Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume III, China, Microfiche Supplement

291. Letter 19 from McConaughy to Johnson¹

Letter No. 19

Washington, October 14, 1955

Dear Alex:

Your long letter No. 6 of October 6 came on the 11th. It was of singular interest and gave us some very valuable sidelights on some of your collateral problems as well as on your general thinking. Walter Robertson, Herman Phleger and Bill Sebald have all read your letter and commented on its particular interest and value.

I have discussed with Rod O’Connor the problem of coordinating the Departmental direction of your talks while the Foreign Ministers Conference is going on. It will be difficult, with the Secretary and Judge Phleger in Geneva, and Robertson, Sebald and myself here. Rod is sure that the Secretary will want to see you from time to time in Geneva, notwithstanding the great pressure of affairs directly related to the Conference. Judge Phleger will also be tied up with the business of the Conference, but naturally will wish to keep close to your negotiations. The regular work on your instructions will almost have to be done from here since our Delegation at Geneva will not have the time, the FE personnel or the files. (As you probably have heard, the Secretary has decided not to take any FE personnel or to engage in discussions of FE subjects. Molotov may be allowed to bring up some FE subjects if he insists, but he will have to do the talking and our Delegation would only listen.) We expect to present a recommendation to the Secretary on Monday for coordination of the direction of the talks while the Conference is going on. We are passing on to the Secretary your expression of hope that he may be able in some way to use Molotov during the Conference quietly to bring some pressure on the PRC to release the detained Americans. We don’t know yet what if anything may be possible along this line.

You will have noted the conspicuous absence in our telegram of any response to your suggestion that we not rule out the introduction of procedural questions near the end of the talks. We appreciated that this might look like “a pot of gold” which could help to keep the talks going. But there is no inclination here now to take a position on this in our telegrams. The Secretary was quite specific in his talk with Foreign Minister George Yeh on Oct. 4 (a copy of the memorandum of conversation is being pouched to you), and on other occasions as to his aversion to the idea of a higher level Conference, his intention to avoid it, and his belief that there is nothing appropriate for discussion which cannot be handled in your conversations. Of course this does not preclude us from keeping the Chinese Communists guessing a little, but on principle there are arguments against seeming to equivocate.

Incidentally the Secretary was quite frank with George Yeh in spelling out to him the extent to which the continuation of the talks is in the interest of the GRC. I think it may tend to soften the criticism of the talks which has been coming out of governmental quarters in Taipei although I doubt if the tone of the Taiwan Press will be changed much.

We have noted your query as to whether it might be permissible for either side to raise new subjects under Item Two. There will be some response to this query by early next week either in my next letter on the 17th or in a telegram.

Yesterday I gave Joy of the British Embassy the observations contained in your 855 concerning O’Neill’s responsibilities. We endorsed your suggestions and requested that they be relayed to O’Neill with a recommendation that he act on them if he and the British Foreign Office perceive no objection. The British are being quite diligent on the implementation problem although they are somewhat concerned now at apparent leaks to the press (Reuters and AP) which hint at the difficulties O’Neill is encountering. I do not know the source of the information which the press is obtaining. I doubt if there is much of a leak since the information is somewhat garbled. Also the stories may indirectly be somewhat helpful rather than harmful since they will add a bit to the public pressure on the PRC to act. Still we must respect British wishes where the protection of their reporting is concerned, so we are taking steps to limit the distribution in the Department of O’Neill’s reports on his conversations with the PRC Foreign Office. There is great interest among the press in O’Neill’s efforts so our P and FE/P people are somewhat on the spot, as is the British Embassy here.

We are hoping that some additional pressure will be exerted on Peiping through U Nu. The Secretary sent him a good strong message in response to U Nu’s extraordinary appeal for a higher level Conference. We assume of course that U Nu will pass on to Chou En-lai the text of the Secretary’s reply. We have endeavored to capitalize on this probability. There is a chance that U Nu will associate himself to some extent with our expression of dissatisfaction over the failure of the PRC to implement the Agreed Announcement. A copy of this exchange of messages will be sent to you.

