Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume III, China, Microfiche Supplement

169. Letter 7 from Johnson to McConaughy¹

Letter No. 7

Geneva, September 7, 1955

Dear Walter:

I find that the second courier which arrives here Sunday evening with your mail does not go directly back to Frankfort and, therefore, while he is extremely useful in giving me a channel twice a week from you, for practical purposes I have a channel only once a week to you.

I greatly appreciated your letter of September 2 which expanded on the second paragraph of the Department’s 677. I thought I knew what the paragraph meant, but I wished to be absolutely sure. I am sorry that I bothered you by sending a telegram over the Labor Day weekend.

Before going on with anything else, I would greatly appreciate your having someone look into the situation in our code room staff here to see if something can’t be done. Gowen has sent many telegrams on the subject and I have sent one, but apparently all he gets back are repeats to other posts asking them whether they can spare anybody and, of course, they never can. While our traffic is lighter than it was, it still comes in big bunches and it is very important that it move promptly. The Department’s telegram to me last weekend on my dinner with Wang is a good example. They were short-handed, no one was on duty to decode it, and, as a result, I did not receive it. No great harm was done, but this well could happen in much more important matters.

Going back to the talks, I know that you all must have been as disappointed as I was that I was unable to sew-up the announcement at yesterday’s meeting. I have a feeling that Wang had probably gone somewhat farther than Peiping approved at our last meeting, and he had received instructions to back-up. However, I am very hopeful that if you agree with me upon the “now” question that I will be able to tie it up at Saturday’s meeting.

I do not know quite how to interpret the release of the nine. I must confess that it came as a complete surprise to me although I have always recognized that this was a possibility. Of course, it was designed to put public pressure on us—they first released the flyers, now they release the nine—probably the reaction of most people is the same that I found even among friendly newsmen; that is, what are we now going to do.

I am impressed by the success that the Communists have had in building up the issue of the Chinese in the United States. Last night Wolf and de Traz of the ICRC were in to see me (I am sending a separate memorandum of conversation), and it was quite clear that even they thought that there was a problem with respect to Chinese departing from the United States. I, of course, gave them the facts, but believe that as soon as the agreed announcement is released we should do a much better job then we have in the past of telling this story.

I presume that you are reconciled, and prepared for Wang screaming loud and hard when I refuse to go on immediately to item two following the announcement. I hope we will be successful in our tactic but believe we must recognize that the July 25th announcement does not in any way imply that we would not talk about other practical matters until all the Americans were released. In fact, if they had not released the flyers, I would have had from the very beginning to have talked about that “other practical matter”. Of course the agenda proposal which they made greatly helps and strengthens our ability to maintain this tactic, but I see some rough seas ahead.

While it may be true that if we do not get all the Americans out before we undertake discussion of item two, we will not be able to do so, at the same time I am not sure it is going to be at all easy to get the PRC to fall in with this. I most certainly do not expect any mass release in any ten days or two weeks and think it would be wrong to base our plans on this even being a possibility. In spite of the satisfactory nature of the “agreed announcement” and our ability to use it to put public pressure on them, we must recognize that “improvement of relations” is still being maintained by them as a factor in the release of all Americans. If we too obviously stall on coming to grips with item two, they may well get their backs up on the release of further Americans, and we will again face another impasse. We can, of course, publicly beat them over the head with the “agreed announcement” and will do so, but the entire operation is not going to be easy or simple.

I will greatly appreciate all the thoughts and suggestions that you can give me on how you visualize my handling of “what should constitute item two of the agenda”. That is, do you visualize a program which would have for its ostensible purpose the establishing of an agreement upon the sub-points to be discussed under agenda item two? If so, how do you visualize my formulation of our points, particularly the “no force” point?

As soon as you have a chance to do so, I would greatly appreciate an outline of the whole trend of our thinking on our tactics under agenda item two. There are, of course, many difficulties in attempting just to keep talking without asking for or giving concessions. We have a great paucity of subjects which can be raised without involving the interests of the GRC. If the PRC has definite objectives, as it probably does, under item two, it will be easy for them to seize and retain the initiative and I will be continually on the defensive. It seems to me that it will also be difficult in such circumstances for me to avoid being too obviously in the position of simply stalling. I wish I could think of some positive and offensive approach we could make, but thus far have not been able to do so.

On the whole question of renunciation of force, I believe it important that we have a carefully thought out program. We have clearly renounced force in Article I of our treaty with the GRC, as well as under our United Nations obligations, but it does not seem to me at all clear that the GRC has done so since it considers action against the mainland as an internal matter. It seems to me that the PRC is playing the present situation very cleverly by talking softly, apparently engaging in no overt offensive operations, while the Nationalists still continue their small-scale raids, their reconnaissance flights and their belligerent statements. How do I answer PRC allegations that our Treaty with the GRC and the accompanying exchange of notes, together with our supply and equipment to the GRC, simply proves that we are approving and supporting the military activities of the GRC against the mainland? Also what do I say when the PRC quotes GRC official statements in questioning whether the GRC has in fact accepted the principle of non-recourse to force with respect to the mainland? Perhaps there are easy answers to these questions, but I must confess that I do not know what they are.

When this entire question comes up, I believe we should anticipate the possibility of PRC proposing to us a joint declaration perhaps something along the lines of Chou’s “five principles” or perhaps even Article I of our Treaty with the GRC which would not in the slightest affect their “right” to use force to “liberate” Taiwan as long as they treat it as an internal matter. If, as I assume, we reject any joint declaration, what are we proposing in its stead? Do we want a general unilateral declaration on renunciation of force so worded as also to specifically apply to the Formosa situation, and, if so, are we not asking for something which the GRC would refuse to do? Or rather than a renunciation of force, are we looking for a de facto cease fire between the PRC and GRC? If so, this seems to be outside the scope of these talks as clearly something that directly involves the GRC.

All the foregoing I realize is very confused as it simply reflects my very confused thinking which I am sharing out loud with you and know that you will treat it as such. I will appreciate all the thoughts you can send me, however preliminary they may be, as I would very much like to have this thought through clearly in my own mind before I come up against it. I am sorry that there was not sufficient time while I was in Washington really to talk these things through. I hope that you will have an opportunity thoroughly to do so with the Secretary and Walter Robertson.

Give Walter my best and tell him I am glad to know that he is back on the job.

I would appreciate your having someone stick into an envelope for us:

a. The Sino-Soviet Treaty,

b. Something containing Chou’s “five principles”,

c. DRF study on the Bandung Conference, including the Chou En-lai speech,

d. Something giving quotations by Chinese Communist leaders on the liberation of Taiwan (We have DRF study No. 6858, “Chinese Communist Views on Taiwan”, which is primarily historical, and

e. Indochina Armistice Agreement.

With kindest regards.

Sincerely,

U. Alexis Johnson
American Ambassador

1. Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72D415. Secret; Official–Informal. Johnson signed the original “Alex.”