Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

51. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 9, 1955¹

Washington, September 9, 1955

SUBJECT

• Possible Belgian Recognition of Chinese Communist Regime.

PARTICIPANTS

• Baron Silvercruys, Ambassador of Belgium
• Mr. Muller, Second Secretary, Belgian Embassy
• Mr. Hoover—Acting Secretary of State
• Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
• UNP—Mr. Bond
• WE—Mr. Dennis

The Acting Secretary told the Ambassador that we were deeply concerned over the prospect of Belgian recognition of Communist China and that in the absence of the U.S. Ambassador in Brussels we had wired our Chargé d’Affaires to express this concern to the Belgian government. Mr. Hoover then read to the Ambassador the substance of the telegram (Department’s 276 of September 3, 1955).² He went on to say that he wished to express as earnestly as he could the U.S. concern over this situation. He particularly emphasized that, over the last year, the people of the U.S. have come to have increasingly strong feelings regarding Communist China. The U.S. Congress has gone on record virtually unanimously against this admission to the UN.³ He is very concerned that, were Belgium to recognize the Peiping regime, there would be a strong public reaction in this country which might jeopardize the traditionally cordial relations between our two nations.

Mr. Robertson remarked that such an action could not come at a worse time. He referred more particularly to negotiations which are proceeding at the present time for the release of American civilians who are still being held by the Chinese Communists. If the latter should now receive further recognition, these negotiations would be imperiled. There is no evidence that Communist China has given up her long-term objectives or would change her tactics except through force and pressure of public opinion. The Chinese Communists continue to violate their international agreements. They now have at least seven hundred thousand troops in North Korea and the buildup continues. An analogous situation is found in Indochina.

Mr. Hoover remarked that we do not, of course, expect an answer from Baron Silvercruys at this moment regarding his Government’s final position. The Ambassador replied that this conversation would be faithfully reported. Naturally, any reply on this matter must come from the Belgian Foreign Affairs Minister and he could not presume to speak for Mr. Spaak. Speaking personally, however, he would like to note the following points.

1. What he thinks is in Mr. Spaak’s mind is that, as the years go by, one is impressed by the fact that in Peiping there is a group which firmly controls the Chinese mainland. The probabilities are that this regime will continue to assert effective control over that area.

2. To be sure, the administration of the area is a cruel one, and some doubt may be expressed about the allegiance of some of the people, but all indications are that sovereignty is exercised to the fullest extent to which a government is able and that we must admit it.

3. The people of China, it is true, are not well informed but the fact is that the group in Peiping represents that mass of people and at Geneva has participated in the settlement of matters at the highest level, even of matters outside Communist China.

4. Communist China is dealing at Geneva on the ambassadorial level with the U.S. not only on matters dealing with prisoners but with other subjects.

Therefore, Communist China today is dealing with many other nations as a full-fledged power. Not only is considerable Belgian capital invested in China but the Communist regime is holding a number of Belgian businessmen as hostages. Belgium must cope with this situation. This must have been a fundamental preoccupation of the Foreign Minister when he broached the matter with the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Brussels. Mr. Spaak might have broached the matter in quite another way, such as in a public speech, but the Ambassador was glad he took the direct approach when he went to Mr. Sprouse because, between friends, you can always adjust differences. Mr. Spaak had not rushed into the matter. It might be compared to Secretary Dulles’ action in giving NATO the benefit of his thoughts before public declarations. Of course, Mr. Spaak may not have had all information that is available regarding the aggressive intentions of Peiping, but there is a certain amount of tranquility which now prevails along the Formosa Strait, in Korea and along the borders of China. Today the Chinese regime is not relying on force. Thus it was that Mr. Spaak wanted the Department to realize how his trend of thought was running. Mr. Spaak will be in New York on the 21st of September and Baron Silvercruys doubts that anything will happen before that date. He also promised that he would send on to Brussels a careful account of Mr. Hoover’s and Mr. Robertson’s remarks.

Mr. Hoover said that he deeply appreciated Mr. Spaak’s approaching us and added that the U.S. looks at this matter differently from Belgium, due to our geographic situation. We are contiguous with the Orient and, therefore, in dealing with China, we are dealing with a neighbor. Mr. Robertson stated that we feel that the admission of Communist China into the UN hangs upon its fulfillment of its international obligations. If there seems to be a tranquil situation today, this is due largely to Communist China’s realization of the attitude which the civilized world takes. We feel that any acceptance of Communist China’s past actions would lead to further aggression on its part.

Mr. Robertson also expressed concern over any effort to lift the UN finding of aggression against Communist China. In forming the UN the members agreed to renounce force as a means of seeking their ends. Communist China has not budged an iota on the use of force. After the aggression in Korea and Indochina, what has suddenly happened to qualify it for membership in the UN? It isn’t a question of who is in territorial possession as regards the UN seat. The U.S. is united politically against letting Communist China into the UN. The Ambassador replied that Mr. Spaak is keenly alive to the 1951 resolution labeling Communist China as an aggressor four years ago,⁴ but now there is a certain amount of tranquility.

Mr. Robertson noted that we had to negotiate with the Chinese Communists at Geneva as they were the ones who committed the aggression. This implied no recognition; if a gangster takes my child, I have to negotiate with the gangster. Recognition by Britain of Communist China did not help the British get their properties in China back again.

Mr. Hoover emphasized his concern over U.S. public opinion and his wish to avoid misunderstanding in the public mind. Mr. Robertson again commented that the timing now is especially bad. The Ambassador asked what would be the conditions under which recognition could be contemplated. Would Communist China have to give up all recourse to force? Mr. Robertson said we think they wish to control all of the Far East. We think if the Chinese Communists are suddenly accepted, all the Southeast Asian countries would be sucked into the Chinese orbit and this would be a threat to the whole free world. The Peiping regime Communists are Communists first and Chinese second, the most fanatical Communists in the world.

It was agreed that since Mr. Spaak would arrive in New York on the 21st for the opening of the UN, perhaps he and Secretary Dulles could discuss this matter further at that time.⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.02/9–955. Secret. Drafted by Dennis and initialed by Hoover, indicating his approval.
2. The telegram under reference was prompted by telegram 223 from Brussels, September 1, which reported that Foreign Minister Spaak called in Chargé Philip D. Sprouse that morning to tell him that after careful consideration and discussion with the Prime Minister and his colleagues, he had concluded that the “time had come” for recognition. (Ibid., 793.02/9–255 and 793.02/9–155, respectively)
3. Most recently, in an amendment to the mutual security bill adopted by the House of Representatives on June 30, by a vote of 221 to 0. For text, see Section 12 of the Mutual Security Act of 1955 (approved July 8; 69 Stat. 283).
4. For text of Resolution 498(V), adopted by the General Assembly on February 1, 1951, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vii, Part 1, p. 150.
5. No record of any discussion of this subject by Spaak and Dulles in New York has been found in Department of State files. Sprouse reported in telegram 260 from Brussels, September 12, that Spaak had apparently given up the idea of recognition for the time being because of the U.S. reaction. (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/9–1255)