Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

57. Telegram From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Formosa (Smythe) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump)¹

Taipei, September 18, 1955—1:30 p.m.

180530Z. Cite MG 9074 for Adm Stump signed Smythe. As a result of conf with highest echelons of MND on 17 Sep the Gimo ordered additional troops to reinforce Matsu garrison as follows: 611 FA Bn (105–M2), 1 inf bn from 57 Div. Apparent basis is that the Gimo expects an attack against Matsu during period 27 Sep to 15 Oct. This order is contrary to the MAAG position as expressed in CHMAAG msg MG 8043 DTG 220216Z June² and made abundantly clear to the ChiNats many times in the past and in my letter to MND dtd 16 Sep 55, summarizing my position as follows: “Since these plans (movement) are not in harmony with MAAG advice nor consistant with our previous discussion on the matter, I feel it necessary that I restate the MAAG position, which is:

A. The off-shore island areas now have a disproportionately large share of GRC forces.

B. The logistical aspects of supporting the off-shore islands have reached a critical stage.

C. More units to the off-shore islands increase the requirements for class 1, 2, 3 and 4 and a resultant greater difficulty in meeting class 5 requirements. This could conceivably result in a lower combat effectiveness with more men.

D. The actual physical space available for units in Matsu area is becoming limited.

E. The overall training program of GRC forces is impeded with each additional unit which is sent to off-shore islands.

F. The important rotation program for units on off-shore islands is not being implemented because of logistical limitations.

G. It is believed that both Matsu and Kinmen garrisons have reached such strength that further increases multiply the support problems out of proportion to any resultant increase in combat effectiveness.

H. Exception: units approved and programmed specifically for the off-shore islands, such as the 155 gun batteries should be sent out according to plan.

I must re-emphasize that I feel that further augmentation of the Kinmen and Matsu garrisons is not in the best interest of mutual defense program. There is another aspect of unit assignment to the offshore islands which requires comment. MND frequently orders the movement of MDAP supported units without any coordination with MAAG. This practice makes smooth, harmonious relationships between MND and MAAG difficult which in turn reduces the general effectiveness of our Sino-American team.”

At present, considering this move of no great overall importance, I do not wish to make a further issue of the matter other than to register a strong protest, thus gaining a bargaining point for future use.³

1. Source: JCS Records, CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) Sec. 29. Top Secret; Priority.
2. Not found in Department of State files.
3. Telegram 200137Z from CINCPAC to Chief MAAG, Formosa, September 19, approved Smythe’s proposal to render a protest, cautioning that this should be done in a manner “so as not to widen gap of understanding, harmony and cooperation between US and GRC authorities.” (JCS Records, CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48) Sec. 29) Telegram 200136Z from CINCPAC to CNO, September 19, stated that although the Communists had the capability for an attack on Matsu, there were no increased indications of such an attack. It noted that CINCPAC had approved Smythe’s proposal for a protest but recommended that the matter not be carried further, noting that the intended reinforcement was not large and could be absorbed within the existing defense structure, that a shift of this magnitude would not decrease the defensibility of Taiwan, and that the major factor against further reinforcement of the offshore islands was the increased logistic support problem. (Ibid.)