing with any of the listed motives under Section III of the Chinese Communists pressing for a Foreign Ministers’ conference, it seems that this Section slights a very major element. One of the reasons Chou made his bid for negotiations at Bandung was his appreciation of the strong world and neutralist sentiment for peaceful negotiations and the avoidance of war. On the positive side, the Chicoms want to enlist this sentiment behind their claims and policies. On the negative side, the Chicoms appreciate that it would be politically most unwise for them to initiate military action, even against the Offshores, without first having established the impression that they had exhausted all avenues of peaceful negotiation. By pressing for a Foreign Ministers’ meeting they are able to capitalize on this sentiment whether or not we agree to such a meeting. If we do not agree, they consider they will be able to reinforce their pose of willingness to negotiate being rebuffed by the United States. If we do agree to such a meeting and no “reduction of tensions in the Taiwan area” is accomplished, they will similarly hope to reinforce their pose of “reasonableness” being frustrated by U.S. “unreasonableness”. In each of these situations they will hope to capitalize on the almost general absence of international support for the GRC position on the Offshore Islands and the deteriorating international position of the GRC as the de jure government of China, further to isolate the United States in its position with respect to the GRC.

3. Contingent Press Release in Event of Break-Off. I think that the Department’s statement is excellent and it well avoids the danger of slamming doors and accentuating any crisis atmosphere that may be created. I have no suggestions.

In this regard I am enclosing a copy of the contingent break-off statement which I drafted prior to the February 9 meeting on the basis of the Department’s 1591. I am keeping this in the brief case for use, if necessary, and would appreciate any comments or suggestions the Department may have. Of course, both of these statements may require some modification to fit them to the situation. As far as my statement is concerned, for maximum effectiveness, it would have to be given out as I left the meeting room and would have to appear largely extemporaneous. In any event I suggest that you keep the text handy on meeting days so that if a break does unexpectedly come, it can be used as a basis for a telephone call from me letting you know exactly what I have said.

4. White Paper Summarizing Talks. Both Dave and I have carefully gone over the Historical Division’s draft paper summarizing the talks to date. Our intention was to transmit our detailed suggestions as with Lindbeck’s paper. However, we both found that this was not practical as, frankly, we feel the paper is in need of complete rewriting. I do not feel that it effectively presents our case, and its shifting back and forth between the chronological and subject approach can only leave the reader very confused. I certainly would not want it to represent the official summary of our talks. Dave is starting to work on an entirely new draft which we will go over together and try to get to you as quickly as possible.

I particularly appreciated the memorandum on the China portion of the discussions with the British as well as Robertson’s conversation with Koo. I especially felt that Robertson’s comments to Koo on Chiang’s recent statements were very well taken and I was glad to see this said.

I will, of course, be glad to go over to Paris if it is thought that it would be useful and I would hope to hear one way or another as soon as possible in order that I nay make my plans. I have made an engagement in Prague for Sunday, March 4, which I would be loath to break but could fit in almost any other time.

I should have previously called your attention to the “question” Wang asked me at the last meeting (paragraph 11 mytel 1513). This is the best and frankest thumbnail summary of their position that he has given to date.

I expect to go back to Prague Saturday morning and return here on Tuesday.

All the best to everyone.

Sincerely,

U. Alexis Johnson
American Ambassador

Enclosure

Comments on Draft²

Undated

COMMENTS ON DRAFT (1/30/56) WHITE PAPER “AMERICAN CIVILIANS IMPRISONED BY CHINESE COMMUNISTS 1949–1956”

Page 1—Introduction

The following is suggested as possibly somewhat preferable wording for paragraph 5: “The two purposes of this policy that have emerged most clearly are: first, to utilize these defenseless Americans as hostages to attempt to obtain political concessions from the United States; and, secondly, to force these Americans to make spurious confessions designed to discredit the United States.”

Page 8

Omit “apparently on the contention that he was a prisoner of war” in penultimate sentence of first full paragraph. I am not clear that this was in fact Chicom’s contention and its inclusion tends to give an impression of some justification for Buol’s detention when in fact there was none.

Page 9

Typographical error in footnote—should be spelled Shih instead of Chih.

Page 14

Delete “civilians” in last line of paragraph ending at top of page. My talks at that time actually also dealt with military personnel.

Suggest that last sentence beginning at bottom of page would read clearer if worded “They were, in other words, expected to build a case against their own country out of their own lives and actions in support of Communist charges, etc.”

Page 22

Suggest second sentence, second paragraph, would be somewhat strengthened by insertion “public” preceding “information on local political and economic conditions, etc.”

