Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

78. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 15, 1955¹

Washington, October 15, 1955

SUBJECT

• Various International Questions²

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• V. K. Krishna Menon, Head of Indian Delegation to the General Assembly
• Ambassador G. L. Mehta
• Mr. J. Jefferson Jones, III

. . . . . . .

The Secretary said that the Geneva talks were not going particularly well. We had reached an agreement with the Chinese Communists in Geneva that the 19 Americans still held as prisoners in China would be expeditiously permitted to exercise their right to return. They had not yet been released and were, in fact, being held as political hostages. The Chinese Communists’ action in this matter raised the question of their good faith.

Mr. Menon commented that the Indians had kept in touch with the Chinese Communists. He felt that there had been a deterioration in the situation recently. The Secretary replied that there had certainly been a deterioration from the point of view of our side, as we were reaching the conclusion that the promises made by the Chinese Communists were not reliable. We had agreed to discuss “other matters” with the Chinese Communists in the Geneva talks. Under this item of the agenda, however, the Chinese Communists had not brought up any substantive matter, only that of a meeting between the Secretary and Mr. Chou En-lai. Mr. Menon interjected that he thought that direct talks between the Secretary and Chou would be useful. It was the only way to settle outstanding issues affecting both countries. The Secretary said that it had not been easy for the United States to hold the talks at the present level. It had had a bad effect on our relations with the Republic of China. We had agreed to discuss differences. The Chinese Communists wanted to discuss holding a conference at a higher level to discuss differences. This did not seem to be an effective means of making progress in talks.

The Chinese Communists had raised the question of the embargo on imports into Communist China. We had raised the question of United Nations soldiers missing in the Korean war. Although our raising of this issue seems to have been considered provocative by the Chinese Communists, we did not so intend it. We merely want whatever information the Chinese Communists could furnish with respect to the missing people, mainly in order to clear our records and inform the families of the missing persons. Such a procedure is normal and in accordance with the Geneva Convention.

The second question which we had raised was the renunciation of force in the Formosa area. This was directly related with the question of the economic embargo of Communist China. It would obviously affect our position with respect to the blockade if we knew whether the Chinese Communists wanted to use commodities imported for a war or for peaceful means. As he had stated to Mr. Menon in a previous conversation, the Chinese Communists say that Formosa is a part of China. However, the Korean Government maintains that North Korea is a part of Korea; the Indians maintain that Goa is a part of India. (Mr. Menon interjected to say that Goa was a part of India.) The Secretary continued that in what he considered to be “a lofty move” the Indians had renounced the use of force in connection with Goa. He thought that the Chinese Communists might in the same way renounce the use of force in the Formosa area.

Mr. Menon referred to recent reports that the Chinese Communists were willing to let forty-seven Americans leave China. The Secretary said that many of these were “turncoats”. They did not want to come back and we did not want them to come back. Some of them, he thought, were Americans in name only; many were in reality expatriates. He wished to make a clear distinction between these and the 19 imprisoned Americans who wanted to come back, but who were being prevented from doing so by the Chinese Communists.

The Secretary expressed the hope that the Chinese situation would work out. While his recent speeches had not yet been “cheered” by the Chinese Communists, he had thrown out the suggestion in several of these speeches that the Chinese Communists seemed to be changing. It was a slow process, but there was at least ground for hope that the Chinese Communists might gradually become convinced of the desirability of using peaceful means to settle their international disputes. Mr. Menon said that the only objective of India in connection with this problem was to try to be helpful. The Secretary replied that India has been and can be in the future very useful. He suggested that Mr. Menon see if he could get the 19 imprisoned Americans out of Communist China. Their continued imprisonment raised the question of the good faith of the Chinese Communists. He understood O’Neill, the British Chargé in Peking, had held some talks with the Chinese Communists regarding the prisoners.

Mr. Menon said that the Chinese Communists had to put the prisoners through the necessary legal processes before they could be released. The Secretary responded that he realized that the Chinese had to save face. He had no objection to their carrying out their own legal processes in the release of the prisoners. However, he thought that they should honestly go through these processes and not hold these prisoners as political hostages. Mr. Menon expressed the opinion that the crux of the matter was that the Chinese situation should not be permitted to blow up in violence. The Formosa question should be settled by negotiation and not by force. He himself had not ruled out the possibility of talks between Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communists. He emphasized that he did not wish to pursue this question too forcefully; he did not wish to distract the Secretary’s mind from the all important task of preparing for the Geneva Conference.

. . . . . . .

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.91/10–1555. Secret. Extract. Drafted by Jones.
2. The conversation touched on a variety of subjects. The only reference to China in the memorandum of conversation, apart from the portion here printed, occurred during discussion of the problem of disarmament. Secretary Dulles said that while it was true that the United States had strategic airbases in other countries, the Soviet Union undoubtedly had bases in the countries of Eastern Europe, and, moreover, “it could put forces in Communist China. Mr. Menon said that he was not certain that it could do this. The Secretary said that Mr. Menon might be correct, but that he thought that the Russians could put forces in Communist China.”