73. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Philippines (Ferguson) to the Department of State1
Secun 36. From Hoover. Reference Secun 30.2 At conference before dinner Oct 10 with President Chiang, he asked what subjects we wanted to discuss. I first informed him of state of President Eisenhower’s health and then took up subject of Geneva Ambassadorial talks and our policy in regard thereto, assuring him in strongest possible terms we would not engage in any discussions affecting other countries without their full and equal participation. President Chiang stated that he himself understood policy perfectly, but expressed concern because the average Chinese on Taiwan, overseas and behind Iron Curtain interpret these talks as leading to recognition of the Communist regime; tending to increase the prestige of the [Page 122] Communists and lessening prestige Chinese Govt on Taiwan. He urged especially that no higher level conferences be held. I pointed out our primary concern for American prisoners still held by Communists and fact ChiComs procrastinating in their agreement for expeditious release, which we are publicizing in comparison to our own actions toward full compliance. I further noted our strong position against higher level talks and any reduction of trade embargo. He remarked that what we hoped to gain by such talks was minor as compared with what we were sure to lose in world prestige. His conclusion: The sooner talks with Communists stopped the better for U.S. and China. He requested that his opposition to Ambassadorial talks and those proposed at higher level be brought to Secretary’s attention. This of course I promised to do.
President Chiang did not think that the Secretary’s recent press statements to the effect that situation in Formosa Straits had improved was warranted. I said I was not familiar with particular statements he referred to, but we were doing everything possible to eliminate activities of neutrals and intermediaries, which was also one of primary reasons for Geneva talks.
In this connection President brought up question large air base being built in Fukien obviously for bombing Taiwan. I stated that I would personally recommend completion Kung Quan base on Taiwan as counter measure upon my return to Washington.
On economic side President stated he was confused by fact that neutralist and pro-Communist countries were still receiving U.S. aid, in many cases in greater amounts than allies. He thought aid should be apportioned with anti-Communist countries receiving highest priority. Hollister pointed out necessity of advance planning and limitations on discretion imposed by Congress. He expressed appreciation U.S. economic and defense aid and was happy that defense aid now at highest point and hoped economic aid soon similarly increased.
After dinner I had opportunity ask President if he had plans for return of Tuapse, stating we believed it was now perhaps more of a liability than an asset. He replied that nothing was planned until at least after Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers, where matter would be reviewed in light of world situation then existing. I then requested his appraisal of political and military situation of offshore islands. He replied briefly that (a) no change had taken place since Radford and Robertson visit, (b) his forces were continuing to improve defenses and (c) an attack could be expected at any time, although he refused to speculate on further details. Frank and cordial atmosphere prevailed at conference and large dinner in our honor [Page 123] which followed. No new subjects or proposals introduced. Memo of full conversation will be forwarded from Embassy Taipei.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.12–HO/10–1155. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.↩
- Supra.↩
- The memorandum of conversation by First Secretary of Embassy Paul W. Meyer, October 17, was sent to the Department with a transmittal slip dated October 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.11/10–1755)↩