Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

80. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State¹

Taipei, October 20, 1955—7 p.m.

347. Taipei’s 905 June² and 334.³ First engagement between GRC and Communist jet aircraft along China coast October 15 presumably more or less accidental but provides useful occasion for assessment of probabilities. Obviously no one can predict future in detail and accidents can happen any time. But based upon what is known in Taipei of Red capabilities, activities and policies, following courses of action appear not improbable:

1. Communists will maintain varying degrees of tension in Formosa Strait by such means as occasional shelling of Kinmen and Matsu and by gradual increase of air activity. Purposes will include promotion of friction between US and its Western and Asian allies including GRC.

2. While Reds are capable of assembling forces for larger scale assault on offshore islands in relatively short time, no evidence exists of active preparation for such attack. This appears support opinion long held by Embassy that attack on scale sufficient to promise Red success probably would be undertaken only as part of wider operations or as result of what they interpret as significant weakening of US position consequent undermining of GRC determination to resist. Communists presumably believe islands will fall in their laps eventually without heavy losses which would be involved in direct assault under present conditions.

3. Meanwhile Reds will continue systematic development of airfields and related facilities in South China until they are in position assume control of air over Formosa Strait. Some US military experts believe they could do this today with difficulty but at present relative rates of development on their side and ours they will be in much better position by next summer.

4. Assumption of air control over strait will be undertaken by Communists with due care to avoid clash with US forces such as to provoke atomic retaliation against Red airfields which probably alone could deal with ChiCom air power comprehensively and effectively under present conditions. Multiplication of Red flights over strait, wearing down of GRC Air Force and Navy, interference with supply of offshore islands, feints against Taiwan itself and consequent possible withdrawal of US air and surface patrols from strait in effort avoid incidents, would prepare ground and atmosphere for next step.

5. This probably would be another international conference to “relieve tension” at which Reds would enjoy substantial benefit of their new air strength in Taiwan area. Influential element in US and Western Europe could be counted on to revive all of arguments so far advanced for abandonment of Kinmen and Matsu but this time applied to Taiwan itself. Latter would have become “indefensible” with loss of air control over strait and even if US remained firm, position of GRC would have been further and gravely undermined politically and militarily.

6. Meanwhile Communists will keep US attention focused on offshore islands—representing very incidental part of larger picture and one for which no satisfactory direct solution exists—thereby inducing sense of futility in US attitude toward Taiwan and Free China.

As seen from Taiwan, indispensible courses of action on part of US to meet above situation for immediate and foreseeable future include:

a. Maintenance of decisive atomic air superiority in China area without which success of US policy can not be expected even though this power may not be used.

b. Development of GRC defenses, both in air and on ground, with maximum rapidity and to maximum extent practicable.

c. Provision of adequate air base facilities at earliest possible date to accommodate USAF combat units when deployed on Taiwan. (Current plans call for 7 fighter squadrons in case of need but there are no adequate places to accommodate them; hence urgent need for Kung Kuan Airbase.) Steps b and c appear most promising deterrents to Reds’ undertaking dispute air control over strait.

d. Maintenance of US position toward Red China which neither it nor others can regard as other than firm and devoid of any inclination toward appeasement.

Rankin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–2055. Secret. Received at 10:28 a.m. Passed to CINCPAC for information at the Embassy’s request.
2. Telegram 905 from Taipei, June 15, urged the approval of preliminary funds for the construction of an airbase at Kung Kuan. (Ibid., 711.56393/6–1555)
3. Telegram 334 from Taipei, October 17, reported that, on October 15, four Nationalist F-86 planes on a reconnaissance flight about 40 miles off the coast opposite Wenchow had been intercepted by four or more MIG–15 planes and had shot down one. (Ibid., 793.00/10–1755)