64. Telegram From the Secretary of State to Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, at Geneva1
4. Your 770.2 Following instructions for your September 28 meeting have been personally cleared with the Secretary in New York.
- 1.
- You are to conduct discussions so that no legitimate basis given for other side to break them off.3
- 2.
- You should continue pressing implementation agenda item 1, pointing out failure to give information to Americans, etc, as disclosed Hong Kong’s 66 to Geneva4 and lack action remaining detained Americans.
- 3.
- We note with satisfaction your refutation Wang’s attempt to contend that imprisoned Americans not included agreed announcement. Announcement applies to all American civilians without distinction and Communists must be held absolutely to this.
- 4.
- After covering implementation item 1 you can proceed to discuss subjects for listing item 2. You should note as subject we propose (a) accounting for US military personnel and (b) renunciation of use of force in Taiwan area. Continue maintain position high level talks out of order on grounds set forth our 745. After discussion as to [Page 103] items for listing agenda item 2 further consideration should then be put over until next meeting, set as far in future as possible.
- 5.
- By separate telegram we are sending you substance statements on accounting for military personnel5 and renunciation use of force.6 Request your comments. These designed for use subsequent meetings but could be used on emergency basis this meeting if you believe break imminent.
- 6.
- With respect to Wang’s item “question of embargo”, you are authorized to accept it for listing, provided he accepts our items, and subject to condition that item “renunciation of force” has priority.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2655. Secret; Priority. Repeated to the Department for information as Dulte 1 from New York, which is the source text. Secretary Dulles was in New York for meetings with the British and French Foreign Ministers in preparation for the four-power Foreign Ministers Conference to be held in Geneva in October and November.↩
-
Johnson commented in telegram 770 from Geneva, September 23, that he thought the meeting that morning had been very useful in bringing home the depth of U.S. dissatisfaction with PRC implementation of the agreed announcement but that it would not be possible to keep the talks solely on that note. He further commented:
“Question is what we do if by time of next meeting there has been no additional performance on their part. Believe that some sort additional reply to his statement today on higher level meeting and line in paras 6 and 8 Deptel 745 [Document 58] would with some difficulty carry me though next meeting or two but problem will be where we go from there. With our having already rejected one of his two items and we apparently having only two items there is not going to be much scope for an agenda argument. It would, under these circumstances seem to me to be our best tactic to attempt to focus on a substantive exchange on ‘no force’ for as long as we could keeping their item of trade embargo on ice for as long as we could.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/9–2355)
↩ - McConaughy wrote to Johnson in letter No. 16, September 30, “You will not be surprised to learn that the President’s illness has given the continuation of these talks added importance in the eyes of the Secretary.” (Ibid., Geneva Talks Files: Lot 72 D 415, Geneva—Correspondence Re US–PRC, 1955–1956) President Eisenhower suffered a heart attack on September 24; he was hospitalized until November 11.↩
- Telegram 66, repeated to the Department as telegram 653 from Hong Kong, September 23, stated that the Americans who had left China through Hong Kong since September 10 knew little or nothing about the agreed announcement. (Ibid., Central Files, 293.1111/9–2355)↩
- The statement concerning unaccounted-for U.S. military personnel was sent to Johnson in telegram 790 to Geneva, September 27, but Dulte 3 from New York of the same date instructed him not to use the statement, which would require further consideration and consultation with the Department of Defense. (Both Ibid., 611.93/9–2755)↩
- See infra.↩