Mr. Robertson is making a speech at Davidson College, North Carolina tomorrow which will have some pretty explicit things to say on the question of implementation of the Agreed Announcement, and on the need for a PRC renunciation of the use of force. We think that this speech will fit well into our strategy. Some very specific questions are posed in this speech. You will get a copy.

On the renunciation of force item, we may have unintentionally misled you somewhat in talking about a “study”. Nothing as elaborate as what that probably signifies to you is underway here. What is being worked on by Bill Sebald and Judge Phleger is a draft declaration proclaiming the renunciation of the use of force, except defensively, with specific reference to the Taiwan area. The form would be analogous to that of the Agreed Announcement of September 10: —two parallel unilateral statements or declarations. The Secretary and Mr. Robertson had some reservations about the first draft and a new version is now in the works. It would be quite simple—only a half a page or so. We hope a draft of this will be ready to send you some time next week for your comments. With the help of Doug Forman and Peter Colm you probably will be able to prepare all the material you will need for expanding on the subject in the course of discussions. Your men certainly have more time to work on this than anybody in CA. However, it is true that they may be somewhat handicapped by not having the feel of all the current thinking here. We hope that Ralph Clough or someone else who is well qualified can be given a few hours of free time in which he can work up some argumentation under informed guidance.

On the embargo question, you may have sensed that the Secretary himself drafted numbered paragraph 5 of your instructions dated October 12, Deptel 870. There seems to be a good chance that we can get some negotiating value from drawing the Chinese Communists out as to just what aspects of the so-called “embargo” they are complaining about. We are troubled by the pressure from the British and the French, and to a much lesser extent the Japanese, for relaxing the COCOM controls and abolishing the differential altogether between CHINCOM and COCOM. Kalijarvi and Barbour met with Robertson on this yesterday. EUR and E are more pessimistic than FE on the possibility of maintaining the higher level of Chinese controls for the present. It is clear that it would be very poor tactics for us to throw away our China control cards now without getting anything in return. We believe we can hold the Japanese in line and we are going to urge the Secretary to make a strong approach to Macmillan and Pinay in the tripartite talks preceding Geneva. Probably the Secretary is the only one who would be able to prevail on the French and British to stay in line. If this can be done our hand will be much strengthened with the Chinese Communists. Undoubtedly the trade controls are the one really effective pressure we are able to exert. We are convinced that those who minimize the value of the higher level of China controls are mistaken. FE is making its own recommendations to the Secretary on the subject. They differ somewhat from those of EUR and E.

We are glad that you expressed your views with complete frankness on the various draft documents on the question of the unaccounted for military personnel. It goes without saying that complete candor both here and in Geneva is essential. There is no hypersensitivity here or among the Pentagon people who are working on this subject, and we know you do not suffer from this affliction either. We want you to react with complete candor and we are doing the same. It is natural that somewhat more weight should be given to the importance of the record here than you would give it in Geneva. While there is plenty of room for argument as to what is the best tack from the standpoint of getting a cooperative response out of the Chinese Communists, I do not think the final version telegraphed from here is actually provocative. Since it is probably a sad fact that we are not going to get any satisfaction out of the Chinese Communists in any event on a single one of these names, it may be just as well to adhere to the stronger text.

We were glad to get Ralph Clough back on the 10th. He has already been of inestimable help to me in the regular work of the office as well as on Geneva matters.

I am surprised to learn that Colonel Ekvall’s new orders have not gone out yet. We had understood from Bill Godel and from Colonel Rasmussen that everything was all squared away for him to be detailed as Assistant Military Attache. We wrote a letter some time ago confirming the continued need for his services and requesting an extension of his assignment. We were assured that this was all that was needed. I will have Ralph check again with the Pentagon today.

Bill Sebald sends his regards and tells you he hopes to find a few minutes some time soon to write you a note.

Regards and continued commendation for steering a good course.

As ever,

WPM

P.S. Please send one carbon copy of your letters in the future, if convenient.

1. Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal. McConaughy initialed the original “WPM.”