278. Letter 18 from McConaughy to Johnson1
I have just taken Peter Colm, who is leaving for Geneva tomorrow morning, in to meet Messrs. Robertson and Sebald and to get a sense of Mr. Robertson’s reaction to the course of the talks. He should be able to give you something of the feel of things at this end. He has not seen the Secretary but I don’t think there is any particular new development in the Secretary’s thinking to be conveyed to you at the moment. Everyone seems to be well satisfied with your conduct of last week’s meetings. The feeling is that the lines which you have blocked out yourself for the near future are sound.
The feeling in FE is that it will be desirable for you to make your presentation on “unaccounted for military personnel” at the next meeting. American public opinion demands that a high priority be given to this item. We cannot afford to take any chance on some untoward development causing us to fail to get this on the record. Hence it may be necessary to present this before touching on the trade embargo question. We do not see that there is anything to lose by putting the military personnel statement in now, particularly since we are trending in the direction of a more flexible and less systematic [Facsimile Page 2] approach to the Agenda items under Point Two. With a less formalized treatment of the Agenda list under Point Two presumably topics may become intermingled and reverted to.
After talks with D’Orlandi, the COCOM and CHINCOM Chairman, we are more than ever convinced that the present time would be highly inopportune for relaxation in the multilateral system of trade controls. It is significant that D’Orlandi was strongly of this opinion. The Japanese Ambassador Iguchi has indicated to us that the Japanese Government may not be as strongly committed to a program of relaxation as we are sometimes led to believe. The critical time of decision will probably be at the CG meeting at Paris early in December. With strong U.S. leadership at that time we may be successful in holding the line. But it cannot be done without aggressive U.S. leadership. Pressure will have to be exerted on the French and British particularly. All this indicates that any disposition to give on the embargo question at Geneva before December will be premature. In any event we do not have the say unilaterally on multilateral controls. As for our own [Typeset Page 386] complete domestic embargo, that policy is fixed by NSC decision and I know of no disposition in any responsible quarter to urge an abrupt change in that policy.
Bill Sebald is working with Judge Phleger on additional material on the renunciation of use of force. This material is aimed for your use in the course of detailed discussions on the item, assuming that a detailed discussion stage will be reached eventually.
[Facsimile Page 3]The foregoing thoughts on the missing personnel item and the trade embargo are of course subject to confirmation by official telegram. We have not yet cleared with the Secretary.
I presume O’Neill will put your three questions formally to the Chinese Communists today or tomorrow. The Foreign Office instructed him to do so (subject to his concurrence) on October 7.
We have told the British we do not like O’Neill’s suggestion that he refer to the PRC promise to notify him of the result of trials of Americans, and inform the PRC authorities that he looks forward to early notification of reduction of sentence in all cases.
This sounds too much like accepting the PRC thesis, and giving up on the implementation of the Agreed Announcement.
We are looking forward to the arrival of Ralph Clough this afternoon. No doubt we will get a better feel of the current atmosphere from him, although I must say that your telegrams have given us a very full and complete picture. We have felt that we have almost had a front center seat.
Regards,
Sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal.↩