70. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Burma1
329. Burmese Embassy transmitted letter dated September 20, 1955 from Prime Minister to Secretary in which Prime Minister requests Geneva talks be raised to level Foreign Ministers.2
Please deliver following reply3 to Prime Minister:
“Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I wish to thank you for your thoughtful letter of September 20 expressing your gratification over the progress that has been made in the talks at Geneva.
The American people share the peaceful aspirations of the people of Burma. Our feeling regarding the prospects for the talks at Geneva is that further progress may be anticipated in proportion as our actions and those of the PRC create an atmosphere favorable to the development of confidence. We believe that one of the important actions which might promote a favorable atmosphere would be a fully reciprocal renunciation of the use of force in the Taiwan area in the pursuit of policy objectives. I know you appreciate the impossibility of progress in negotiations under the threat that one of the parties may resort to force. We believe that the removal of this threat should be the first order of business in our discussion at Geneva of ‘other practical matters’.
A second requirement for the development of an atmosphere of confidence is that whatever undertakings are reached in the talks [Page 117] should be faithfully and promptly implemented. This applies specifically to the Agreed Announcement of September 10. For our own part, not only have we long since made it possible for any Chinese who wishes to return to the PRC to do so, but we have given the Indian Government full information relating to the performance of the functions undertaken by the Government of India in connection with the Agreed Announcement, and have offered the Government of India all facilities for the performance of its functions. Information about these and other measures taken by my Government in fulfillment of our obligations under the Agreed Announcement has been promptly and fully conveyed to Ambassador Wang at Geneva, in the hope that he would provide our Ambassador with similar information. So far, he has refused to do so, and the conclusion is inescapable that the PRC is, for the present, at least, failing to carry out its obligations under the Agreed Announcement. The Chargé d’Affaires of the UK has been unable to secure any information about the status of the still-detained Americans, and not a single one of the imprisoned Americans has been allowed to communicate with him. The PRC announced on September 10, and subsequently carried out, the release of ten of twenty-nine detained American civilians. Since that time the PRC has taken no action looking toward the release of the remaining nineteen of whom eighteen are imprisoned.
I am deeply disturbed, and the American people are gravely distressed, by the continued imprisonment of these eighteen Americans in the PRC and by the continued denial of exit permits to others. This lack of fulfillment by the PRC of the obligations assumed by it in the Agreed Announcement of September 10 is a most serious impediment to progress in the talks at Geneva. Indeed, if some measures are not soon forthcoming enabling the still-detained Americans expeditiously to return to the United States, it would become most difficult to credit any undertaking of the PRC on any subject. However, my Government has not reached the final conclusion that the PRC is acting in bad faith, and would reach such a conclusion only with the greatest reluctance. In answer to a question on this at my last press conference4 I said ‘… we are still holding to the belief that the Chinese Communists will carry out their agreement that all the Americans that are there are entitled to return and will be allowed expeditiously to exercise that right.’ In an atmosphere of confidence engendered by such evidence of good faith fruitful discussion of other practical matters at issue will be possible.
I believe you will agree that the two Ambassadors engaged in the talks at Geneva should be entirely competent to discuss the genuine practical bilateral issues of immediate concern to my Government and that of the PRC. If either of the Ambassadors, on their level, should prove unable to furnish relevant information or discuss genuine practical issues, this would reflect the unwillingness of his Government to furnish this information or to have these questions discussed, rather than a need for a change in the level of the talks. Such unwillingness on the part of either Government would render conversations at any level pointless. I should like to stress that Ambassador [Page 118] Johnson has my full confidence and I wish to assure you that I personally am following the talks in detail.
With cordial regards, Faithfully yours, Foster Dulles”.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2055. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted in CA and PSA; cleared in draft by Phleger, Robertson, and Sebald; and approved and signed by Dulles.↩
- The letter from Prime Minister U Nu, transmitted to the Department on September 27, stated that although he thought the Chinese would find it extremely difficult to make an open avowal of any change in their attitude toward Taiwan, there were indications, such as the removal of signs calling for the liberation of Taiwan from public places in Peking, suggesting that they had abandoned the use of force to achieve their objectives. He stated that, although U.S. agreement to higher level talks might be termed capitulation or appeasement in some quarters, such an agreement by the United States could only mean an act of great generosity or magnanimity. (Ibid., 611.93/9–2055) A note attached to a copy of the letter states that U Nu indicated that he would convey any reply to Chou En-lai. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Dulles–U Nu Correspondence)↩
- Telegram 434 from Rangoon, October 18, reported that the message was delivered on October 14. (Ibid., Central Files, 611.93/10–1855)↩
- On October 4; the transcript is printed in Department of State Bulletin, October 17, 1955, pp. 604–608. Ellipsis in the source text.↩