322. Letter 15 from Johnson to McConaughy1
I hope to take advantage of the more frequent pouch service for the next few weeks.
The Secretary arrived Wednesday evening, and Herman Phleger immediately got in touch with me to show me the message which he [Typeset Page 445] and the Secretary drafted on the plane on the way over replying to your 981. I made no suggestions for any changes and they sent it off immediately Niact at about 8 p.m. Geneva time, but I was sorry to see from your 1013 that it had apparently not arrived.
The Secretary asked to see me the same evening and I had some general discussion with him, primarily on the trade question. I gathered that he had talked with Macmillan on the CHINCOM question and that he had come to the conclusion that some drop in the CHINCOM level, toward but not all the way to a COCOM level, is shortly inevitable. (I understand a telegram on the subject went from Paris to the Department but I have not seen it.) We had some general discussion on how this could be tied in with my talks here but came to no conclusion, except that I gathered that it is the Secretary’s desire that if this development is in any event going to take place, I should attempt to capitalize on it here. I told him that, without expressing any opinion on whether or not the level should or should not be dropped, my strong feeling was that if we had come to the conclusion that it was going to be dropped, I thought it important solely from my standpoint here that it would appear we had agreed, or at least acquiesced, rather than that it had happened in spite of our opposition.
If I am going to make any capital out of it here, it would be important that Wang and I have had at least some discussion of the subject prior to any reduction becoming known to the Chinese Communists. [Facsimile Page 2] Obviously I cannot and would not in any sense negotiate with him on the level of CHINCOM controls, but believe I could at the most intimate a causal relationship. It seems to me that this would assist in the objective of keeping these talks going by giving the Chinese Communists a feeling that the talks were not entirely devoid of results for them. It just might also help somewhat in release of Americans.
Yesterday’s meeting went about as expected except for Wang’s introduction of his draft agreed statement. It is clearly a very clever piece of work, and if published, would have much public appeal. As I noted in my 970, I feel that it does represent some slight advance inasmuch as it relates some form of renunciation of force to a Foreign Ministers’ meeting rather them to the previous position on withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Taiwan area. Of course, this latter objective is merely deferred to the Foreign Ministers’ Conference.
I am very provoked at Wang’s attitude yesterday—sitting back and smugly telling me that he knew something I didn’t know with regard to implementation but would not tell me what. It was only after I got back to the hotel after the meeting that I learned that the press tickers reported the release of Harriet Mills and Father Proulx. I was put in a somewhat foolish position at the meeting by not knowing this. This was probably their intent. Technically I have no basis for [Typeset Page 446] real objection, as under the Agreed Announcement there is no obligation on their part to inform me here (nor to inform O’Neill, for that matter), but it is hardly in the spirit of relationship which I have been trying to establish with Wang. Of course he was under instructions, and it is clear that their objective is to make clear that these releases are their unilateral act and that any credit in the matter will go only to the British. They are not going to let me obtain any credit by giving out the announcement here.
What I am disturbed by and am sending you a telegram on is that from Hong Kong’s 84, sent Department 883, it appears O’Neill was informed of these releases on October 26, but I had no word here until Hong Kong’s 84 was received today.
The missing military personnel item went about as I expected. I was sorely tempted to put it off as it was late, we had already exchanged many recriminations on our occupation of Taiwan and implementation, and the atmosphere was poor. However I decided to get it over with and, as it turned out and was to be expected, he was under clear instructions and no matter when or how I did it, the result was going to be the same. I felt that I was able to back him into a corner for whatever satisfaction there was to be derived from that. I don’t think we should drop the subject too quickly or easily, but feel that we are not going to get any real satisfaction. [Facsimile Page 3] I should think that, in light of our discussion at yesterday’s meeting, we might consider again also pushing the matter in the MAC.
Herman Phleger has just been in while I have been dictating this letter. We have been having some preliminary discussion of Wang’s draft agreed statement of yesterday. He talked with the Secretary a little about it during the course of yesterday’s Foreign Ministers’ meeting. We are seeing the Secretary this afternoon. I will save any comments, as I presume the Secretary will want to send you a message during the course of the day on the subject.
Sincerely,
American Ambassador
- Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal. Johnson signed the original “Alex.” A handwritten note on the letter indicates it was received on November 2.↩