Page 25

Suggest last sentence, penultimate paragraph, be reworded so as to make it clear it refers to rights of communication with U.K. Charge, etc., covered by Agreed Announcement and not right of release which is not “trivial”. Suggest some wording along following lines: “Most of them have even been denied the meager privilege of communicating with the United Kingdom Charge at Peiping and receiving visits from him pending their release as was provided for in the Communist pledge of September 10, 1955.”

Page 30

It seems to me we need to find some better conclusion than giving currency to the ostensibly plausible Communist proposition that there is a difference between those who have “committed offences against the law and those who have abided by the law”. As it stands I do not think that we make a convincing case for the valid conclusion of the last paragraph. My suggestion would be something along the following lines as a substitution for the last three paragraphs:

“This commitment clearly applies to all Americans, and particularly to those in prison. As the Chinese Communists had finally on September 6, 1955 agreed to grant exit permits to those Americans who, although not in prison, had up to that time also been denied permission to leave the country, only the cases of Americans in prison were under discussion at the time the Chinese Communists made this public commitment. It will be noted that the Announcement states and it was clearly understood that the Chinese Communists had committed themselves ‘further to adopt appropriate measures’ so that these remaining imprisoned Americans could ‘expeditiously’ return.

“Nevertheless the pattern of continued Chinese Communist efforts to use these innocent and unfortunate victims of Chinese Communist ‘justice’ for political purposes is clear. On the date of the Announcement, September 10, 1955, and four days before making their demand for a meeting with the Secretary of State, the Chinese Communists announced the release of ten of these imprisoned Americans. On October 27, 1955, the date of the opening of the 4-Power Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Geneva, and also the date the Chinese Communists embodied their demand for a meeting with the Secretary of State in a formal document, the Chinese Communists announced the release of two more imprisoned Americans. On November 17, 1955, the day following the close of the 4-Power Foreign Ministers’ meeting, the release of three imprisoned Americans was announced by Peiping. Since that time only one American, Dr. Homer Bradshaw, has been released, it being clear even to Peiping that in his case Mrs. Bradshaw would shortly pass away in China as a result of the treatment she had received in prison unless Dr. Bradshaw, who is a physician, could accompany her from the country.

“In the meanwhile the Chinese Communists have tried hard to assert that the remaining thirteen Americans imprisoned, equally covered by their September 10 commitment, are somehow not entitled to return because they have ‘committed offences against the law’, and, on the other hand, to intimate that their return depends on ‘improvement in relations’, that is, the granting to Communist China of political concessions by the United States.

“Thus the Chinese Communist failure to honor its pledge of September 10, 1955 to release all imprisoned Americans, and its pattern of action with regard to those prisoners who have been released, again conclusively establish the continued efforts of Peiping to use innocent Americans as political hostages and propaganda pawns.”

Enclosure

Draft Press Release³

Undated

PRESS RELEASE

I regret to announce that Ambassador Wang has rebuffed my efforts to continue to seek with him agreement on a declaration which would renounce the threat or use of force generally and particularly in the Taiwan area, and which would unqualifiedly provide that differences between the United States and Communist China be settled only by peaceful means.

Ambassador Wang made it clear that his refusal further to meet with me was based upon the Chinese Communists’ unwillingness to drop the demand that the U.S. give up its right to self-defense against armed attack in the Taiwan area, and in fact concede to them the very goals for which they would use armed force.

⁴Ambassador Wang also informed me of the Chinese Communists’ intent to denounce our Agreed Announcement of September 10 with respect to the return of civilians. Such unilateral action cannot relieve the Chinese Communists from the obligation which they assumed in that Agreement expeditiously to release all detained Americans, and the U.S. continues to expect them to fulfill that obligation and promptly to release the thirteen Americans still detained in Communist Chinese prisons.

Chinese in the United States continue to be entirely free to return to mainland China and the U.S. offers no obstruction whatever to their departure. The Indian Embassy in the U.S. has not brought to the attention of my Government any case of a Chinese who claims he is being prevented from leaving, nor has Ambassador Wang here presented any factual evidence of obstruction.

⁵In spite of the Chinese Communist commitment of September 10 last year expeditiously to release all detained Americans, thirteen Americans still remain in Chinese Communist prisons. The US continues to expect the Chinese Communists to fulfill that commitment and promptly release those unfortunate people.

I have informed Ambassador Wang that any further communications between the two sides can be transmitted through our respective consular offices here in Geneva.

1. Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal. Johnson signed the original “Alex.”
2. Confidential.
3. No classification marking.
4. This paragraph to be used and penultimate paragraph deleted if Wang denounces Agreed Announcement. [Footnote in the original.]
5. This paragraph to be used and second paragraph deleted unless Wang denounces Agreed Announcement. [Footnote in the original.]